14JUN

Hormuz transits climb to 13 on 28 April

4 min read

11:42UTC

Windward logged 13 crossings, up from 9 on 24 April; one outbound vessel ran AIS-dark and CENTCOM revised its blockade tally to 37 vessels.

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Key takeaway

Hormuz transits climbed to 13 on 28 April; CENTCOM revised its blockade tally to 37 vessels.

Maritime intelligence firm Windward logged 13 Strait of Hormuz crossings on 28 April 2026, up from 9 on 24 April , comprising 3 inbound and 10 outbound vessels. One outbound vessel ran AIS (Automatic Identification System) dark, with its transponder switched off in a pattern the maritime trade reads as deliberate concealment. The Windward daily, sourced from satellite AIS feeds and proprietary shipping intelligence, is the most granular public record of Hormuz tempo during the blockade.

CENTCOM (US Central Command) logged 37 vessels redirected per the 25 April US forces statement on the Windward read, a downward revision from the 38 vessels counted in the 27 April reporting . The discrepancy may be a US forces revision rather than a real decline; the figure is bracketed pending the next CENTCOM statement. The Windward-sourced clarification on LPG SEVAN corrects the seizure framing carried in : the OFAC-sourced record names the vessel as sanctioned on 25 April among 19 shadow-fleet tankers, not seized at sea. OFAC (Office of Foreign Assets Control) is the Treasury bureau that administers economic sanctions; the 25 April designation was a list-rather-than-takedown action.

Iran is drafting a bilateral transit protocol with Oman to oversee Strait of Hormuz passage , and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi told Sultan Haitham in Muscat on 26 April that any reopening must run through Tehran's terms . The 28 April rise to 13 transits sits inside that diplomatic envelope, not outside it. Three inbound versus ten outbound implies cargo running out faster than freight running in, with shadow-fleet operators clearing existing positions before any 1 May reset. The single AIS-dark outbound continues a baseline opacity rate Windward reported running at roughly 13 per cent on 24 April ; concealment tracks with the OFAC shadow-fleet designation and the wider sanctions architecture pressuring Iranian cargo carriers.

CENTCOM has logged 37 vessels redirected over the blockade and reframed the LPG SEVAN status from seizure to sanction inside three days, the tightest correction interval since the operation opened on 28 February. Brent at $111.16 sets the price record running alongside the operational tempo, and Windward's daily Hormuz transit count carries the only granular public ledger sitting between the two.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow channel through which around a fifth of all the world's oil normally passes. Before the war started, about 135 ships transited each day. On 28 April, only 13 ships made the crossing, according to the tracking company Windward. That is roughly 10% of normal traffic. One of those ships turned off its tracking signal, which tanker operators do when they want to avoid being detected. The slow traffic is why oil prices are so high: the world's most important oil route is nearly completely blocked.

What could happen next?

Consequence
CENTCOM's revised tally of 37 vessels redirected (down from 38) represents the first downward revision of the blockade figure since enforcement began, which may reflect a deliberate US forces communications correction rather than any actual change in enforcement intensity.
Risk
AIS-dark transits, as documented on 28 April, reduce CENTCOM's situational awareness of actual vessel movements through the strait, creating potential for miscalculation if an untracked vessel crosses the US enforcement perimeter without prior identification.

Source Landscape

This story draws on neutral-leaning sources from Israel

Israel

Primary parallel: The 1984-87 Tanker War in the Iran-Iraq conflict is the most structurally comparable period of Hormuz interdiction. At peak interdiction intensity in 1987, roughly 37 vessels were attacked in the strait over the year, with Lloyd's of London applying a 25-30% war-risk premium to Gulf hulls.

Transit volumes dropped by approximately 15-20% from baseline during peak months but never collapsed below 60% because neither belligerent could physically close the strait. The 2026 conflict has pushed transit volumes to 10% of baseline, a far deeper disruption, because CENTCOM's blockade enforcement adds a second-layer interdiction effect on top of Iranian mine and seizure risk.

Counter-parallel: The 1984-87 Tanker War did not involve a US Navy blockade enforcement mechanism. The current 90% traffic reduction reflects the additive effect of two enforcement regimes, CENTCOM blockade plus IRGC interdiction, operating simultaneously in the same waters, which has no direct historical precedent in Hormuz interdiction history.

