13MAY

Araghchi denies Hormuz obstruction at BRICS Delhi

3 min read

20:00UTC

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi told BRICS foreign ministers in New Delhi on 14 May that Iran has not created any obstacles in the Strait of Hormuz, one day after Iran's Supreme National Security Council finalised a formal Hormuz security plan.

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Key takeaway

Araghchi denied Hormuz obstruction at BRICS the day after Iran's SNSC finalised a formal control architecture for the strait.

Abbas Araghchi, Iran's Foreign Minister, arrived in New Delhi on 14 May having announced his attendance at the BRICS (the Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa grouping, a multilateral forum for non-Western powers) foreign ministers meeting the previous day . In his address, he told the assembled ministers that Iran "has not created any obstacles in the strait of Hormuz" ¹. The claim was structured for a non-Western audience and delivered one day after Iran's Supreme National Security Council finalised a formal Hormuz security plan that operationalises the transit toll and corridor regime.

Deputy Foreign Minister Ali Bagheri Kani, accompanying Araghchi in Delhi, called on BRICS states to act "against US aggression." South China Morning Post reported Iran's anti-American rhetoric was testing India's balancing posture ². India is the largest non-Chinese user of Iranian-routed crude, with domestic political constraints that make open endorsement of Araghchi's framing costly; Delhi is expected to prioritise de-escalation language over bloc confrontation in the final communique.

The Persian Gulf Strait Authority (PGSA), established on 5 May, requires vessels to register, pay a transit toll in Chinese yuan, and adhere to a designated corridor . Tehran frames those requirements as regulatory, not obstructive; Araghchi's Delhi statement carries that framing to a non-Western audience that has not signed up to Washington's counter-position. The denial is designed to hold simultaneously with the operational architecture. Iran had also declared no US weapons may transit Hormuz into regional bases, announced the same day as Araghchi's denial, adding a new operational constraint while the Foreign Minister described a strait without obstacles.

The BRICS stage gives Tehran a non-Western readership that is both sympathetic and practically important. Whether the BRICS communique adopts Araghchi's "no obstacles" framing or remains neutral on the transit regime question is one of the key diplomatic tests of the Delhi meeting.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

The BRICS group, which includes Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, is a forum where non-Western countries coordinate positions. Iran's foreign minister went to their meeting in New Delhi on 14 May and told them Iran was not blocking the Strait of Hormuz. The day before, Iran's own security council had approved a formal plan to control the strait with tolls and corridors. Iran told the BRICS audience one thing and did another thing at home. The key question now is whether India, which chairs BRICS and buys a lot of Iranian oil, will back Iran's framing or stay neutral.

Deep Analysis

Root Causes

Iran's need to maintain non-Western alignment while the bilateral US-Iran track operates through Pakistan reflects a domestic constraint: Mojtaba Khamenei's government cannot be seen to negotiate with Washington without simultaneously demonstrating non-Western solidarity. The BRICS presence is a legitimacy-maintenance exercise for the domestic audience, not a negotiating move directed at Washington.

The structural tension between Araghchi's "no obstacles" claim at BRICS and the SNSC's written Hormuz security plan produced one day earlier is resolved by audience separation: the denial is for BRICS consumption, the written architecture is for operational and legal purposes. Both can coexist because they address different audiences on different registers.

What could happen next?

Consequence
BRICS communique language on Hormuz will reveal India's positioning: adoption of Iran's 'no obstacles' framing would give the PGSA toll regime non-Western multilateral cover; de-escalation language would leave Iran's regulatory framing without BRICS endorsement.
Risk
Bagheri Kani's call for BRICS states to act against US aggression tests India's chair neutrality at a time when Delhi has maintained public silence on US Iran sanctions targeting Indian firms in the Shamkhani network.

Source Landscape

This story draws on mixed-leaning sources from Hong Kong SAR China

Hong Kong SAR China

LeftRight

Primary parallel: The 2015 Vienna nuclear talks offer the closest structural match: Iran ran a bilateral US-Iran track through the P5+1 format while maintaining a separate multilateral position-staking exercise through the Non-Aligned Movement.

The dual-track approach allowed Tehran to claim both engagement with the West and solidarity with the Global South. Araghchi, who was Iran's deputy negotiator at Vienna, is now repeating the same diplomatic architecture at a larger institutional stage.

