27JUL

Gulf producers build around the strait

3 min read

10:27UTC

Kuwait said it would raise production as Iraq's Kirkuk-Ceyhan and Saudi Arabia's Yanbu East-West pipelines moved roughly 9 million barrels a day around Hormuz, against the strait's normal 20 million.

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Key takeaway

Gulf pipelines route about 9 million barrels a day around Hormuz, under half the strait's normal flow.

Kuwait said it would begin increasing production, and Gulf exporters drew on pipeline routes that skirt the strait of Hormuz entirely: Iraq's Kirkuk-Ceyhan line to Turkey's Mediterranean coast and Saudi Arabia's Yanbu East-West line to the Red Sea ¹. Both run crude out to open water without touching the waterway the IRGC has formally declared closed.

The two pipelines carry roughly 9 million barrels a day between them, against the strait's normal 20 million ². Producers can route under half their oil around Iran's leverage, which is why a closure threat still bites even as the workaround keeps prices calm: the alternatives soften the chokepoint without replacing it.

Three Saudi very large crude carriers reactivated their transponders off Oman on 19 June, the first confirmed commercial crossings since the closure declaration ³. Days earlier those same ships had only been positioned near Hormuz, not transiting ; by 22 June they were moving cargo across the closure line itself, turning a structural hedge for Riyadh and Baghdad into a live one.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

While Iran claims to have closed the Strait of Hormuz, Gulf oil producers have been routing crude through two alternative pipelines that avoid it entirely. One runs from Iraq's Kirkuk oilfields north to Turkey's Mediterranean coast; the other crosses Saudi Arabia from east to west, ending at the Red Sea port of Yanbu. Together these carry roughly 9 million barrels a day. The problem is that this is less than half of what normally goes through Hormuz (about 20 million barrels a day). So the world can get some oil out of the Gulf via these pipelines, but not nearly enough to replace what would normally flow through the strait. That is one reason energy prices remain elevated even as they fall from their peak.

What could happen next?

Consequence
The 9 million barrels per day pipeline ceiling means Asian refiners dependent on Gulf crude face a persistent supply gap until the Oman corridor delivers full restoration; Kuwait's production increase partially offsets this but at reduced margin given sub-$80 Brent.
Precedent
Saudi Aramco's resumption of VLCC transits through the Oman corridor, using AIS transparency rather than dark shipping, establishes a Gulf-producer norm for Hormuz reopening: producers will transit when the route is physically safe, regardless of IRGC declaration status.

Source Landscape

This story draws on neutral-leaning sources from Qatar

Qatar

Kuwait's production increase announcement adds barrels precisely when global markets are still absorbing the Hormuz disruption overhang. Kuwait's estimated budgetary breakeven is lower than Saudi Arabia's (roughly $65-70 per barrel), giving it incentive to maximise volume even at $77.54 Brent.

The three Saudi VLCCs that reactivated AIS transponders and transited via the Gulf of Oman on 19 June (advance on represent Saudi Aramco testing the Oman corridor for its own export programme. Saudi crude transit via Oman rather than the standard Hormuz lane bypasses the PGSA insurance mandate and avoids the IRGC-claimed closure zone, but adds one to two days of transit time and Oman anchorage costs to each voyage.

For downstream Asian buyers, the key variable is whether the combined pipeline-plus-Oman-corridor supply is enough to prevent physical shortages. At approximately 9-11 million barrels per day bypass (vs 20 million normal), roughly half the pre-war Gulf export volume is physically accessible. Asian refiners running at 80-90% of their 2025 Gulf-crude intake are not immediately supply-constrained, but they are running at compressed operational margins.

Consensus view: The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies has documented the structural ceiling on Gulf pipeline bypass capacity in prior Hormuz-risk analyses: Kirkuk-Ceyhan's roughly 600,000-700,000 barrels per day (damaged and intermittent since 2023 PKK attacks on Turkish territory) and Saudi Arabia's Yanbu East-West pipeline at roughly 5 million barrels per day design capacity combine to approximately 9 million barrels per day at best, against Hormuz's normal 20 million barrels per day.

This 45% ceiling is a structural fact, not a temporary constraint.

Counter-view: The Energy Policy Research Foundation (EPRINC) in Washington notes that the bypass calculation excludes the UAE's Habshan-Fujairah pipeline (capacity roughly 1.8 million barrels per day, running from Abu Dhabi to the Fujairah coast outside the Gulf), which brings the combined bypass total closer to 10-11 million barrels per day, or 55% of normal Hormuz flow. Saudi VLCCs reactivating at Hormuz to transit the Oman lane add cargo on top of the pipeline alternative.

Key tension: Whether the combination of pipeline bypass and Oman-corridor tanker transits can supply enough volume to prevent supply-shock pressure on Asian refiners during the 60-day negotiating window, without requiring a full Hormuz commercial reopening.

First Reported In

Update #135 · Trump's threats peak, his paper stays blank

Wikipedia / Kpler· 22 Jun 2026

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Causes and effects

Caused by

Saudi tankers moved, Hormuz stayed shut

The Saudi VLCCs that were only positioned near Hormuz on 19 June reactivated their transponders and transited with cargo by 22 June, advancing from positioning to confirmed transit.

Occurred 19 Jun 2026

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This Event

Gulf producers build around the strait

The bypass covers under half of normal flow, capping the panic without removing Iran's leverage.

Led to

The paper says open, water says shut

Gulf producers routing via Oman bypass capped at under half throughput contextualises the 12-ship Hormuz collapse on 22 June.

Occurred 22 Jun 2026

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Different Perspectives

Asian buyers (India, Japan, China, South Korea)

Asian refiners are absorbing 62% of Yanbu's 3.75m b/d flow, the bulk of Saudi Arabia's rerouted crude now clearing east rather than into the Atlantic basin. That destination split leaves Asian buyers more exposed to any single Yanbu-specific disruption than under the kingdom's normal multi-terminal export pattern.

Russia / Lukoil

Moscow loses the roughly $14-a-barrel legal headroom the frozen price-cap formula would otherwise have released toward $58, even as Urals trades below Russia's own $59 budget floor. The shadow-fleet insurance workaround the freeze leaves untouched remains the actual route sanctioned crude clears above $44 in practice.

European Union / Council

Brussels adopted its 21st sanctions package on 23 July, letting boarding states confiscate and sell shadow-fleet cargo outright and freezing the G7 price cap's automatic adjustment to mid-2027, converting indefinite tanker storage into recoverable value for enforcers.

Freight and tanker desks

The Baltic Exchange's TD3C VLCC benchmark, most desks' reference for Gulf freight, prices a single-vessel voyage while Saudi shippers now pay for two Suezmax charters at roughly double the transit time. That gap leaves any book hedged purely on TD3C carrying unrecognised Suezmax basis risk on the bulk of Saudi rerouted volume.

Mediterranean refiners (Sines, Trieste, Augusta)

Refiners already facing aframax rates up 198% month-on-month now watch Ain Sokhna draw 23% of Yanbu's rerouted crude through the same SUMED corridor they lean on for product backfill. Fujairah and ARA stocks near record lows leave little room to absorb a thinner Suez product flow.

Saudi Arabia

Riyadh has rerouted its entire western-coast crude book through Yanbu and Suez since the 23 July Bab el-Mandeb embargo, absorbing a roughly $2m-per-voyage Suezmax premium on every diverted cargo. The kingdom's fiscal breakeven near $108 a barrel makes that freight cost, not the blockade itself, the more durable drag on export economics.