At 13 transits against a 135-per-day baseline, the Hormuz disruption removes approximately 18-19 mb/d of potential throughput from global markets daily. Kpler's flow data shows shadow fleet routing of Iranian crude at roughly 1.2 mb/d reaching Chinese refiners, and Saudi Aramco has rerouted some Red Sea and Yanbu export volumes to non-Hormuz paths.

IEA's April 2026 Oil Market Report estimated the net supply disruption at 6-8 mb/d after accounting for rerouting and shadow fleet volumes. That net figure, rather than the gross 18-19 mb/d transit loss, sets the realistic price-support floor: a Hormuz reopening would remove the gross scarcity signal but the net disruption has already been partially absorbed by alternative routing, meaning a ceasefire-day Brent drop would likely settle at $85-95 rather than returning to the pre-war $63 baseline.

Consensus view: Vortexa's maritime analytics team notes that the 13-transit reading on 28 April sits within the 9-16 range that Windward has documented across the preceding week, suggesting the strait has stabilised at a new constrained equilibrium rather than continuing to decline.

Vortexa's model places genuine throughput capacity at 20-25 transits per day under current IRGC enforcement conditions, implying 7-12 transits per day are being suppressed by a combination of US blockade enforcement and Iranian interdiction risk.

Counter-view: Kpler's AIS analytics division argues the official transit count systematically understates actual throughput because AIS-dark vessels, like the outbound tanker on 28 April, are not captured in Windward's transit figures. Kpler's synthetic-aperture radar data for the same period suggested 2-4 additional uncounted vessels transiting per day under AIS suppression, meaning the true transit figure may be 15-17 rather than 13.

Key tension: Whether the 13-transit reading represents a genuine operational floor set by enforcement activity, or whether AIS-suppression is enabling a parallel dark-transit corridor that US and Iranian surveillance cannot fully monitor, making the true throughput figure systematically higher than public transit counts suggest.

First Reported In

Update #83 · UAE quits OPEC, war signs nothing

Windward· 29 Apr 2026

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Causes and effects

Caused by

Brent closes at $105.73, dark activity rises

Hormuz transits rose to 13 on 28 April, up from 9 logged in ID:2750 on 24 April.

Occurred 24 Apr 2026

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This Event

Hormuz transits climb to 13 on 28 April

Hormuz transits at 13 sit at roughly a quarter of the pre-war daily baseline, but the move higher matters: it tracks Iran's revised ceasefire signalling and the Pakistan mediator track, not a CENTCOM relaxation. The CENTCOM tally of 37 vessels redirected, revised down from 38 logged on 27 April {{EVREF:/t/iran-conflict-2026/81/centcom-blockade-widens-past-hormuz-strait/}}, tightens the operational record alongside the LPG SEVAN seizure-versus-sanction correction.

Led to

CENTCOM blockade hits 44 vessels, 69m barrels

Adm Cooper's 44-vessel count directly escalated from the 38 logged on Day 60 (ID:2879)

Occurred 30 Apr 2026

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Different Perspectives

Shipping and insurance underwriters

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Jordan

Azraq absorbed its fourth Iranian strike in seven weeks, again drawing no direct Jordanian retaliation, only an American one. Amman's exposure, hosting US basing without the Patriot density of Gulf allies, has not changed even as the war around it widens.

Houthi movement

The Houthis' 20 July blockade of Saudi-linked shipping is the injury Riyadh's new 43-nation coalition directly answers, yet the group itself was never asked to join and remains outside every proposal on the table. Sanaa-aligned commentators call the coalition a paper reassurance for insurers rather than a deployable force.

Egypt's Cabinet

Egypt confirmed the Damietta blaze was an attack, not an accident, on soil the war had never touched before. Cairo now faces an unclaimed threat to a facility supplying roughly 7% of its domestic gas, with no author to hold accountable and no pattern yet to defend against.

Oman

Muscat is running the only channel Iran will use, a voluntary Hormuz fee modelled on Malacca, but stayed out of Saudi Arabia's new naval coalition entirely. Oman's mediating leverage depends on treating Hormuz as shared and non-exclusive, the opposite of what Tehran is now demanding of it.

Iraq's Prime Minister

Al-Zaidi cancelled his first official Riyadh visit and convened the Coordination Framework, the coalition that keeps him in power and whose factions sit inside the PMF that Saudi jets just struck. He is caught between a five-year Saudi investment relationship and armed groups inside his own state he does not fully control.