13APR

Seven Ships Cross Hormuz, No Oil Tankers

3 min read

17:09UTC

IRGC / Lloyd's List Intelligence

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Key takeaway

Seven ships in 24 hours is a checkpoint, not a reopening.

Seven ships transited the Strait of Hormuz on ceasefire Day 3. None were oil tankers. 325 oil tankers and more than 600 vessels remain stranded inside the Persian Gulf. Iran's toll system had reached 20 transits per day before the ceasefire ; seven is a regression, not a recovery. The pre-war baseline of 135 per day illustrates the distance to normalisation.

Iran's inspection and ban regime transforms the strait from an international waterway into a customs border. Ships linked to Israel are excluded; tolls are reportedly payable in cryptocurrency. The IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) mine charts published on 9 April direct all traffic through corridors near Larak Island under IRGC naval control. Oman formally refused the toll regime, citing international maritime treaty obligations, but Omani vessels still face the same inspection process.

ADNOC CEO Sultan Al Jaber put it plainly: "Passage is subject to permission, conditions and political leverage." Goldman Sachs issued revised scenarios: $82 per barrel base if Hormuz resumes this weekend, $100+ if closed another month, $120 severe. Every day without mine clearance normalises the toll regime that preceded the ceasefire .

Deep Analysis

In plain English

Before the war, about 135 ships passed through the Strait of Hormuz every day, carrying 20% of the world's oil. On Day 3 of the ceasefire that was supposed to reopen it, only seven ships passed and none were oil tankers. 325 tankers are sitting stuck inside the Gulf waiting. Iran is charging fees, banning some ships, and controlling who gets through. The UN tried to force the strait open; Russia and China blocked it.

Deep Analysis

Root Causes

Iran's closure of Hormuz reflects a shift from opportunistic disruption to structural leverage doctrine. The toll system represents a permanent claim to sovereign authority over an internationally recognised strait — the same claim it made unsuccessfully in the 1980s. The ceasefire has preserved the toll regime rather than ending it, which is Iran's primary economic gain from the war regardless of nuclear outcome.

China and Russia's UNSC veto removes multilateral enforcement. Without that mechanism, Hormuz reopening requires either a bilateral US-Iran deal that explicitly addresses the toll regime, or unilateral US naval action. The Trump administration has so far declined both .

What could happen next?

Consequence
Every day without mine clearance normalises Iranian toll authority over an internationally recognised strait, making restoration of UNCLOS freedom of navigation progressively harder to claim without confrontation.
Short term · Assessed
Risk
GL-U expiry on 19 April would recriminalise 325 stranded tankers' cargo before the ceasefire even ends, forcing operators to choose between legal jeopardy and abandoning cargo.
Immediate · Assessed
Consequence
China's tankers already transit under the toll regime; its UNSC veto locks in a competitive advantage over Japanese, South Korean, and European shippers for as long as the regime persists.
Medium term · Assessed

Source Landscape

This story draws on mixed-leaning sources from United Kingdom, Qatar and 2 more

United Kingdom

Qatar

United States

Iran

Primary parallel: The 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War tanker war period produced the US Operation Earnest Will (1987-1988), which reflagged Kuwaiti tankers under the US flag and provided direct naval escort. Transit volumes recovered to near-normal within six months of naval protection. The Islamabad talks offer no equivalent mechanism.

Counter-parallel: The 2021 Suez Canal blockage by the Ever Given demonstrated that a single chokepoint's closure for six days added $54 billion to global shipping costs. Hormuz has been at under 5% capacity for over 40 days, affecting not just oil but LNG, fertiliser, and container shipping for South and East Asia.

Goldman's three Brent scenarios ($82/$100+/$120) bracket a 6-9 week structural uncertainty window. At the $82 base, a Hormuz resumption this weekend still leaves fuel costs 20-25% above pre-war levels due to tanker repositioning time and insurance repricing.

EU diesel carries approximately $18-22 per barrel Hormuz premium; Asian LNG spot prices have risen roughly 40% since Hormuz closure. The 325 stranded tankers represent approximately 325 million barrels of crude; at $97 Brent, that is roughly $31.5 billion of cargo unable to deliver. Aggregate daily demurrage across 325 tankers at $35,000-55,000 per vessel exceeds $15 million daily.

Consensus view: Goldman Sachs commodities research, the International Energy Agency (IEA), and Lloyd's List Intelligence all concur that seven transits in 24 hours represents a checkpoint function, not reopening. The IEA's emergency assessment puts global oil market stress at the highest since the 1973 Arab oil embargo, with 13 million barrels per day of Persian Gulf production effectively stranded.

Counter-view: The Gulf Research Centre in Dubai argues the toll regime, while commercially distorting, has created a functioning navigation system where before there was a blockade. Seven transits of non-oil vessels may reflect inspection processing capacity rather than Iran's willingness to reopen — the system is building toward higher throughput, not cementing at seven.

Key tension: Every day without mine clearance normalises Iranian navigational control as the de facto legal regime. The longer this continues, the harder it becomes to restore UNCLOS-defined freedom of navigation without a confrontation Iran can frame as aggression.

First Reported In

Update #64 · Islamabad talks open already cracked

Iran International· 10 Apr 2026

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Causes and effects

Caused by

Iran publishes mine charts converting Hormuz reopening into IRGC corridor

IRGC mine charts published 9 April (ID:2121) forced all ships into IRGC-controlled Larak Island corridors, directly suppressing Day 3 transit count to seven ships with zero oil tankers.

Occurred 9 Apr 2026

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Hormuz toll system carried 20 transits per day before ceasefire

The 20/day transit level reached by 5 April (ID:2119) under the toll regime has been cut further by ceasefire Day 3 conditions — the ceasefire has reduced traffic rather than increased it.

Occurred 5 Apr 2026

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Brent rebounds as Goldman prices ceasefire risk

Oil markets repriced on ceasefire announcement (ID:2124); Goldman's $82-$120 Brent scenarios on Day 3 represent the market's updated pricing of persistent Hormuz restriction.

Occurred 9 Apr 2026

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This Event

Seven Ships Cross Hormuz, No Oil Tankers

The ceasefire has reduced Hormuz transits rather than raised them; Iran's de facto customs authority over the strait is consolidating daily.

Different Perspectives

ASML / European tech industry

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France / Anne Le Henanff

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Germany / Federal government

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USTR / Ambassador Andrew Puzder

Puzder's public warning on 25 May that CAIDA is inconsistent with the EU-US trade framework was the first time Washington made its bilateral pressure visible before a Commission adoption vote rather than after. The USTR Section 301 determination on 24 July provides the enforcement backstop.

European Commission / Henna Virkkunen

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OpenForum Europe / open-source community

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