Day 44: Islamabad collapses: 10 days to expiry

Iran tabled a 10-point plan at Islamabad listing "acceptance of enrichment" as non-negotiable. The United States tabled a 15-point plan demanding a zero nuclear weapons commitment, removal of Iran's HEU stockpile from the country, limits on defence capabilities, and unconditional Hormuz reopening. Donald Trump posted that "there will be no enrichment of Uranium" ; Iran's plan explicitly claims the right to it.

Sanam Vakil, Chatham House's Middle East and North Africa director, assessed that Iran is "unlikely" to surrender its HEU stockpile and that downblending to lower enrichment levels is the realistic floor for any deal. Iran's Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi had publicly offered downblending on CBS in March, but Islamabad's US demands went further: full removal of the material from Iranian territory.

The last verified stockpile figure is 440.9 kg of uranium enriched to 60%, recorded by the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) in September 2025, before the strikes. At 60% purity, that quantity requires relatively modest further enrichment to reach weapons-grade; the IAEA defines a "significant quantity" for a single device at 25 kg of 90%-enriched uranium. Since the Majlis voted 221-0 to suspend all IAEA cooperation on 3 April , no independent verification has been possible.

The Arms Control Association assessed in March that US negotiators were "ill-prepared for serious nuclear negotiations." The JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) took 20 months of structured talks with continuous IAEA access to bridge a comparable enrichment gap. Islamabad attempted the same in two days, without inspectors.

CENTCOM (US Central Command) announced on 11 April that USS Frank E. Petersen Jr. and USS Michael Murphy transited the Strait of Hormuz as part of a mine clearance mission. The operation was launched while Day 1 of the Islamabad talks was still under way. Trump framed it as "a favour to countries all over the world, including China, Japan, South Korea, France, Germany."

The IRGC Navy denied the ships had entered the strait at all, a direct contradiction of CENTCOM's own press release. Its statement went further: "Any attempt by military vessels to pass through the Strait of Hormuz will be dealt with severely." The denial is notable because CENTCOM published the ships' names and mission profile; either the IRGC did not detect the transit or chose to deny it publicly while responding through other channels.

The operation is consistent with reporting that Iran deployed at least a dozen naval mines (Maham-3 moored and Maham-7 seabed limpet models) without systematically tracking every placement . Iran's inability to locate all its own mines created the operational rationale: the US framed clearance as a global service, not an act of aggression.

The timing carries its own message. Sending warships through a mined strait while your vice president is negotiating in a hotel 2,400 km away is not an accident. It sets a parallel track: diplomacy in Islamabad, military facts on the water. If the IRGC follows through on its threat, the confrontation would collapse the ceasefire window entirely.

The IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) stated that mines remain in the Strait of Hormuz and that the waterway "will never return to its previous status." Commercial traffic sits at roughly 8.0% of the pre-war daily baseline: Kpler data shows 5 to 11 transits per day against a pre-war norm of 120 to 140 .

More than 600 vessels, including 325 oil tankers, remain stranded inside the Gulf, according to Lloyd's List Intelligence. Iran is vetting each vessel individually before granting passage, a process that analysts expect will cap throughput at 10 to 15 ships per day even if the vetting posture loosens. At that rate, clearing the backlog alone would take weeks.

The IRGC's language is worth parsing carefully. "Will never return" is not a negotiating position; it is a declaration of a new permanent status. It aligns with Iran's Islamabad proposal, which sought to impose fees on every vessel passing through the strait, reportedly $1 to $2 million per ship. If formalised, that would create a precedent for every maritime chokepoint globally.

For consumers, the blockade's persistence translates directly. Roughly 20 million barrels per day of oil that normally passes through Hormuz is absent from global supply. Oxford Economics projects that disruption will cut world GDP growth by 1.2 percentage points in 2026. That cost is accumulating daily while the strait stays effectively closed.

Qatar confirmed on 11 April that $6 billion in frozen Iranian assets remain frozen and any release requires US Treasury Department approval, which has not been granted. Iran had entered the Islamabad talks claiming the US had already agreed to release these funds.

The money traces back to the 2023 prisoner-swap deal and was frozen again under sanctions renewed by Trump in March . It was originally earmarked for Iranian humanitarian imports, food and medicine purchases that sanctions otherwise block. Subsequent US sanctions froze it again. Iran's parliament speaker framed the release as settled, not a subject for negotiation. Qatar's correction on 11 April flatly contradicted that position.

