Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)

When US-Israeli strikes began on 28 February 2026, the IRGC activated a pre-planned Decentralised Mosaic Defence, devolving launch authority to 31 autonomous provincial units to prevent command decapitation. It sustained 70+ waves of Operation True Promise 4 through late March despite losing its Navy Commander Admiral Tangsiri, intelligence chief Behnam Rezaei, and Ground Forces chief Mohammad Pakpour to Israeli strikes in a single week. By 12 April it declared the Strait of Hormuz would "never return to its previous status" and began operating a customs authority charging $1 per barrel in yuan or stablecoins. Major General Ahmad Vahidi consolidated control of both Iran's military posture and its negotiating delegation by 22 April, sidelining Foreign Minister Araghchi: the corps reversed the ministry's Hormuz reopening announcement within hours, then seized three vessels the following week.

The IRGC's wartime trajectory continued through late May and into June. On 25 May 2026, CENTCOM struck two IRGC mine-laying boats and a SAM site at Bandar Abbas; the IRGC responded the next day by claiming it had shot down a US MQ-9 Reaper drone over the Persian Gulf and fired on an F-35 and an RQ-4. CENTCOM issued no confirmation. On 27 May, IRGC adviser Ali Shamkhani called Trump's demands over Iran's nuclear programme a "fantasy", publicly contradicting Foreign Minister Araghchi's concurrent Doha negotiations. On 7 June 2026, the corps fired at least 10 Ballistic Missiles at Ramat David Airbase in northern Israel, its first direct salvo onto Israeli soil in this phase, framed by Mohsen Rezaei as a warning; all were intercepted and no casualties reported. The same day, an Iranian parliamentarian publicly confirmed the IRGC charges $1.5-2 million per ship for Strait of Hormuz transit, collected in barter goods and cryptocurrency as a dollar-sanctions bypass. The corps simultaneously conducted a domestic counter-insurgency raid in Saravan, Sistan-Baluchistan, killing four anti-government fighters and seizing Starlink satellite terminals, signalling its awareness of satellite communications as an opposition coordination tool. On 25 June 2026, the IRGC Navy declared the new Oman-IMO Strait of Hormuz corridor "unacceptable and dangerous", ordering every vessel to coordinate with the IRGC on VHF Channel 16 or face "enforcement measures". South Korean vessels cleared the strait the same day without complying, escalating its claim to govern Hormuz transit into a three-way contest between the IRGC mandate, the Oman/IMO toll-free corridor, and the GCC/US zero-tolls position. That contest turned kinetic on 25 June when an IRGC drone struck the Singapore-flagged container ship M/V Ever Lovely inside the Oman-IMO corridor; tanker Kiku was hit two days later. The IRGC claimed counter-strikes on US bases (unverified). On 26 June, CENTCOM struck IRGC missile and drone storage on Qeshm Island and a coastal radar near Sirik, the first US kinetic strike on Iranian soil since the 16 June Islamabad MOU. With Khamenei communicating only through couriered handwritten notes, the IRGC remains the only functioning decision-making authority in Iran.

On 12 July 2026, the IRGC Navy struck the Cyprus-flagged container ship GFS Galaxy in the strait, then declared Hormuz "closed until further notice"; one of the vessel's eleven Indian crew was reported missing. The declaration turned the corps' long-running claim to govern Hormuz transit, from the April "never return to its previous status" pledge through the VHF Channel 16 mandate and the Ever Lovely and Kiku strikes, into an outright closure order backed by force. CENTCOM answered within hours with its third strike wave of the week, roughly 140 targets including IRGC fast-attack boats, and insisted the strait remained open to lawful traffic.

Founded in May 1979 to protect Iran's revolutionary system, the IRGC expanded over four decades from ideological guardian to economic empire, controlling an estimated 10-20% of Iran's GDP through construction, energy, and banking conglomerates. Its Quds Force ran proxy networks across Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and Gaza; its Basij paramilitary controlled domestic dissent. The corps is formally under the Supreme Leader, but in practice operates with growing autonomy from Iran's elected institutions.