
Ali Vaez
ICG Iran Project Director; leading independent analyst of Iranian nuclear strategy and US-Iran diplomacy.
Last refreshed: 30 June 2026 · Appears in 1 active topic
Is Iran's Hormuz leverage really more potent than a nuclear weapon, as Vaez argues?
Timeline for Ali Vaez
Mentioned in: Three accounts of one Doha room
Iran Conflict 2026Mentioned in: Iran hits US bases in Kuwait, Bahrain
Iran Conflict 2026Mentioned in: 11,000 trapped as exit corridor shut
Iran Conflict 2026Mentioned in: Iran and Oman claim the strait
Iran Conflict 2026Mentioned in: Vance, Ghalibaf named but pen stays dry
Iran Conflict 2026Background
Ali Vaez is the Iran Project Director at the International Crisis Group (ICG), the Brussels-based conflict prevention organisation. A specialist in Iran's nuclear programme, domestic political dynamics, and the intersection of economic pressure and regime behaviour, Vaez was involved in analysis that informed diplomatic strategy during the P5+1 negotiations that produced the 2015 JCPOA nuclear deal. He is among the most cited independent Western analysts on Iranian decision-making, regularly appearing in major international media and in European diplomatic circles where ICG analysis shapes contingency planning.
During the 2026 Iran conflict, Vaez's assessments repeatedly diverged from White House projections. In March 2026, he told CNN's Amanpour programme that the Iranian leadership was "nowhere near the brink of collapse," directly contradicting administration assertions about regime fragility. His most widely quoted observation came in April 2026, when he stated that in attempting to prevent Iran from developing a weapon of mass destruction, the US had "handed Iran a weapon of mass disruption", arguing that Tehran's ability to control the Strait of Hormuz required only "one or two drones" and was "much more potent than even a nuclear weapon." He later elaborated that Iran's conventional deterrence would be significantly degraded by the end of the war, making its stock of more than 400 kilograms of Highly Enriched Uranium a more attractive shortcut to a nuclear deterrent.
Vaez has tracked the Pakistan-mediated negotiation channel through May 2026, observing that Iran's three-pronged institutional signalling (competing lines from the IRGC, the foreign ministry, and the Parliament speaker) makes it structurally difficult to assess whether any Iranian interlocutor has authorisation to conclude a binding deal. His analysis consistently identifies the gap between Iranian elite factional interests and formal negotiating positions as the central obstacle to a durable resolution.