Iraq negotiated bilateral Hormuz passage for a Very Large Crude Carrier of approximately 2 million barrels in mid-May and was in talks for additional tankers, while Pakistan secured transit for two Qatari LNG vessels through a Pakistan-Iran agreement, according to OilPrice.com reporting with Windward vessel-tracking corroboration1. Neither Iraq nor Pakistan paid the Persian Gulf Strait Authority yuan tolls directly; Tehran accepted political engagement in lieu of yuan.
Returning from the BRICS foreign ministers meeting in New Delhi where his travel had been announced four days earlier, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi told Mehr News Agency: 'the strait of Hormuz is open to friendly nations, and restrictions apply only to adversaries'2. The Mehr quotation is the doctrinal anchor; the Iraq and Pakistan operational deals are its implementation evidence. Araghchi's wording arrives alongside the 26-nation Western coalition paper, codifying Iran's counter-framework on the same chokepoint.
The bilateral track operationalises the Persian Gulf Strait Authority toll infrastructure established on 5 May and the $2m yuan per-ship toll Lloyd's List confirmed. Pakistan's status as the US-Iran MOU carrier gives Islamabad the diplomatic capital it spent on Qatari LNG passage, and China endorsed Pakistan's mediatory role on 13 May. The same Qatar that signed the 26-nation coalition paper received LNG through this bilateral track, an inconsistency Doha is paid to tolerate by both sides.
Counter-perspective: Western capitals will read the friendly-nations formulation as straightforward coercion of flag states; Tehran frames it as the legitimate exercise of littoral-state authority under UNCLOS Article 38(2), which permits coastal states to regulate transit passage in narrow conditions. The structural effect is identical either way: every flag state is now forced into a declared political position on Iran, making Hormuz a sorting mechanism rather than a freely-navigable strait.
