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Iran Conflict 2026
18APR

124m barrels of Russian crude freed

4 min read
14:57UTC

The US Treasury permitted any country to purchase Russian oil already at sea, drawing sharp rebukes from European leaders who warned Washington was dismantling the sanctions regime it built.

ConflictDeveloping
Key takeaway

Washington has formally acknowledged that energy market stability now outweighs Russian revenue denial.

The US Treasury issued 30-day sanctions waivers on 12 March permitting any country to purchase approximately 124 million barrels of Russian oil already at sea, with the window running through 11 April 1. The waivers began on 5 March covering Indian refineries before expanding globally a week later. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent called the measure "narrowly tailored" but told Sky News that Russian revenue gains were "an inevitability" 2.

The waivers arrive against a transformed price environment. In January, Urals Crude traded below $38 per barrel against Brent at $62.50, and Russian oil revenues had fallen roughly 32% year-on-year . The Iran conflict reversed that trajectory. Brent reached approximately $103 per barrel by 18 March — a 65% increase — driven by the near-collapse of tanker traffic through the strait of Hormuz. Analysts at Rapidan Energy and Wood Mackenzie have called this the largest energy supply disruption since the 1973 oil embargo 3. The IEA's 400-million-barrel strategic reserve release — its largest-ever coordinated drawdown — failed to arrest the climb. Prices briefly touched $126 at peak.

European leaders responded in terms that left little ambiguity. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz — who told Trump on 3 March that Europe would not accept Ukraine terms negotiated without European participation — stated: "Easing sanctions now, for whatever reason, is wrong." European Council President António Costa said the move "impacts European security." Zelenskyy warned Russia could earn "$10 billion" over a fortnight. From Moscow, RDIF head and Special Presidential Envoy Kirill Dmitriev pushed the opposite direction, arguing the global energy market "cannot remain stable" without Russian oil 4.

The waivers expose a structural contradiction in Western sanctions policy. The regime was designed to constrain Russian revenue during a period of low oil prices. The Iran war has created conditions where every barrel Russia sells generates more revenue than the sanctions architecture was built to prevent — and where the US itself needs Russian crude on the market to contain domestic energy costs. The peace talks that froze when the Iran conflict began remain suspended; the sanctions leverage built for those negotiations is now eroding under the weight of an unrelated war. The 11 April expiry date will test whether the waiver was genuinely temporary or whether market pressure makes renewal politically unavoidable.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

The US government temporarily lifted rules preventing countries from buying Russian oil sitting on ships at sea. With oil prices spiking because of the Iran war, letting those cargoes sell was seen as the lesser evil. But once you issue this kind of temporary permission, it becomes very hard to withdraw — markets, shipping contracts, and payment channels all adapt to the new reality. Critics argue Russia collects the windfall either way, and the pause creates political and commercial pressure for further pauses.

Deep Analysis
Synthesis

The waiver is the first formal US acknowledgement that its dual-war economic containment strategy is self-defeating. It establishes a hierarchy — energy market stability ranks above revenue denial — that will constrain future sanctions design and provide adversaries with a replicable template: creating enough energy market disruption to force Western self-exemption from their own sanctions regimes.

Root Causes

The structural incompatibility of simultaneous Iran and Russia energy containment was inherent from the conflict's first week — no sanctions architecture designed for a single-conflict environment can restrict two major hydrocarbon producers simultaneously without triggering market failure. The G7 price cap ($60/barrel) was calibrated for a sub-$80 Brent environment; above $90, circumvention incentives for non-G7 buyers structurally exceed compliance costs, rendering the cap inoperative regardless of waiver decisions.

Escalation

The 11 April expiry falls during peak market stress — Brent at $103 and Hormuz disruption ongoing. Structural market pressure for extension materially exceeds political pressure for termination. The waiver's expansion from India-specific to global within one week signals scope creep that the Iran waiver precedent suggests will accelerate rather than reverse before expiry.

What could happen next?
  • Precedent

    Sanctions waivers issued under energy market duress establish a replicable template for future erosion whenever geopolitical pressure and market stability objectives conflict.

    Long term · Assessed
  • Risk

    If the 11 April expiry triggers an oil price spike, extension becomes politically mandatory — effectively converting a temporary waiver into a permanent accommodation.

    Short term · Assessed
  • Consequence

    EU member states maintaining harder sanctions lines than Washington face commercial disadvantage as non-G7 buyers access Russian oil with implicit US blessing.

    Immediate · Assessed
  • Meaning

    The seven-day expansion from India-specific to global waivers reveals Treasury had minimal confidence in a narrow application holding against market pressure.

    Immediate · Assessed
First Reported In

Update #5 · Trump frees 124m barrels; Russia earns €6bn

NBC News· 18 Mar 2026
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Different Perspectives
Lloyd's of London underwriters
Lloyd's of London underwriters
Lloyd's held its Hormuz war-risk rate at $10-14 million per voyage; underwriters need a UN Security Council resolution or formal PGSA de-listing before repricing, not a Senate testimony. The PGSA remains on the SDN list under EO 13224, so any vessel transiting a nominally reopened strait still deals with a sanctioned counterparty.
Saudi Arabia and Gulf states
Saudi Arabia and Gulf states
Brent crude at $95-97 on 2-3 June reflects Gulf producers benefiting from the conflict premium; a genuine Hormuz deal would likely cut that premium by $10-15 per barrel. Riyadh's $87 per barrel budget breakeven means the current price is comfortable, reducing the Gulf's urgency to push for a rapid settlement.
China
China
OFAC's Nobitex designation leaves China's informal bilateral currency-swap lines with Iran as the CBI's remaining rial-defence mechanism; Chinese financial institutions face secondary-sanctions risk if they interact with successor wallets. Beijing's MOFCOM Blocking Rules protect mainland refineries from direct designation but do not shield informal swap-line counterparties.
Lebanon / Hezbollah
Lebanon / Hezbollah
Lebanon's Washington delegation demanded full Israeli withdrawal and the return of 1.2 million displaced; Hezbollah deployed an FPV drone that killed an Israeli soldier at Yohmor while talks ran, demonstrating it can impose costs even at Israel's deepest penetration point. Lebanon's government cannot deliver the Hezbollah disarmament guarantee Israel demands.
Israel / Benjamin Netanyahu
Israel / Benjamin Netanyahu
Israeli forces seized Beaufort Castle above the Litani on 1-2 June and advanced to within 10 km of the Zaharani river while ceasefire delegations sat in Washington; the advance ran entirely outside the Beirut-only truce Netanyahu accepted on 1 June. Each kilometre taken raises Israel's withdrawal price before any permanent text is signed.
Iran: Foreign Ministry and domestic population
Iran: Foreign Ministry and domestic population
Araghchi rang six capitals in 48 hours to reopen talks the SNSC had suspended, calling the IRGC line 'speculation'; at home, 37 political prisoners were executed since 19 March while students marched in Tehran, Mashhad and Hamadan. The diplomatic thaw has not eased the state's wartime repression tempo.