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Iran Conflict 2026
23JUL

Seven Ships Cross Hormuz, No Oil Tankers

3 min read
19:27UTC

IRGC / Lloyd's List Intelligence

ConflictDeveloping
Key takeaway

Seven ships in 24 hours is a checkpoint, not a reopening.

Seven ships transited the Strait of Hormuz on ceasefire Day 3. None were oil tankers. 325 oil tankers and more than 600 vessels remain stranded inside the Persian Gulf. Iran's toll system had reached 20 transits per day before the ceasefire ; seven is a regression, not a recovery. The pre-war baseline of 135 per day illustrates the distance to normalisation.

Iran's inspection and ban regime transforms the strait from an international waterway into a customs border. Ships linked to Israel are excluded; tolls are reportedly payable in cryptocurrency. The IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) mine charts published on 9 April direct all traffic through corridors near Larak Island under IRGC naval control. Oman formally refused the toll regime, citing international maritime treaty obligations, but Omani vessels still face the same inspection process.

ADNOC CEO Sultan Al Jaber put it plainly: "Passage is subject to permission, conditions and political leverage." Goldman Sachs issued revised scenarios: $82 per barrel base if Hormuz resumes this weekend, $100+ if closed another month, $120 severe. Every day without mine clearance normalises the toll regime that preceded the ceasefire .

Deep Analysis

In plain English

Before the war, about 135 ships passed through the Strait of Hormuz every day, carrying 20% of the world's oil. On Day 3 of the ceasefire that was supposed to reopen it, only seven ships passed and none were oil tankers. 325 tankers are sitting stuck inside the Gulf waiting. Iran is charging fees, banning some ships, and controlling who gets through. The UN tried to force the strait open; Russia and China blocked it.

Deep Analysis
Root Causes

Iran's closure of Hormuz reflects a shift from opportunistic disruption to structural leverage doctrine. The toll system represents a permanent claim to sovereign authority over an internationally recognised strait — the same claim it made unsuccessfully in the 1980s. The ceasefire has preserved the toll regime rather than ending it, which is Iran's primary economic gain from the war regardless of nuclear outcome.

China and Russia's UNSC veto removes multilateral enforcement. Without that mechanism, Hormuz reopening requires either a bilateral US-Iran deal that explicitly addresses the toll regime, or unilateral US naval action. The Trump administration has so far declined both.

What could happen next?
  • Consequence

    Every day without mine clearance normalises Iranian toll authority over an internationally recognised strait, making restoration of UNCLOS freedom of navigation progressively harder to claim without confrontation.

    Short term · Assessed
  • Risk

    GL-U expiry on 19 April would recriminalise 325 stranded tankers' cargo before the ceasefire even ends, forcing operators to choose between legal jeopardy and abandoning cargo.

    Immediate · Assessed
  • Consequence

    China's tankers already transit under the toll regime; its UNSC veto locks in a competitive advantage over Japanese, South Korean, and European shippers for as long as the regime persists.

    Medium term · Assessed
First Reported In

Update #64 · Islamabad talks open already cracked

Iran International· 10 Apr 2026
Read original
Different Perspectives
India
India
India buys more Saudi crude than any other country and has 2.5 million nationals working in the kingdom, so a $100 Brent and a live strike on Saudi tankers reach New Delhi through both fuel bills and remittance risk. Neither channel has an alternative route the way Saudi Arabia's own pipeline does.
Qatar
Qatar
Qatar co-authored the four-mediator ten-day ceasefire proposal alongside Egypt, Pakistan and Oman, centred on resuming Hormuz navigation, while separately pursuing its dated compensation claim against Iran at the UN Security Council filed on 21 July. Doha is mediating and litigating in the same week.
Israel
Israel
Israeli intelligence, reported by the Wall Street Journal, assesses Iran moved thousands of centrifuges and part of its roughly 440kg enriched-uranium stock into Pickaxe Mountain after the June 2025 strikes on its three main nuclear sites. Some of the US refuelling aircraft now deploying to the region are bound for Israeli bases and Ramon Airport.
Houthis
Houthis
Yahya Saree announced the missile and drone strikes on the Encelia and Layla on 22 July as enforcement of the embargo his forces had declared by radio warning alone two days earlier. Six vessels already turned back on the broadcast; the strike shows Houthi forces will use weapons once warnings stop working.
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia's state news agency confirmed only a fire on the Encelia's bow, with the crew safe; the Layla strike remains unconfirmed by Riyadh. The kingdom built its Petroline pipeline specifically to bypass Hormuz through the Red Sea, so the tanker fire lands on the route Riyadh had already spent billions escaping.
United States
United States
Washington is weighing both ten-day proposals but wants a longer truce than either offers, and moved F-16 and F-35 jets plus refuelling aircraft into the region while it decides. That deployment, not Trump's Pickaxe Mountain remarks, is the measurable US action, buying options for the day talks fail rather than betting on them.