The gap between Iran's characterisation ("agreed") and Qatar's statement ("pending Treasury approval, not granted") is instructive. It suggests the asset claim served as domestic political framing rather than an operational negotiating position. The $6 billion was a bargaining chip pointed inward, not outward: it told the Iranian public that sanctions relief was already won before talks began.

Releasing the funds would ease domestic pressure on the Iranian government without touching the nuclear or military files. That is precisely why neither side moved on it. For Washington, releasing $6 billion before Iran agreed to any nuclear concession would collapse domestic support for the talks. For Tehran, claiming the release was already agreed gave parliament speaker Ghalibaf cover to present Islamabad as a position of strength, not supplication. The money never moved. Vance left without the matter resolved.

As the Islamabad talks concluded on 12 April, IDF (Israel Defense Forces) strikes killed 18 people in southern Lebanon, 13 of them in the village of Tefayta. The strikes continued a pattern that began on ceasefire day itself: on 7 April, hours after the Iran ceasefire was announced, Israel struck more than 100 targets across Lebanon, killing at least 303 people and wounding over 1,150.

Benjamin Netanyahu declared the ceasefire "does not bind Israel in Lebanon." Trump supported that position. The 98th Division deployed into southern Lebanon during the ceasefire window, joining four divisions already operating there: the 36th, 91st, 146th, and 162nd . Five IDF divisions are now active in a country that is not formally part of any ceasefire agreement.

Iran formally accused the US of ceasefire violations and warned that its allies are "an inseparable part" of the ceasefire, with violations carrying "explicit costs and strong responses." Hezbollah had fired a missile at Tel Aviv days earlier, triggering air-raid sirens across three Israeli cities; it was intercepted . Iran listed Lebanon as a precondition at Islamabad. It was not resolved.

Lebanon has no seat at the negotiations, no ceasefire of its own, and no voice in the terms. It is the active front in a war whose ceasefire explicitly excludes it. Beirut bears the cost of strikes that Iran cites as violations. For Lebanese civilians, the ceasefire is something that happened to other people.

Iran's Foreign Ministry stated after the talks that "the two sides agreed on a number of points" without specifying which. Its spokesperson added: "Diplomacy never comes to an end." The language was conciliatory, leaving the door open to further rounds.

Fars News Agency, which is close to the IRGC, ran a harder line: "Iran is in no hurry, and until the US agrees to a reasonable deal, there will be no change in the status of the Strait of Hormuz." Iranian state television described the session as "the third round of negotiations," a framing that implies two prior sessions were held without being publicly acknowledged.

The two messages serve different audiences. The Foreign Ministry's tone is aimed outward, at Pakistan, the EU, and other mediators who need a signal that further talks are possible. Fars News speaks inward and to the IRGC's own constituency: the strait stays closed, Iran holds the leverage, there is no urgency. Parliament speaker Ghalibaf had already codified three ceasefire violations and two preconditions before arriving in Islamabad , setting the rhetorical floor below which no Iranian official can go without facing domestic blowback.

The "third round" claim is the most interesting detail. If two prior rounds occurred before the 11 April public opening at the Serena Hotel, they were conducted without any non-Iranian source reporting them. That would mean the Islamabad format had been tested in secret before it was unveiled, and it still failed.

The European Union rejected Donald Trump's suggestion of a US-Iran "joint venture" on Hormuz toll collection. Under UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea), which applies as customary international law to non-signatories including both Iran and the United States, ships enjoy transit passage that "shall not be impeded" and fees may only be charged for specific services rendered, not by reason of passage alone.

No post-1945 precedent exists for a coastal state imposing mandatory tolls on a natural international strait. Just Security assessed Iran's blanket selective toll as a "clear violation" of international norms. Iran's Islamabad proposal included a fee structure tied to vessel passage, as detailed in the Hormuz traffic event above.

Trump had previously called the toll concept "a beautiful thing." That language sits uncomfortably alongside the US's historical role as guarantor of freedom of navigation. The EU's rejection is a legal rebuke, but it has no operational teeth: Russia and China co-vetoed the UNSC Hormuz reopening resolution 11-2 , blocking the only multilateral enforcement route for free navigation.

If tolls are formalised, the precedent extends far beyond Hormuz. Turkey could apply the same logic to the Bosphorus, Egypt could renegotiate Suez terms, Indonesia and Malaysia could toll the strait of Malacca. The EU's objection is not about Iran alone; it is about preventing the rewrite of a maritime order that underpins European trade.

