12JUN

Seven VLCCs at Chabahar, three at Hormuz

3 min read

09:18UTC

Lowdown Wire

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ConflictDeveloping

Key takeaway

Seven VLCCs gathered at Chabahar on 20 April while only three vessels transited the strait the same week.

Windward detected seven Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs, the standard two-million-barrel oil tankers that carry Gulf crude) near Chabahar on Iran's Makran coast on 20 April ¹. Chabahar is Iran's only deep-water port on the Arabian Sea and sits east of the geometry Admiral Brad Cooper's narrower port-interdiction order covers. The same Windward log counted three strait transits the day before, a fraction of the 135-per-day pre-war baseline and the lowest count since the blockade began.

Earlier mid-transit reroutings from India to Chinese ports ahead of the OFAC General License U lapse established the Chabahar-routing adaptation; seven VLCCs at anchor there indicate the same workaround now running at capacity. The USS Spruance's firing into the Touska's engine room earlier in the same window hardened the Hormuz risk premium on the kinetic side, but the structural story is sideways: vessels avoiding the strait do not need the strait reopened to clear cargo.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

The US Navy has been blocking oil tankers from using the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow sea passage through which most Gulf oil normally flows. Iran has responded by loading oil onto tankers at a different port, Chabahar, which sits on Iran's other coastline , the Arabian Sea side , and has no connection to the strait at all. Windward, a maritime tracking company, spotted seven large tankers near Chabahar on 20 April. Only three vessels transited the strait in the same period. This matters because it shows the blockade has not stopped Iran from shipping oil , it has just changed which port the oil leaves from. Chabahar is operated under a 2016 agreement with India, which adds a political complication: any US attempt to block Chabahar would directly affect India's interests.

Deep Analysis

Root Causes

CENTCOM's written blockade order was drafted around the Strait of Hormuz and Iranian Gulf ports, reflecting the operational assumption that Iranian crude exports require the strait. Chabahar sits on the Makran coast, outside the Gulf, accessible from the Arabian Sea without any Hormuz transit.

The legal gap was present from the order's inception: Iran never ratified UNCLOS, leaving its domestic maritime law , updated in 2024 to claim jurisdiction over 'hostile-linked vessels' , as the operative legal text on the Iranian side, while the US order covers only Iranian-port traffic rather than the full territorial sea.

India's 2016 Chabahar agreement, originally designed to give Delhi access to Afghan and Central Asian markets bypassing Pakistan, created an operational control structure that places Chabahar partially inside Indian sovereign jurisdiction, complicating any US enforcement action.

What could happen next?

Consequence
Chabahar routing at capacity would reduce the blockade's supply-disruption component while leaving the kinetic risk premium intact, potentially splitting the oil price signal into two separable factors.
Short term · 0.72
Risk
Any CENTCOM attempt to extend interdiction to Chabahar creates a direct India-US collision over India's 2016 operational rights agreement with Tehran.
Medium term · 0.78
Precedent
The Chabahar bypass establishes a template for sanctions evasion at ports outside written enforcement geometry, applicable to any future blockade scenario.
Long term · 0.8

Source Landscape

This story draws on neutral-leaning sources from Israel

Israel

Primary parallel: During the 1973 Arab oil embargo, Saudi Arabia and Iraq routed exports overland via the Trans-Arabian Pipeline (Tapline) and the Iraq-Turkey pipeline to bypass tanker interdiction risk in the Gulf of Suez. The embargo's price effect was sustained not because all physical flow stopped but because the diversion routes lacked the throughput to replace lost Gulf volume , the same arithmetic now being tested at Chabahar.

Counter-parallel: In 1984 Iraq began the 'tanker war' phase of the Iran-Iraq conflict specifically because Iran had identified and was exploiting Kharg Island's offshore loading capacity as a bypass around Iraqi interdiction.

Iraq's response , attacking Kharg Island itself , escalated the conflict rather than closing the bypass. The 2026 situation differs in one critical respect: Chabahar is Indian-operated under a 2016 bilateral agreement, making a direct CENTCOM strike against the port a three-way diplomatic incident.

Seven VLCCs near Chabahar represent approximately 14 million barrels of potential lift capacity at the VLCC standard of 2 million barrels each. Even at 50% utilisation and a single loading cycle per week, the route could sustain 7 million barrels per week of Iranian crude flow , roughly 1 million barrels per day.

