
National Security Council (Iran)
Iran's apex security body, now issuing official victory texts that contradict the US MOU terms.
Iran's Supreme National Security Council is the constitutional apex of state security, but on 29 May 2026 it published its own ten-point account of an unsigned US deal, directly contradicting Washington's text on uranium removal.
Last refreshed: 11 August 2026 · Appears in 2 active topics
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Iran's Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) is the constitutional apex of Iranian security decision-making, established under Article 176 of the 1989 revised constitution to replace the earlier Defence Council. It is chaired by the president and draws members from all three government branches, the military and the IRGC, but every binding decision requires the Supreme Leader's final ratification.
The secretariat has been vacant since Secretary Ali Larijani was killed in an Israeli strike on Tehran , and no successor has been named. Since April 2026 much of the council's practical authority has drained into the IRGC military council, which controls access to the Supreme Leader's office and directs operations outside civilian channels .
Despite that shift, foreign ministries, the IMF and the IAEA continue treating council statements as Iran's authoritative position, because the body answers directly to the Supreme Leader's office rather than to the Foreign Ministry. That makes its texts binding on Iran's formal position even when they contradict what civilian negotiators are simultaneously saying.
The council published a rival deal text
On 29 May 2026 the council called the unsigned war-ending memorandum a ten-point Iranian victory, with enrichment rights recognised; the US text published the same day demanded Iran's highly enriched uranium be removed first . Because the council answers to the Supreme Leader's office rather than the Foreign Ministry, the text cannot be quietly withdrawn.
Trump hand-edited the US draft on 31 May to demand physical destruction of the 60%-enriched stockpile rather than blend-down, a gap neither side had closed before talks were suspended. Two incompatible official versions of the same accord now exist, and Pakistan, as mediator, must find wording both can sign.
The council codified a Hormuz toll regime
The council finalised a formal Hormuz security plan on 13 May 2026, codifying the Persian Gulf Strait Authority's transit toll and corridor system, and separately barred US weapons from transiting the strait into regional bases . It followed a similar pattern two weeks earlier, approving a limited internet restoration scheme, Internet Pro, for select businesses and academics on 28 April after 1,416 hours of blackout.
Both moves show the council still issuing binding domestic and maritime policy even as operational command has drained elsewhere; the toll plan gave legislative and security cover to a system the military had already been running on the water since 6 May.
The council called the pause a defeat
At 23:30 Tehran time on 7 April 2026 the council published its acceptance of the Ceasefire pause, describing it as an "undeniable, historical, and crushing defeat" for the United States and crediting the decision to the Supreme Leader's office rather than to negotiators .
The maximalist framing Left Iran's own negotiators almost no room: any later compromise that looked like a concession would contradict the council's own official account of victory, a bind the council itself built rather than inherited.