3AUG

Bab el-Mandeb returns as second chokepoint

4 min read

10:16UTC

International Crisis Group's Yemen analyst Ahmed Nagi told PressTV Houthi forces are "very likely to escalate" in Bab el-Mandeb if the US blockade bites Iran. Brent has not priced a dual-chokepoint scenario.

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Key takeaway

A Bab el-Mandeb closure alongside Hormuz would cut 25% of seaborne energy supply and neutralise Saudi Arabia's pipeline backup.

Ahmed Nagi, senior Yemen analyst at the International Crisis Group, told PressTV that Houthi forces are "very likely to escalate in Bab el-Mandeb" if the US blockade begins to bite Iran ¹. A Yemeni military official quoted by the same outlet in late March called closure of the Red Sea strait "among the primary options" if escalation continued. Ali Akbar Velayati, a former Iranian foreign minister with continuing influence in the Iranian establishment, told PressTV that "the unified command of the Resistance front views Bab al-Mandeb as it does Hormuz".

Bab el-Mandeb is the narrow strait at the southern end of the Red Sea, between Yemen and Djibouti, that every Gulf-origin cargo bound for Europe via Suez must pass through. If it closes at the same time as Hormuz, the two closures together remove roughly 25% of global seaborne energy supply from market. Every Gulf-origin cargo bound for Europe or Asia then needs a Cape of Good Hope detour, 10 to 20 extra days at sea, with freight rates rising sharply before any insurance uplift. The scenario exceeds any case modelled in IEA emergency-release protocols.

Saudi Arabia's East-West pipeline, Petroline, was restored to its full 7 million barrels per day capacity as the contingency backup if Hormuz closed. Petroline bypasses Hormuz. It does not bypass Bab el-Mandeb. The pipeline ends at Yanbu on the Red Sea coast, and a Red Sea chokepoint closure eliminates that alternative routing entirely. The dual-chokepoint scenario is the one contingency the published Saudi infrastructure cannot resolve.

Markets already treat the Hormuz operation as a partial action rather than a full closure on the pullback. The dual-chokepoint scenario has not yet been re-priced into Brent at all. The caveat from Nagi matters: Houthi operational capacity in the Red Sea was degraded by the 2025 US campaign, and "very likely to escalate" from a senior analyst is not the same as confirmed operational readiness. The separate development that Hezbollah has received a new jet-powered Iranian loitering munition (see event 11) suggests the resupply network is still partially functional, which tilts the probability towards the Houthis having more than rhetoric to deploy.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

There are two narrow sea passages that most of the world's oil and gas must travel through. One is the Strait of Hormuz, between Iran and the Gulf states, which the US is currently blockading. The other is the Strait of Bab el-Mandeb, at the southern end of the Red Sea, between Yemen and Djibouti. The Houthi movement in Yemen, which fought a successful campaign against shipping in the Red Sea in 2023 and 2024, is now signalling it might close the second strait as well, if the US blockade starts hurting Iran. If both straits were closed at the same time, roughly a quarter of the world's energy supply would have no sea route. The Saudi pipeline that was restored as a backup route for Hormuz ends on the Red Sea coast, so it would be useless if Bab el-Mandeb were also blocked. Oil and gas prices for European and Asian buyers would rise sharply. The important caveat is that the Houthis' ability to actually close Bab el-Mandeb is uncertain after the US degraded their forces in 2025. The threat is real but the capability is unconfirmed.

What could happen next?

Risk
A dual-chokepoint closure would cut roughly 25% of global seaborne energy supply and eliminate Saudi Arabia's Petroline alternative routing, exceeding any scenario modelled in IEA emergency-release protocols.
Consequence
Current Brent crude pricing reflects partial Hormuz closure only; a credible Bab el-Mandeb threat materialising would trigger a repricing well above the blockade-day $103 peak.

Source Landscape

This story draws predominantly on Iran state media, with sources from Iran

Iran

Primary parallel: The 1987-88 Tanker War provides the only historical case of simultaneous Iranian pressure on both Gulf chokepoints. Iran mined Hormuz and threatened Bab el-Mandeb transit simultaneously, forcing the Reagan administration's Operation Earnest Will tanker escort programme.

The dual-pressure model was ultimately broken not by military force alone but by the US Navy's destruction of the Iranian frigate Sahand and the oil platforms that funded the mine-laying operation in April 1988's Operation Praying Mantis.

Counter-parallel: The 2023-24 Houthi Red Sea campaign demonstrated that sustained Bab el-Mandeb interdiction is feasible for a non-state actor operating with Iranian support, but also that the US-UK Joint Maritime Force degraded Houthi anti-ship missile capacity significantly over a 14-month campaign. The question is which of these two cases is more predictive: Praying Mantis (state actor broken by kinetic response) or 2023-24 (non-state actor degraded but not stopped).