Brent's refusal to settle below $96 across five consecutive sessions reflects the market pricing the kinetic risk premium at Hormuz, not the physical supply gap. If Chabahar throughput scales to even 500,000 bpd, the price signal loses its supply-disruption component and becomes a pure risk premium , a structurally different and easier-to-exit pricing regime.

Consensus view: IISS maritime analyst Nick Childs and Kpler's head of tanker analytics Homayoun Falakshahi both conclude that seven VLCCs at Chabahar demonstrate the blockade has displaced rather than halted Iranian crude exports: the physical flow continues through a port outside CENTCOM's written enforcement geometry, meaning the price signal is being sustained by kinetic risk and insurance withdrawal, not by physical interdiction .

Counter-view: The Russian Institute of World Economy notes that Chabahar's infrastructure constraints , single deep-water berth, limited storage, Arabian Sea swell exposure , cap throughput at roughly 300,000 barrels per day even at maximum utilisation, well below the 1.8 million bpd Iran was exporting before the war, so the route is a partial relief valve rather than a blockade-replacement.

Key tension: Whether the Chabahar routing is already large enough to break the price signal that underpins the blockade's coercive logic, or whether CENTCOM will be forced to extend interdiction geometry east into the Arabian Sea , a move requiring additional force posture and risking direct India confrontation.

First Reported In

Update #76 · Trump posts an exit Iran can't reach

Windward· 22 Apr 2026

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Causes and effects

Caused by

Ping Shun diverted from Vadinar to Dongying

Ping Shun's mid-transit diversion to China ahead of GL-U lapse established the Chabahar-routing adaptation now running at capacity with seven VLCCs.

Occurred 15 Apr 2026

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US warship seizes Iranian cargo ship Touska

USS Spruance firing into the Touska's engine room on 19 April hardened the Hormuz risk premium, reinforcing Chabahar as the safer export route.

Occurred 19 Apr 2026

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This Event

Seven VLCCs at Chabahar, three at Hormuz

Iranian crude is leaving through a port outside CENTCOM's written enforcement geometry while Hormuz legitimate traffic collapses to 2 per cent of its pre-war baseline.

Led to

Five vessels, no AIS: Hormuz goes dark

The all-dark AIS transit day on 23 April advances the dark-fleet dominance pattern documented by Windward on 19-20 April (ID:2671), where only 3 transits were recorded and 7 VLCCs were held near Chabahar.

Occurred 23 Apr 2026

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Different Perspectives

Oil markets and Lloyd's of London

Brent fell to $89.25 on ceasefire probability, not new barrels, with traders voting for Trump's deed over Tehran's denial. Lloyd's has not repriced Hormuz war-risk cover because its trigger requires a UN Security Council resolution or government certification, so tanker insurance costs remain elevated regardless of the spot move.

Pakistan and Qatar mediators

Pakistan's Mohsin Naqvi was in Tehran for his second visit in under a week, using the Pakistan-Qatar channel that delivered April's ceasefire after an identical public-denial cycle. The channel carries both civilian and military buy-in from Islamabad, the only configuration Iran's split command cannot dismiss as a partial signal.

India

India summoned the US Deputy Chief of Mission after three Indian sailors were killed aboard MT Settebello, the first formal grievance from a major non-belligerent directed at US enforcement. Indian seafarers supply roughly 12 per cent of the global maritime workforce; their presence on third-flag Gulf tankers is structurally inevitable regardless of bilateral diplomacy.

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)

The IRGC declared Hormuz closed on 11 June while civilian negotiators were on the same mediation channel, then issued no public comment on the MoU framework. Its silence on the framework, rather than any foreign ministry statement, is the operative approval signal; the corps' unilateral Hormuz closure shows it did not treat the diplomatic track as binding on its operations.

Iran foreign ministry (Baghaei)

Esmail Baghaei told IRNA that reports of a finalised deal were 'merely speculation' and that Iran had 'not yet made a final decision'. The denial is structurally identical to Iranian foreign ministry statements during the April ceasefire talks, which produced a binding text within 48 hours of the same language.

Trump administration / CENTCOM

Trump cancelled the third strike day and called the MoU 'very strong' and almost ready to sign, while CENTCOM kept tanker enforcement running in the same 24-hour window. The administration is simultaneously withdrawing the military pressure it claims drove the deal and sustaining the enforcement campaign it is trying to trade away.