Counter-parallel: China's 2003 six-party talks on North Korea show the limits of the pattern: Beijing hosted a multilateral process that gave Pyongyang non-Western cover, but the framework ultimately required bilateral US-DPRK terms to move. The BRICS stage gives Iran audience credibility without moving the bilateral terms.

Consensus view: Crisis Group's Iran researcher Ali Vaez and the Institute for Iran-Eurasia Studies' Brenda Shaffer have both documented Iran's multi-track diplomacy pattern: Tehran runs a bilateral US channel through Pakistan while simultaneously staking out a non-Western multilateral position to prevent either track from fully closing.

Araghchi's Delhi statement fits the pattern: it maintains Iran's negotiating credibility with BRICS members without committing to the bilateral channel's terms.

Counter-view: Indian strategic affairs analyst C. Raja Mohan argues India's BRICS chair position makes Delhi a structural moderating force on any confrontational communique language: India is the largest non-Chinese user of Iranian-routed crude and cannot afford the bloc-solidarity framing Bagheri Kani requested. The BRICS communique will likely emerge as de-escalation-forward rather than anti-US, which limits the practical value of Araghchi's Delhi presence.

Key tension: Whether the BRICS communique adopts Iran's "no obstacles" framing, which would give Tehran non-Western multilateral cover for the PGSA toll regime, or adopts India's expected de-escalation language, which would limit that cover.

First Reported In

Update #97 · Chips for Beijing, no paper for Iran

South China Morning Post· 14 May 2026

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Causes and effects

Caused by

Araghchi flies to BRICS Delhi 14-15 May

Araghchi's 12 May announcement that he would attend BRICS Delhi set up his 14 May denial of Hormuz obstruction.

Occurred 12 May 2026

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Mokhber calls Hormuz an atomic-bomb equivalent

Iran's 9 May declaration of Hormuz as a strategic deterrent prefigures Araghchi's diplomatic framing as 'no obstacles' at BRICS.

Occurred 9 May 2026

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This Event

Araghchi denies Hormuz obstruction at BRICS Delhi

Iran ran a simultaneous dual operation on 13-14 May: writing institutional Hormuz architecture at home while denying obstruction to a non-Western multilateral audience abroad, a posture that claims diplomatic credibility at BRICS without ceding operational control of the strait.

Different Perspectives

NATO eastern flank (B9 + Nordics)

The B9+Nordic Bucharest joint statement on 13 May reaffirmed Ukraine's sovereignty within internationally recognised borders and backed NATO eastern flank reinforcement; the summit accepted Zelenskyy's bilateral drone deal proposal as a structural alternative to the stalled US export approval pathway, treating it as a European defence architecture question rather than aid delivery.

IAEA / Rafael Grossi

Grossi is still negotiating a sixth ZNPP repair ceasefire with no agreement after 50 days of 750 kV line disconnection; the 3 May ERCL drone strike that destroyed environmental monitoring equipment represents a qualitative escalation in infrastructure degradation that the IAEA has documented but cannot compel either party to halt.

Péter Magyar / Hungary

Magyar's incoming foreign minister pledged on 12 May that Hungary will stop abusing EU veto rights; the pledge is a statement of intent rather than a binding legal commitment, and Magyar's MEPs voted against the €90 billion loan as recently as April, while a planned referendum on Ukraine's EU accession preserves a downstream blocking lever.

EU Council and European Commission

The Magyar cabinet formation on 12 May removes the Hungary veto that had blocked the €9.1 billion first tranche since February; the Commission is now coordinating the three-document disbursement package for an early-June vote. The structural blocker is gone; the disbursement question is now scheduling, not politics.

Donald Trump / White House

Trump announced a 9-11 May three-day ceasefire with a 1,000-for-1,000 prisoner exchange attached, then called peace 'getting very close' on 11-13 May while Russia's 800-drone barrage was under way; his public framing adopted Russian diplomatic language without securing any Russian operational concession or verifying the exchange was agreed.

Vladimir Putin / Kremlin

Putin told reporters on 9 May the war is 'coming to an end' while Peskov confirmed on 13 May that territorial demands are unchanged and Russia requires full Ukrainian withdrawal from all four annexed regions; the verbal accommodation costs Moscow nothing and conditions any summit on a pre-finalised treaty Kyiv cannot accept.