The dual-chokepoint scenario removes approximately 25% of global seaborne energy supply simultaneously. Saudi Arabia's Petroline restoration to 7 million barrels per day is the only physical bypass for Hormuz, but the pipeline terminates at Yanbu on the Red Sea coast. Bab el-Mandeb closure eliminates that alternative entirely, meaning the full Saudi production capacity has no viable export route.

Cape of Good Hope re-routing adds 10 to 20 extra days per voyage, raising freight rates and insurance costs before any commodity price effect. European LNG import infrastructure has no overland alternative to seaborne routes through both straits. Brent Crude at $101.82 (13 April close) has not priced this scenario; the consensus price corridor assumes partial Hormuz closure only.

Consensus view: IISS Maritime Security Programme analysts assess that Houthi operational capacity in the Red Sea was meaningfully degraded by the US Red Sea campaign of early 2025, and that current Houthi rhetoric about closing Bab el-Mandeb is capability-aspirational rather than capability-confirmed. The phrase 'very likely to escalate' from International Crisis Group's Ahmed Nagi is an intent assessment, not a capability readiness certification.

Counter-view: Chatham House Gulf Initiative researchers argue the relevant variable is Iran's weapons resupply capacity, which appears more intact than Western defence ministries assessed after the Syrian route closed.

Hezbollah's confirmed operational use of a 2025-production Iranian drone (see event 11) suggests the resupply network has reconstituted via alternative pathways, which tilts the probability that Houthi stockpiles of anti-ship munitions are being refreshed on a similar timeline.

Key tension: Whether Houthi escalation in Bab el-Mandeb is constrained by the damage inflicted in the 2025 Red Sea campaign, or whether Iranian resupply has restored enough capability to make the dual-chokepoint scenario operationally plausible rather than merely rhetorical.

First Reported In

Update #68 · Sanctioned tankers slip the blockade

PressTV· 14 Apr 2026

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Causes and effects

Caused by

Saudi pipeline bypass restores 7 million bpd route

Saudi Arabia's restoration of Petroline to full capacity (ID:2288) bypasses Hormuz but terminates at Yanbu on the Red Sea, meaning Bab el-Mandeb closure would eliminate the only alternative routing for Gulf exports.

Occurred 12 Apr 2026

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Trump orders blockade on a tweet

Trump's blockade order (ID:2282) is the direct trigger cited by Houthi-aligned sources as the provocation for potential Bab el-Mandeb escalation.

Occurred 12 Apr 2026

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This Event

Bab el-Mandeb returns as second chokepoint

A second chokepoint closure would remove roughly a quarter of global seaborne energy supply at once, and the Saudi pipeline backup terminates on the Red Sea coast.

Led to

Riyadh asks Washington to end blockade

ICG analyst warning of Houthi Bab el-Mandeb closure on 13 April has been echoed by Riyadh itself, raising the warning to host-government level.

Occurred 14 Apr 2026

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Different Perspectives

Belarus

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European Union / Operation IRINI states

Italy, Greece and Poland boarded the sanctioned tanker Toa Payoh off Pantelleria under a standing EU mandate rather than a national decision, extending enforcement from the Channel and Baltic and the Black Sea and Azov into the Mediterranean. Italian Defence Minister Guido Crosetto praised the crew; the captain's refusal to produce documentation left detention unconfirmed.

Poland and the NATO eastern flank

Warsaw's Coordination Team said explicitly its forces tracked the 30 July missile incursion and were ready to shoot it down, then flew air cover for an EU tanker interdiction three days later. Poland is simultaneously the war's nearest spillover victim and a contributor to enforcing sanctions against the state causing that spillover.

Ukraine (government, defence establishment and civilians)

Kyiv runs its manpower crisis through acting Defence Minister Yevhen Khmara, whose formal appointment waits for parliament's 18 August return, and a fortnight-old Commander-in-Chief, Mykhailo Drapatyi. Reported attacks on enlistment officers rose from 5 cases in 2022 to 341 in 2025, reaching Odesa's Territorial Recruitment Centre staff directly on 2 August.

Kremlin and Russian domestic economic voices

Moscow has not addressed July's advance-rate collapse or Sberbank's OFZ warning; Novak's diary ran to OPEC+ quota diplomacy with no diesel item logged since 15 July. Economist Nikolai Korzhenevsky calls the Central Bank's RUB 2.3tn in bank lending effectively deficit monetisation, a framing Sberbank's Skvortsov, with his own institutional interest, has not disputed.

IAEA (Rafael Grossi)

IAEA inspectors logged Zaporizhzhia's 22nd loss of off-site power, ten of them in the last three months, after a thunderstorm knocked out the plant's sole surviving backup line. Grossi reads the accelerating frequency, not any single outage, as the safety signal now that the plant's redundancy is exhausted.