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Iran Conflict 2026
10JUN

Seven Ships Cross Hormuz, No Oil Tankers

3 min read
09:46UTC

IRGC / Lloyd's List Intelligence

ConflictDeveloping
Key takeaway

Seven ships in 24 hours is a checkpoint, not a reopening.

Seven ships transited the Strait of Hormuz on ceasefire Day 3. None were oil tankers. 325 oil tankers and more than 600 vessels remain stranded inside the Persian Gulf. Iran's toll system had reached 20 transits per day before the ceasefire ; seven is a regression, not a recovery. The pre-war baseline of 135 per day illustrates the distance to normalisation.

Iran's inspection and ban regime transforms the strait from an international waterway into a customs border. Ships linked to Israel are excluded; tolls are reportedly payable in cryptocurrency. The IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) mine charts published on 9 April direct all traffic through corridors near Larak Island under IRGC naval control. Oman formally refused the toll regime, citing international maritime treaty obligations, but Omani vessels still face the same inspection process.

ADNOC CEO Sultan Al Jaber put it plainly: "Passage is subject to permission, conditions and political leverage." Goldman Sachs issued revised scenarios: $82 per barrel base if Hormuz resumes this weekend, $100+ if closed another month, $120 severe. Every day without mine clearance normalises the toll regime that preceded the ceasefire .

Deep Analysis

In plain English

Before the war, about 135 ships passed through the Strait of Hormuz every day, carrying 20% of the world's oil. On Day 3 of the ceasefire that was supposed to reopen it, only seven ships passed and none were oil tankers. 325 tankers are sitting stuck inside the Gulf waiting. Iran is charging fees, banning some ships, and controlling who gets through. The UN tried to force the strait open; Russia and China blocked it.

Deep Analysis
Root Causes

Iran's closure of Hormuz reflects a shift from opportunistic disruption to structural leverage doctrine. The toll system represents a permanent claim to sovereign authority over an internationally recognised strait — the same claim it made unsuccessfully in the 1980s. The ceasefire has preserved the toll regime rather than ending it, which is Iran's primary economic gain from the war regardless of nuclear outcome.

China and Russia's UNSC veto removes multilateral enforcement. Without that mechanism, Hormuz reopening requires either a bilateral US-Iran deal that explicitly addresses the toll regime, or unilateral US naval action. The Trump administration has so far declined both.

What could happen next?
  • Consequence

    Every day without mine clearance normalises Iranian toll authority over an internationally recognised strait, making restoration of UNCLOS freedom of navigation progressively harder to claim without confrontation.

    Short term · Assessed
  • Risk

    GL-U expiry on 19 April would recriminalise 325 stranded tankers' cargo before the ceasefire even ends, forcing operators to choose between legal jeopardy and abandoning cargo.

    Immediate · Assessed
  • Consequence

    China's tankers already transit under the toll regime; its UNSC veto locks in a competitive advantage over Japanese, South Korean, and European shippers for as long as the regime persists.

    Medium term · Assessed
First Reported In

Update #64 · Islamabad talks open already cracked

Iran International· 10 Apr 2026
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Different Perspectives
Oil markets / Lloyd's underwriters
Oil markets / Lloyd's underwriters
Futures markets priced CENTCOM's strikes-complete statement as a de-escalation signal and pushed Brent down 1.7 per cent to $94.71, even as the IRGC declared Hormuz closed. Lloyd's war-risk premiums held elevated because institutional de-listing requires a UN Security Council resolution that Russia and China have just shown they will block.
Pakistan (mediator)
Pakistan (mediator)
Interior minister Mohsin Naqvi carried dual civilian and military letters to Mojtaba Khamenei in Tehran on 6-7 June with no public response. The IRGC's Hormuz closure on 11 June shows the corps is acting independently of the channel Pakistan is using, making the mediation structurally unable to produce a binding commitment without direct IRGC access.
Russia and China
Russia and China
Russia and China voted against GOV/2026/40 at the IAEA Board, following through on the blocking position coordinated with Grossi in Geneva on 5 June; both states continue to oppose Western institutional pressure on Iran at every multilateral venue.
E3 and IAEA (UK, France, Germany)
E3 and IAEA (UK, France, Germany)
The E3 co-sponsored IAEA resolution GOV/2026/40, adopted 21-3-10 on 10 June, demanding Iran disclose 440.9 kg of unaccounted HEU and admit inspectors to four denied facilities. The 10 abstentions and Russia-China noes leave any Security Council referral without a viable enforcement path.
IRGC / Iran military command
IRGC / Iran military command
The corps declared Hormuz closed to all traffic on 11 June and claimed two vessels struck, overriding the MoU its own civilian negotiators were pursuing through Pakistan. The closure order used the Persian Gulf Strait Authority apparatus to convert a toll mechanism into a military prohibition.
Trump administration / CENTCOM
Trump administration / CENTCOM
CENTCOM completed a second day of strikes on Tehran, Sirik and Minab, rejected the IRGC Hormuz closure as inconsistent with observed transit, and said strikes were complete. Hegseth framed the bombing explicitly as the negotiation: the method is coercive deal-making with no stated pause threshold.