15APR

First LNG tanker crossed Hormuz since February

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13:33UTC

A Japanese-owned LNG carrier and a French-flagged container ship transited on 4 April under a CENTCOM operational carve-out, the first non-China-linked passages since 28 February.

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Key takeaway

Selective Hormuz transits resumed without restoring bulk LNG flows.

On 4 April 2026, a Japanese-owned LNG tanker and a French-flagged container ship made the first Strait of Hormuz transits under a CENTCOM operational carve-out since 28 February, per EnergyConnects' tracker ¹. The seven-day rolling average for Hormuz transits reached its highest level since the war began on the same reporting window, with 13 ships crossing between 4 April and the print date.

The selectivity matters. Traffic through the strait remains dominated by China- and Iran-linked vessels, and every transit remains subject to Iran's new tolling system and mandatory northern-passage routing, which are creating bottlenecks rather than easing throughput. The carve-out permits named vessels to cross under CENTCOM protection; it does not restart bulk LNG flows from Qatar, and it does not change the Ras Laffan force majeure .

The TTF print may be partially discounting the reopening ahead of physical confirmation, in line with the broader ceasefire-optimism pattern pricing the screen rather than the tape. The confirmation signal would be a sustained uplift in LNG-specific transits rather than the aggregate ship count, because the bulk of the 13 crossings in the window were not LNG cargoes and the LNG transits themselves were exceptions rather than routine.

For procurement desks the take-away is that the Qatari cargo bridge to Europe remains impaired, the Atlantic basin is still funding the marginal molecule into ALSI , and the ceasefire decision on 21 April will determine whether the selective carve-out expands or closes. A collapse takes the Japanese and French precedents off the board before they scale.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow waterway between Iran and Oman. Before the 2026 conflict, roughly a fifth of the world's oil and LNG shipments passed through it every day. Since February, Iran has effectively closed the strait to Western shipping. On 4 April, for the first time since 28 February, a Japanese-owned LNG tanker and a French-flagged container ship crossed the strait. They were able to do so because the US military had negotiated a special exemption for certain vessels. But they had to accept Iran's new tolling system, which charges fees based on where the ship is from and who owns the cargo. This is not a full reopening. Most shipping companies are still avoiding the strait because normal insurance cannot cover vessels transiting without a proper ceasefire agreement. The handful of crossings so far are exceptions, not a return to normal.

What could happen next?

Consequence
Japanese and French operators' willingness to transit under the carve-out while paying the Iranian tolling fee effectively endorses the tolling system's legitimacy in commercial practice, regardless of Western governments' formal rejection of it.
Risk
If LNG cargo restart via Hormuz requires paying Iran's yuan-denominated toll, EU member states importing QatarEnergy or Abu Dhabi LNG may face a legal conflict between EU sanctions policy (which restricts yuan payments to sanctioned parties) and supply security requirements.

Source Landscape

This story draws on neutral-leaning sources

Primary parallel: The 1987-88 Tanker War during the Iran-Iraq conflict saw the US Navy establish Operation Earnest Will to escort Kuwaiti tankers reflagged as American vessels through the strait. That operation produced the same structural outcome: Western vessels transited under military protection while non-protected vessels paid Iranian-imposed fees or faced risk. The parallel ended when Iran accepted UN Security Council Resolution 598 and agreed a ceasefire with Iraq.

Counter-parallel: The 2023-24 Red Sea attacks by Houthi forces produced a different outcome: no military carve-out was established, Western shipping largely rerouted around the Cape of Good Hope, and the maritime insurance market adjusted to a permanently higher Red Sea risk premium. Hormuz cannot sustain the Cape of Good Hope bypass because there is no alternative route for Gulf LNG exports; this structural difference forces a different resolution than the Red Sea precedent.

Consensus view: Lloyd's of London marine risk analysts and the Joint War Committee assess that the CENTCOM operational carve-out does not constitute a cleared shipping lane in insurance terms.

Vessels transiting under a military carve-out cannot obtain normal war risk cover because the insurance contract requires a declared open strait, not a negotiated exemption. Japanese and French operators are therefore self-insuring or using specialist P&I clubs, which accept the risk at a substantial premium.

Counter-view: Iranian transport economist Reza Taghizadeh-Hesary, writing in the Journal of the Persian Gulf, argues Iran's tolling system has a commercial logic that the West is misreading as hostility: Tehran is converting the strait from a free transit zone into a managed commercial route with origin-based pricing. China and Iran-linked vessels paying in yuan are establishing a parallel maritime order that Western operators will eventually join on Iran's terms.

Key tension: Whether the CENTCOM carve-out represents a temporary humanitarian arrangement pending diplomatic resolution, or the de facto beginning of a two-tier Hormuz transit system where Western vessels pay a risk and tolling premium indefinitely.

First Reported In

Update #2 · TTF EUR 42 as Russian LNG ban enters range

EnergyConnects· 15 Apr 2026

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Different Perspectives

European Commission

Commissioner Jorgensen formally acknowledged the post-Russia energy security framework cannot absorb the LNG shock, cutting the mandatory storage target from 90% to 80% and explicitly warning that normalisation is not foreseeable even with immediate peace. The Commission is now dependent on coordinated member state LNG purchasing and demand flexibility to bridge the remaining gap.

Germany

Germany holds the EU's largest storage estate but entered injection season at 23.32% fill with a 4.3 TWh/day injection ceiling that physically prevents any sprint recovery; the Bundeswirtschaftsministerium has maintained its early warning stage since July 2025. An escalation to Alarmstufe, which would trigger compulsory injection obligations, remains live if storage fails to rise through April.

QatarEnergy

QatarEnergy declared force majeure on European LNG contracts citing Ras Laffan strike damage, while the Gulf Research Centre assessed the declaration may also reflect a commercial decision to reallocate volumes toward higher-priced Asian spot markets without triggering breach penalties. Independent engineering confirmation of damage extent has not been published, leaving legal and commercial uncertainty unresolved.

Equinor / Norway

Norway remains the EU's largest pipeline gas supplier and benefits from sustained elevated TTF; Norwegian pipeline capacity has partially offset the Russian supply loss but cannot close the structural gap. Norway Zone 4 power prices at EUR 2/MWh on 13 April illustrate how hydro-dominated systems are structurally decoupled from the gas price shock affecting continental Europe.

Italy

Italy cleared day-ahead power at EUR 133/MWh on 13 April, four to five times the Iberian equivalent, because gas-fired plants set the marginal price for approximately 90% of generation hours. Italy's circa 40 GW of gas-fired CCGT capacity, built when gas was cheap and nuclear was politically blocked, is now a structural liability at EUR 47/MWh TTF.

Spain

Spain cleared at EUR 29/MWh on the same day Italy paid EUR 133/MWh, the starkest single-day demonstration that its renewable energy investment is translating directly into price shock insulation for industry. Iberian interconnector constraints at the Pyrenees mean Spain cannot export this advantage to northern European markets at scale.