OFAC (Office of Foreign Assets Control) General License U, which authorises the sale and delivery of Iranian-origin crude oil loaded before 20 March, expires on 19 April. No renewal, extension, or replacement licence has been issued as of 12 April. Seven days remain.

OFAC has not published a single Iran-related action since 20 March, 23 days of silence during an active war. It amended general licences for Russia and Venezuela in the same window, making the Iran silence conspicuous.

The licence's scope is narrow. It covers crude and petroleum products loaded on vessels on or before 20 March. It does not authorise new purchases, new loadings, or any transaction after its expiry. The oil tankers stranded in the Gulf are already in legal limbo; GL-U expiry would recriminalise any remaining deliveries.

GL-U expires three days before the ceasefire's own expiry around 22 April, creating back-to-back deadlines. A renewal would signal US willingness to keep a back-channel open despite the talks breakdown. Non-renewal would be read in Tehran as confirmation that the US is tightening pressure rather than extending space. Neither outcome has been signalled, which in itself is a signal: the administration has not decided, or has decided not to show its hand.

Brent Crude traded between $95.20 and $96.69 on 11-12 April, essentially flat from the prior update's $96.39 . The post-ceasefire drop to $92 proved temporary; Brent has since recovered and settled into a narrow band above $95.

The flat range tells a story. Markets are not pricing in a clean resolution. They are not pricing in a return to conflict either. They are pricing a structural stalemate: the Hormuz strait stays mostly closed, supply stays constrained, and nobody knows what happens when the ceasefire expires.

Oxford Economics projects world GDP growth at 1.4% in 2026 if the conflict persists, down from a 2.6% baseline. War risk insurance premiums remain four to five times pre-war levels. Commercial vessels rerouting via the Cape of Good Hope add 10 to 20 days per voyage, and US importer freight rates have risen by up to 50%.

Most equity markets have not yet priced in a sustained conflict scenario, which means the current oil price may be an underestimate of the economic shock if the ceasefire collapses without a replacement framework. Brent peaked sharply higher before the ceasefire was announced; a return to those levels would sharpen the GDP drag considerably.

Pakistan's Deputy Prime Minister Ishaq Dar confirmed on 12 April that Islamabad will continue mediating between the US and Iran despite the talks producing no agreement. Dar stated: "Islamabad has been and will continue" as mediator. Iran's Foreign Ministry signalled willingness to continue but proposed no date.

Pakistan hosted the talks by invoking the precedent of the 1988 Geneva Accords, when it hosted proximity negotiations between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan. Pakistani officials logged more than 25 high-level contacts in the days preceding the talks to arrange the format. Sessions shifted from proximity to direct, with Pakistani officials mediating in the room.

Vance's departure leaves Pakistan as the only state with an active claim to the mediator role. Oman, which facilitated earlier indirect channels, has not publicly offered to host a next round. Egypt relayed a truce offer in early April but has not been part of the Islamabad format. Pakistan now has roughly 10 days to produce a follow-up session before the ceasefire expires around 22 April.

Pakistan's neutrality took damage during the talks themselves. Defence Minister Khawaja Asif posted anti-Israel content on social media during the opening session , an unforced error that compromised the host country's image of impartiality. Whether that incident weakens Islamabad's standing as a future venue remains to be seen.

The Soufan Center reported on 9 April that Mojtaba Khamenei, Iran's Supreme Leader since March 2026, is reportedly unconscious and unable to participate in decision-making, citing US and Israeli intelligence. The claim cannot be independently verified and relies on a single source category.

Khamenei publicly authorised the ceasefire after 34 days of decisional silence . His is the constitutional authority under Iran's system: The Supreme Leader commands the armed forces, approves major foreign policy decisions, and cannot delegate that role to another official. The SNSC (Supreme National Security Council) accepted the ceasefire , but the Council acts under The Supreme Leader's authority, not independently of it.

The incapacitation claim carries specific operational consequences. If Khamenei cannot govern, the IRGC's 31 separate commands operate under the "mosaic defence architecture" without a single point of authority above them. Individual commanders can interpret ceasefire terms differently, refuse compliance without centralised countermanding, or escalate without authorisation from the top. The Soufan Center assessed the ceasefire as "hovering on the verge of collapse" in the same report.

A caveat is necessary. US and Israeli intelligence have a direct interest in destabilising Iranian decision-making structures. The claim may be accurate, partially accurate, or planted. It appeared in a single analytical outlet rather than being confirmed by multiple independent sources. Until corroborated, it belongs in the category of intelligence that shapes the environment without confirming a fact.