OFAC designated a ten-node procurement network on Tuesday 29 September 2026, five individuals and five entities, under its proliferation authorities1. Treasury places KavoshCom Asia R and D Group of Tehran at the centre and ties it to Iran's Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics. Three of the entities share the Cavalier Dynamics name and are separately incorporated in Riyadh, Islamabad and Istanbul; a fourth, EC Mojo Technology Co Limited, sits in Hong Kong2.
Treasury named what the network bought and for whom. Electronics and connectors went to Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industrial Company (HESA, its usual name in the arms trade), which builds uncrewed aircraft, Treasury says. More went to Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group, which Treasury identifies as responsible for solid-fuelled ballistic missile development3. Treasury describes Seyyed Asghar Alizadeh Tabatabai as the defence ministry's representative in Beijing, buying finished weapons systems and dual-use components inside China, and names Waseem Pasha Tajammal of Rawalpindi as the Cavalier group's chairman4. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said Treasury would continue to identify and isolate the Iranian government's enablers5.
Enforcement against the designated companies in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey is not a question for Tehran. It is a question for Riyadh, Islamabad and Ankara, none of which has published a response, and the designation asserts a supply line rather than complicity by any of the three governments. Iran can replace imported electronics for a drone line faster than it can replace the chemistry behind a solid-fuel motor. Naming Shahid Bakeri as a buyer in late 2026 says which programme still depends on imports.
The US State Department ran its own designation the same day, eight entities and five individuals under the order covering Iran's conventional arms, Executive Order 13949, while Treasury listed its targets under Executive Order 13382, which covers weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems6. The two carry different triggers and different routes off the list. State also posted up to $15m through Rewards for Justice, the programme that pays informants, for information disrupting the IRGC's financial machinery rather than for any individual7. In the same statement it said it has supplied updated identifying details for Iranian entries on the United Nations Consolidated Sanctions List, which the Security Council has been unable to implement8. No panel has ever been appointed to keep those entries accurate: the Security Council has not elected a chair for the committee that would appoint one, eight candidates put forward by the Secretariat were rejected in April 2026, and Russia and China then blocked renewal of the mandate that would have authorised the work on 17 September, which expired on 26 September. The entries decay fastest for the states that screen against the UN record rather than the American one.
