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Iran's second salvo hits Israel and Gulf

4 min read
09:56UTC

A second wave of Iranian missiles and drones reached Israel, US bases, and Gulf territory — evidence that the opening strikes did not eliminate Iran's launch capability.

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Key takeaway

Iran's second missile wave, simultaneously targeting three distinct actor categories, demonstrates residual offensive capability despite leadership decapitation and reflects pre-planned escalation protocols executing independently of the interim council.

Iran launched a second wave of missiles and drones at Israel, US military installations, and Gulf state territory on Saturday. The first retaliatory wave, launched in the hours after the US-Israeli strikes, targeted 27 US military bases across seven countries , with the Pentagon reporting zero American casualties at the time. The second wave maintained the same target categories — but produced casualties that the first did not.

The operational fact that matters: Iran can sustain multiple launch waves after absorbing simultaneous strikes across five cities. Operation EPIC FURY was designed to degrade Iran's military capability. If Iran retains enough functioning missile infrastructure and launch crews to mount a second salvo, either the strikes did not achieve their degradation objectives or Iran's arsenal is more dispersed and hardened than the planners assumed. Iran's Ballistic missile programme has been built for survivability since at least the Stuxnet attack on Natanz in 2010, with production and storage facilities distributed across underground complexes designed to absorb aerial bombardment. The June 2025 strikes on Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan would have accelerated that dispersal further.

The targeting of Gulf states — for the second time — deepens a diplomatic crisis that Gulf governments did not seek. Saudi Arabia had already publicly framed the conflict as one that began with US-Israeli attacks — a statement that distances Riyadh from Washington while leaving Saudi territory exposed to retaliation for hosting American forces. For Gulf capitals, the calculation they deferred for decades — whether US basing agreements create more security or more risk — is now being answered with Iranian warheads.

The second wave also contradicts the framing that Washington and Tel Aviv offered for the operation: a surgical, limited degradation of Iranian military and nuclear capability. Surgical operations end. Iran's continued ability to launch suggests this has become a war of attrition — and neither side has articulated what a stopping point looks like.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

Iran has launched a second large-scale wave of missiles and drones hitting multiple targets at once: Israel, US military bases in the region, and Gulf Arab states. This matters for two reasons. First, it shows Iran's missile forces are still operational despite Israeli strikes — the launch capability has not been destroyed. Second, hitting multiple countries simultaneously is a deliberate strategy designed to spread the conflict, force more governments to consider direct involvement, and signal that this is not a limited exchange. The fact that this wave is occurring even as Iran's political leadership is in transition strongly suggests these attacks were planned in advance and are proceeding on autopilot — meaning no one in Tehran needs to press a button for them to continue.

Deep Analysis
Synthesis

The second wave of Iranian missiles and drones is the moment at which this conflict transitions from a potentially bounded Israeli-Iranian bilateral exchange into a genuinely regional war. The UAE, which had no role in initiating strikes, has sustained civilian casualties. US service members are dead. Gulf states hosting American forces are now active targets. Each of these developments creates its own political pressure for escalation: the UAE cannot absorb casualties without domestic and diplomatic response; the US cannot absorb combat deaths without congressional and public pressure for retaliation; Gulf state governments face a fundamental contradiction between their security dependence on American basing and their desire not to be drawn into the conflict. Iran's strategy appears to be to make neutrality structurally impossible for all regional actors simultaneously.

Root Causes

The second wave reflects Iran's pre-war deterrence doctrine: the threat of proportionate but asymmetric retaliation distributed across multiple theatres simultaneously. Iran's military planning under the IRGC has long been premised on the belief that the cost of attacking Iran must be spread across the region rather than borne by Iran alone — hence the Axis of Resistance network of proxies, and hence the direct strikes on Gulf states hosting US facilities. The execution of this doctrine in the absence of confirmed senior military command suggests these protocols were pre-authorised and can execute without real-time political direction, which is itself a significant analytical finding about how the second phase of this conflict will unfold regardless of what the interim council decides.

Escalation

The second wave confirms that Iran's missile and drone forces retained meaningful offensive capacity after the initial Israeli strikes — the degradation was real but incomplete. The simultaneous targeting of multiple states is strategically significant: it forces the US, Israel, and Gulf states to divide defensive resources, complicates the international diplomatic response, and signals that Iran intends to prosecute a widening war rather than absorb strikes and negotiate. The most dangerous element is the targeting of US military personnel and installations: three American deaths have already been confirmed, and the Trump administration's public rhetoric leaves diminishing domestic political space for a restrained US response. The trajectory is sharply escalatory, with each wave of Iranian strikes narrowing the window for de-escalation and increasing the probability of direct US strikes on Iranian territory beyond what the opening operation entailed.

What could happen next?
  • Meaning

    The second wave confirms Iran retains residual offensive missile capability and is executing pre-planned escalation protocols that do not require real-time political authorisation from the interim council.

    Immediate · Assessed
  • Risk

    Simultaneous strikes on US military installations and Gulf states make direct and expanded US military action significantly more likely within the next 24–48 hours.

    Immediate · Assessed
  • Consequence

    Gulf states hosting US military facilities face an irreconcilable tension between their security partnerships and their new exposure as Iranian targets, likely forcing rapid diplomatic repositioning.

    Short term · Assessed
  • Risk

    If Iranian missile forces continue to demonstrate survivability against Israeli strikes, other regional actors may reassess the deterrent value of their own ballistic missile programmes.

    Long term · Suggested
First Reported In

Update #4 · Interim council claims power; US troops die

CNBC· 1 Mar 2026
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