12JUN

Sharif, Munir and Xi meet in Beijing

3 min read

09:18UTC

Pakistan's prime minister and army chief were in Beijing together on Monday, meeting Xi Jinping as the Iran deal nears its sequencing decision. The two principal mediators are coordinating with China face to face for the first time.

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ConflictDeveloping

Key takeaway

The mediation has consolidated in the one capital that can underwrite a frozen-asset release.

Pakistani prime minister Shehbaz Sharif met Xi Jinping in Beijing on Monday 25 May, day three of a four-day state visit, with army chief Asim Munir also in the Chinese capital ¹. Munir had flown to Beijing straight from Tehran, which he visited on 23 May , while Sharif and his foreign minister arrived in China on the same Saturday .

Pakistan has run as the principal back-channel between Washington and Tehran through the war. For the first time both of its principals are in Beijing at once, coordinating with China in person rather than through relayed messages, and on the days the deal sits at its closest. Munir's shuttle from Tehran on 23 May to Beijing by 25 May collapses two mediation tracks into a single room.

The venue matters more than the photographs. China holds the tools the sequencing deadlock needs a third party to provide: frozen-fund mechanics, yuan settlement, and the standing to vouch for who pays whom and when. Beijing also already hosts Iran's designated China envoy, speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, appointed in late April with sign-off from both President Masoud Pezeshkian and Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei , so the Iranian contact is already in the city.

A joint Pakistan-China statement is expected by 27 May, its content still undisclosed. Whether it names a mechanism for escrowing the frozen assets against a reopening of the strait, or leaves that clause untouched, will matter more than anything in the visit's choreography.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

Pakistan has been acting as the go-between in talks to end the war between the United States and Iran. On 25 May, both Pakistan's Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and its army chief Asim Munir were in Beijing at the same time, meeting Chinese President Xi Jinping. Munir had flown there directly from Tehran, which he visited on 23 May. Iran's own special envoy to China was also in Beijing. This is the first time all the main mediators have gathered in the same city at once. China matters here because it is Iran's biggest oil customer, and it may be the only country that could help resolve the argument over the $12 billion in frozen money that Iran wants released before reopening the strait.

Deep Analysis

Root Causes

Pakistan's role as the principal back-channel emerged from three structural conditions: a 959-kilometre shared border with Iran, a general-officer-led military intelligence relationship with both Washington and Tehran, and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) financial dependency that gives Pakistan unique access to Chinese credit facilities.

Asim Munir's ability to fly Tehran-to-Beijing without a 24-hour public announcement reflects the operational security of the military-to-military channel, which has carried every nuclear-monitoring concession of the war.

The simultaneous presence of both Sharif (civilian, economic track) and Munir (military, security track) in Beijing signals that the Pakistan side has concluded the $12bn sequencing problem requires both tracks resolved in parallel, not sequentially.

What could happen next?

Consequence
The joint Pakistan-China statement expected by 27 May will indicate whether China is prepared to act as guarantor for the $12bn sequencing mechanism, or merely as a diplomatic host.
Opportunity
If China agrees to route the $12bn release through its state banking system rather than a US Treasury channel, it bypasses the US re-freeze risk Iran has demanded protection against, potentially unlocking the sequencing deadlock.

Source Landscape

Primary parallel: In July 1994, Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence and Chinese Ministry of State Security coordinated the North Korea nuclear framework talks through simultaneous Pyongyang and Beijing visits by Pakistani and Chinese officials in the week before the Agreed Framework was initialled.

That trilateral format, a mediating state shuttling between the target state and China as guarantor, produced the only nuclear-freeze agreement North Korea has ever nominally accepted. The structural parallel to the 25 May Sharif-Munir-Xi meeting is direct: the mediating state's security and civilian tracks converging on Beijing to coordinate with China before a final framework is signed.

Counter-parallel: In 2006, Pakistan attempted a similar trilateral format during India-Pakistan nuclear talks, with Sharif's predecessor Shaukat Aziz coordinating with Beijing on Kashmir confidence-building measures. That format produced no agreement because China declined to act as guarantor for any outcome that required it to absorb US diplomatic pressure. The 2006 failure is the cautionary case: China's willingness to host does not guarantee China's willingness to back.

