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Iran Conflict 2026
1JUN

GL 134A lapses toward quiet extension

3 min read
08:32UTC

Treasury's Russian crude waiver expired on 11 April with wire reporting from Reuters, Semafor and Bloomberg pointing to renewal worth roughly $150 million a day to Moscow at current Urals prices.

ConflictDeveloping
Key takeaway

The Russian oil waiver is the same instrument doing the opposite job it was designed for.

General License 134A (GL 134A), the OFAC (Office of Foreign Assets Control) waiver that authorised transactions for Russian crude loaded before 12 March, expired on 11 April. Reuters, Semafor and Bloomberg report, citing people familiar with the discussions, that an extension is coming 1. A Treasury spokesperson offered only that the department "does not preview actions related to our sanctions."

Daniel Fried at the Atlantic Council called on Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent on 8 April to let the waiver lapse and fall back on the price cap. Asian governments led by India and the Philippines are pushing in the other direction. A week ago this was framed as a binary choice at $121 Urals . Bloomberg estimates the waiver is worth roughly $150 million a day in additional Russian budget revenue at $114 to $116 Urals.

One week of that uplift covers a fortnight of Kinzhal strikes. A full year covers a sum the EU has spent months trying to route to Kyiv against Hungarian opposition. The original GL 134 was defensible in March at $73 a barrel as market stabilisation after the Strait of Hormuz closed. At 64% above that price, and with the Iran ceasefire of 8 April partially reopening Hormuz, the same instrument now hands Moscow a surplus the sanctions architecture was designed to prevent. The Russia-Iran corridor that Israel struck at Bandar Anzali last month still runs.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

When the Iran conflict disrupted oil markets in March, the US Treasury issued a temporary waiver allowing banks and traders to continue processing payments for Russian crude already at sea. The idea was to prevent a sudden oil price spike. The waiver was set to expire on 11 April. The problem: when the waiver was issued, Russian oil was selling at $73 per barrel. By expiry it was trading at $114-116. That means every extra day of extension hands Russia roughly $150 million in war-funding revenue that sanctions were supposed to block.

Deep Analysis
Root Causes

GL 134A was issued on 12 March 2026 as a market-stabilisation measure when the Iran war disrupted Gulf crude flows. The structural problem is that the licence's dollar value is oil-price-sensitive: a barrel-price doubling since issuance means the waiver now hands Moscow a windfall the original policy never contemplated.

The secondary cause is bureaucratic path dependency. Once a sanctions waiver is issued to enable active market transactions, financial institutions and energy traders build positions around it. Lapse without a wind-down window triggers counterparty defaults that US regulators are reluctant to own.

What could happen next?
  • Consequence

    Each week of extension at current Urals prices transfers approximately $1.05 billion to Russia, partially offsetting the impact of the EU's phased gas import ban beginning 25 April.

  • Risk

    If the waiver is extended without a firm sunset date, it establishes precedent that sanctions can be indefinitely deferred when market conditions create lobby pressure, weakening the credibility of the entire OFAC architecture.

First Reported In

Update #12 · Three narrowings of US support for Kyiv

Reuters (via Kyiv Independent)· 11 Apr 2026
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