20APR

Four states write Hormuz rules without Washington

3 min read

10:10UTC

Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Pakistan met at Antalya on 18 April to expand the quadrilateral's scope to sanctions relief, maritime security and ceasefire guarantees. The United States had no seat at the table.

← Back to Two unsigned rulebooks collide at Hormuz Jump to analysis ↓

ConflictDeveloping

Key takeaway

The Antalya four are drafting a Hormuz settlement in a room the White House chose not to sit in.

The Antalya Diplomacy Forum on 18 April hosted the third meeting of Hakan Fidan (Turkish Foreign Minister), Prince Faisal bin Farhan (Saudi Arabia), Badr Abdelatty (Egypt) and Ishaq Dar (Pakistan) ¹. Stated scope expanded beyond any prior round to sanctions relief, maritime security and multi-state ceasefire guarantees, without a US seat at the table.

Regional officials told Bloomberg and the Associated Press a two-week ceasefire extension had been agreed in principle. White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt said the United States had not formally requested one, and Iran's Ismail Baqaei then denied the extension entirely on 20 April. The extension now rests on wire-service reporting citing regional officials; the market priced that reporting as authoritative on Friday, and the market was wrong when Brent round-tripped on Monday.

Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Pakistan are the four states whose ports, pipelines or airspace integration bear the direct weight of a Hormuz closure. Pakistan Army Chief Field Marshal Asim Munir is now the person carrying diplomatic paper Iran will read , and Pakistan Air Force F-16s are reinforcing Saudi Arabia's airspace integration in parallel. For European governments watching from Brussels, the Antalya format is where a practicable ceasefire text will plausibly be drafted, which is a shift in where the centre of gravity of the process sits.

A counter-view from Washington is that quiet Mediation works best when the United States does not claim public ownership, and that an absent US seat is tactical rather than structural. That reading sits against a 22 April ceasefire expiry with no published text behind it and no signed Iran instrument on the US side .

Deep Analysis

In plain English

Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Pakistan held their third meeting at a diplomatic conference in Antalya, Turkey on 18 April. This group has been trying to negotiate a ceasefire and keep the Strait of Hormuz open, without the United States in the room. For the first time, the four countries said they were also discussing sanctions relief for Iran. That is significant because US sanctions on Iran are the main economic weapon in the conflict, and the US Treasury controls them rather than any of these four countries. Meanwhile, regional officials told wire services a two-week ceasefire extension had been agreed in principle. But Iran's foreign ministry spokesman denied it the same day, and the White House said the US had not formally requested an extension. Only a wire service citing unnamed regional officials is confirming a deal that no government has publicly signed.

Deep Analysis

Root Causes

The Antalya quadrilateral emerged because four states have economic exposure to Hormuz throughput that Washington does not share. Turkey processes Russian crude for European re-export; Saudi Arabia and the UAE are the two largest alternative suppliers but need Hormuz stable to maintain their own export routes.

Egypt's Suez revenues depend on tanker flows that Hormuz disruption redirects; Pakistan's oil import bill is dominated by Gulf crude. All four have more direct economic incentive to stop the war than the US does.

What could happen next?

Opportunity
The Antalya format's expanded scope over sanctions relief creates a regional buy-in mechanism that could anchor a post-ceasefire deal if Washington eventually co-signs the framework.
Risk
A ceasefire extension confirmed only by wire services citing unnamed regional officials is fragile: Iran's denial and Washington's non-request leave the 22 April deadline without any signed text behind it.

Source Landscape

This story draws on mixed-leaning sources from Türkiye

Türkiye

Primary parallel: The 2015 Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA) required a P5+1 format (the US, UK, France, Russia and China plus Germany) because sanctions relief required US and EU legislative or executive action that no regional format could substitute. The Antalya quadrilateral's claim of sanctions-relief scope attempts to compress that architecture into four states, none of which control the sanctions architecture that matters most to Tehran.

Counter-parallel: The 1994 Agreed Framework with North Korea was negotiated bilaterally by the US and North Korea without a regional format, then collapsed partly because South Korea and Japan were not invested in its delivery. The Antalya model inverts that failure: it builds regional buy-in first, without US participation, which may produce regional durability at the cost of US-deliverable sanctions relief.

Consensus view: Chatham House's Sanam Vakil notes the Antalya quadrilateral's third meeting is the first time a regional format has claimed scope over sanctions relief, a domain previously treated as bilateral US-Iran territory.

By placing sanctions relief on the table, Fidan, bin Farhan, Abdelatty and Dar are collectively signalling that a regional solution may require partial sanctions unwinding that Washington has not authorised, creating a gap between what the four states are promising and what they can deliver.

Counter-view: The Ankara Policy Center's Selim Koru argues the scope expansion is deliberate diplomatic positioning: by claiming sanctions relief as a regional concern, the quartet acquires veto-adjacent status in any eventual US-Iran deal, because a ceasefire built on guarantees the four states negotiated cannot be sustained if Washington undercuts those guarantees with OFAC actions.

Fidan, bin Farhan, Abdelatty and Dar gain veto-adjacent status in any eventual US-Iran deal precisely by claiming that scope.

Key tension: Whether the quadrilateral's absence of a US seat is a diplomatic asset (Iran talks to it precisely because Washington is not in the room) or a structural limit (it cannot deliver on sanctions relief without US Treasury cooperation).

First Reported In

Update #74 · Two unsigned rulebooks collide at Hormuz

Hurriyet Daily News· 20 Apr 2026

Read original →

Different Perspectives

Jordan

Jordan has not addressed the IRGC's claim that Jordanian civilians and soldiers supplied targeting intelligence for the 20 July Aqaba strike, even as its deputy prime minister received a condemnation call over Iran's earlier missile fire. The base has now produced the war's first confirmed American deaths on Jordanian soil.

CENTCOM

CENTCOM confirmed a third American service member died in northern Iraq on 19 July clearing unexploded ordnance from a downed Iranian drone, and recovered unidentified remains at Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan. The Pentagon has framed its Khuzestan strikes as degrading IRGC capacity, a rationale that stretches to explain a reactor foundation with no nuclear material in it.

Kuwait

Kuwait's military said it was confronting Iranian attacks after the Shuaiba power and desalination complex burned for the second time in two days on 19 July, following an earlier ministry request that households ration water. Roughly 90 per cent of Kuwait's drinking water depends on the same generating units Iran keeps hitting.

IRGC

The IRGC claimed a 21st wave of Operation Nasr-2 struck Aqaba Airport and Azraq on 20 July, destroying hangars and aircraft, and thanked Jordanians for supplying intelligence. No US, Jordanian or Kuwaiti source has confirmed any part of the claim, which Press TV alone carried.

IAEA

The IAEA said it is looking into reports of a 19 July strike on the Darkhovin nuclear plant construction site, confirming inspectors found no nuclear material there on their last visit. Grossi again called for restraint near nuclear sites, a faster response than the four months of silence that followed the disputed Bushehr strike.

Shipping and war-risk insurers

War-risk premiums for Hormuz transits reached 3 to 10 per cent of hull value on 17 July, against 0.25 per cent before the war, as Brent cleared $87 and daily transits fell to eight vessels. Underwriters are pricing the confirmed UKMTO mine near the Traffic Separation Scheme, not the IRGC's unconfirmed 18 July mining claim, which CENTCOM called false.