Consensus view: The Shanghai Institutes for International Studies and the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore both assessed in May 2026 that the simultaneous presence of Pakistan's Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and army chief Asim Munir in Beijing, with Munir flying directly from Tehran on 23 May, upgrades the Pakistan-China coordination from a parallel diplomatic track to a unified command structure.

China is the only actor that can underwrite the $12bn frozen-asset sequencing through its state banking system if the US Treasury authorisation channel stalls.

Counter-view: Researchers at the Pakistan Institute of Strategic Studies in Islamabad argue the Beijing visit carries a domestic signalling function that Western analysts systematically underestimate: Sharif's government faces parliamentary pressure over the economic cost of mediating a war that has disrupted Pakistani LNG imports through Hormuz.

The visit to Xi on day three of a four-day state visit is as much about securing energy-credit arrangements for Pakistan as it is about brokering an Iran deal.

Key tension: Whether China's willingness to host the simultaneous Sharif-Munir coordination translates into Beijing offering to act as guarantor for the $12bn sequencing, a role that would require China to absorb US secondary-sanctions exposure on its own balance sheet.

First Reported In

Update #107 · Two markets, two prices on one Iran deal

Pakistan Today· 25 May 2026

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Causes and effects

Caused by

Munir returns to Tehran two days on

Munir's 23 May Tehran visit (ID:3580) directly preceded his Beijing leg, converting a serial shuttle into a simultaneous trilateral presence.

Occurred 23 May 2026

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Pakistan's PM takes the deal to Beijing

Sharif and Dar's 23 May departure to China (ID:3582) opened the state visit that the 25 May Sharif-Xi-Munir meeting is day three of.

Occurred 23 May 2026

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Speaker Ghalibaf made Iran's China envoy

Ghalibaf's appointment as China special envoy (ID:3429) established the Iranian contact in Beijing that the Sharif-Munir visit now coordinates around.

Occurred 18 May 2026

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This Event

Sharif, Munir and Xi meet in Beijing

China is the one actor with the financial machinery to underwrite a frozen-asset release, and the mediation has just consolidated in the capital that holds it.

Different Perspectives

Oil markets and Lloyd's of London

Brent fell to $89.25 on ceasefire probability, not new barrels, with traders voting for Trump's deed over Tehran's denial. Lloyd's has not repriced Hormuz war-risk cover because its trigger requires a UN Security Council resolution or government certification, so tanker insurance costs remain elevated regardless of the spot move.

Pakistan and Qatar mediators

Pakistan's Mohsin Naqvi was in Tehran for his second visit in under a week, using the Pakistan-Qatar channel that delivered April's ceasefire after an identical public-denial cycle. The channel carries both civilian and military buy-in from Islamabad, the only configuration Iran's split command cannot dismiss as a partial signal.

India

India summoned the US Deputy Chief of Mission after three Indian sailors were killed aboard MT Settebello, the first formal grievance from a major non-belligerent directed at US enforcement. Indian seafarers supply roughly 12 per cent of the global maritime workforce; their presence on third-flag Gulf tankers is structurally inevitable regardless of bilateral diplomacy.

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)

The IRGC declared Hormuz closed on 11 June while civilian negotiators were on the same mediation channel, then issued no public comment on the MoU framework. Its silence on the framework, rather than any foreign ministry statement, is the operative approval signal; the corps' unilateral Hormuz closure shows it did not treat the diplomatic track as binding on its operations.

Iran foreign ministry (Baghaei)

Esmail Baghaei told IRNA that reports of a finalised deal were 'merely speculation' and that Iran had 'not yet made a final decision'. The denial is structurally identical to Iranian foreign ministry statements during the April ceasefire talks, which produced a binding text within 48 hours of the same language.

Trump administration / CENTCOM

Trump cancelled the third strike day and called the MoU 'very strong' and almost ready to sign, while CENTCOM kept tanker enforcement running in the same 24-hour window. The administration is simultaneously withdrawing the military pressure it claims drove the deal and sustaining the enforcement campaign it is trying to trade away.