Windward
Israeli maritime AI company tracking AIS evasion, dark-fleet movements, and sanctions breaches at scale.
On 30 July, Windward found Bab el-Mandeb tanker crossings had fallen 39% since 20 July, showing how maritime risk had narrowed another vital oil route.
Last refreshed: 22 September 2026 · Appears in 4 active topics
Why does Windward's vessel data diverge from what governments claim about Hormuz?
Timeline for Windward
Recorded four outbound vessels going AIS-dark on 14 August
Iran Conflict 2026: Five ships crossed Hormuz in a dayMentioned in: One ship or five? Hormuz counts split
Iran Conflict 2026Assessed Bab el-Mandeb transit collapse to about 7.5 Saudi-linked tankers a day
European Oil Markets: Bab el-Mandeb thins to 7.5 tankers a dayMentioned in: Brent tops $100 as the reroute closes
Iran Conflict 2026Mentioned in: Houthis fire on the Saudi tanker Encelia
Iran Conflict 2026Background
Windward is an Israeli maritime intelligence company that tracks vessel movements, location-signal manipulation and sanctions-evasion patterns. Its work is useful where official claims about a SEA route or blockade conflict with observed traffic. On 15 April, its data recorded 117 dark-fleet vessels in The Gulf and 15 Hormuz transits, contradicting a US claim that Iran's sea trade had stopped completely.
Founded in 2011 by Ami Daniel and Matan Peled, Windward combines Automatic Identification System data with satellite imagery and behavioural analysis. It listed on London's AIM market in December 2021. Its practical significance lies in testing what vessels report about themselves against what their movements indicate.
That role is durable because shipping restrictions create incentives to hide routes, identities and cargoes. Windward documented 136 navigation-denial zones in The Gulf on 6 March, illustrating the limits of vessel signals alone during conflict.
Windward measures the Red Sea retreat
On 30 July, Windward reported that total Bab el-Mandeb crossings had fallen 22% since 20 July. Tanker transits fell 39%, while Saudi-flagged traffic nearly halved to an average of about 7.5 vessels a day. The figures made Windward's vessel data a measure of whether the route remained usable for commercial shipping.
The retreat followed the 22 July attack on the Saudi tanker Encelia, whose bow caught fire after Houthi missiles and drones struck it. For Windward, the episode extended its role beyond counting ships: its data showed the commercial effect of violence after insurers and operators reassessed the route.
Windward exposes tanker location fraud
On 4 July, Windward identified a US-sanctioned, Guyana-flagged tanker broadcasting a false anchor-swing track while loading Iranian crude near Kharg Island. Its analysts found the deception by comparing satellite imagery with the vessel's Automatic Identification System signal, rather than trusting the broadcast location.
The finding showed why Windward's work matters to sanctions enforcement. On 12 April, it had also documented active tankers using the identities of scrapped ships in Hormuz, where 14 State Department-sanctioned shadow-fleet vessels were tracked. Each case turns a ship's public signal into evidence that must be tested against other sources.
It caught a tanker faking anchor
How does Iran's dark fleet evade sanctions in the Strait of Hormuz?
How are sanctioned tankers getting through the Hormuz blockade?
Reference
Why does Windward say the Strait of Hormuz is not really open?
How does Windward's data differ from official US government claims about Hormuz?
Who supplied the evidence behind the EU's 2026 shadow fleet sanctions?
What has Windward found about Hormuz traffic during the 2026 conflict?
Did Windward find evidence the Strait of Hormuz was really closed?
How much AIS spoofing is happening in the Persian Gulf?
