12JUN

PGSA opens vessel portal, withholds tariff schedule

4 min read

09:18UTC

Iran's Persian Gulf Shipping Authority opened a vessel-submission portal on 18 May yet published no fee schedule by 20 May; Lloyd's of London entered no agreement.

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ConflictDeveloping

Key takeaway

An unpublished tariff preserves case-by-case IRGC leverage and keeps Lloyd's war-risk cover closed across the Hormuz corridor.

Iran's PGSA (Persian Gulf Shipping Authority) opened a vessel-submission portal and an X account on 18 May 2026 , four days after the 16 May announcement that "full details" would follow "soon" . By 20 May no fee schedule had been published. The PGSA derives its authority from the Majlis-backed Hormuz toll bill enacted in early May and has positioned itself to Lloyd's of London as the sole lawful authority for Hormuz passage certification.

Windward Maritime Intelligence reports up to $2 million per transit paid in yuan, a $1 per barrel cargo toll, and Bitcoin payments to IRGC-linked wallets ¹. No contract has surfaced. Lloyd's has not entered any agreement with PGSA; underwriters have informally signalled war-risk cover will not reopen until written rules of engagement exist somewhere, from either Iran or the 26-nation Hormuz coalition .

Iran also extended a bilateral guided-passage architecture with Iraq, Pakistan, Qatar, India and Oman, the latter confirmed by Baghaei on 18 May . Six India-flagged vessels conducted a coordinated cluster transit under Iranian operational assurances on 17 May, and Windward logged dark-AIS (Automatic Identification System) activity surging roughly 600 per cent between 19 April and 3 May. Vessels paying IRGC wallets in bitcoin or yuan go transponder-dark for the crossing, running outside the paper record PGSA is nominally building.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

Iran controls the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow channel through which roughly 20% of the world's oil passes. Since the war began, Iran has been charging ships to cross through. In May, Iran set up an official authority, the Persian Gulf Shipping Authority (PGSA), to handle the toll collection formally. They even launched a website. But as of 20 May they still have not published what the toll costs. Ships are paying up to $2 million per crossing, sometimes in Chinese currency, sometimes in cryptocurrency, with each deal individually negotiated. Shipping insurance companies, including Lloyd's of London, say they will not reopen their cover for ships crossing until someone publishes written rules. Without insurance, freight costs stay high, which means the goods those ships carry cost more everywhere.

Deep Analysis

Root Causes

The Majlis-enacted Hormuz toll bill gave the PGSA statutory authority but did not fix its fee schedule. This structure was deliberate: a legislative mandate for toll-collection combined with executive discretion over pricing preserves maximum leverage at the point of negotiation while giving Iran a legal argument that the tolls are sovereign maritime fees rather than extortion.

Lloyd's refusal to engage the PGSA reflects not hostility to the toll concept but the structural impossibility of pricing open-ended discretionary fees. War-risk underwriters model expected loss against premium income; without a known per-voyage rate there is no loss expectation to price against. The 600% dark-AIS surge compounds this: the fleet Lloyd's cannot see is the fleet Lloyd's cannot price.

What could happen next?

Consequence
Lloyd's informally conditioning war-risk cover on written governance from any Hormuz party means the tariff vacuum directly prolongs the Brent premium and shipping-cost elevation for every European economy importing via Hormuz.
Short term · 0.8
Risk
Two parallel payment systems (PGSA formal permits and IRGC-linked Bitcoin wallets) running simultaneously create a compliance minefield for shipping companies: paying IRGC-linked wallets may violate OFAC sanctions while refusing to pay blocks transit.
Immediate · 0.75
Opportunity
Iran's bilateral guided-passage architecture with Iraq, Pakistan, Qatar, India and Oman creates a de facto regional maritime governance layer that could become a foundation for a published multilateral tariff regime if the broader conflict settles.
Medium term · 0.5

Source Landscape

This story draws on neutral-leaning sources from Israel

Israel

Primary parallel: During the 1984-1988 Tanker War, Iran charged de facto passage fees through the strait of Hormuz by requiring vessels to accept IRGC escort and pay informal 'inspection fees' to IRGC naval units.

Lloyd's War Risks Rating Committee raised Gulf surcharge rates to 2.5% hull value per voyage; operators paid informal IRGC naval units without any printed schedule to reference. The PGSA in 2026 is a more formalised institutional version of that same improvised tax, now backed by Majlis legislation rather than ad hoc IRGC activity.

Counter-parallel: In 2007-2008, the Somali piracy crisis created informal coastal passage fees payable to Puntland pirate networks. Insurance markets eventually produced specific war-risk clauses and standard ransom cover (the 'Institute Warranty Limits' amendment), which required a stable enough threat actor and a settled enough payment mechanism to price.

The Somali model normalised after five years. PGSA is attempting institutional compression of that timeline, but without a published tariff there is no pricing baseline for underwriters.

At $2 million per vessel and approximately 14 vessels transiting per day (Windward's 17 May figure), the PGSA toll generates a theoretical $28 million per day in informal payments, though actual collection is lower given bilateral passage agreements that substitute political engagement for cash.

For shipping companies, the unpublished tariff creates a cost uncertainty that cannot be hedged. A published $2 million fee could be built into freight rates; a negotiated fee that might be $500,000 or $3 million on any given vessel cannot. Freight rates therefore carry a discretionary-toll premium on top of the war-risk premium, compounding the structural Brent spread the IEA model cannot explain.

Consensus view: FPRI's Michael Kofman and Atlantic Council's Jonathan Fulton assess the unpublished tariff as a deliberate operational design. Iran's IRGC has operated informal transit pricing since at least March 2026 , running individual vessel negotiations at up to $2 million per transit. The PGSA provides a formal institutional wrapper for that practice without surrendering the case-by-case leverage that generates the highest per-vessel payments.

Counter-view: Chatham House's Homayoun Alizadeh argues the opacity reflects internal institutional competition rather than strategic design: the PGSA reports through the Majlis, but the IRGC wallets receiving Bitcoin payments operate outside the PGSA's formal remit. Tehran may be managing two competing toll systems that the absence of a published tariff keeps from visibly contradicting each other.

Key tension: Whether Lloyd's of London will produce written war-risk terms conditional on any governance document from any Hormuz party, or whether the market is waiting specifically for a US-Iran written agreement before reopening cover.

First Reported In

Update #103 · Senate 50-47; UNSC at Barakah; no US paper

Windward Maritime Intelligence· 20 May 2026

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Causes and effects

Caused by

PGSA goes live on Hormuz transit

PGSA's 18 May portal launch enabled the permit system described in event 3 without producing a public fee schedule.

Occurred 18 May 2026

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Iran and Oman draft Hormuz bilateral

Baghaei's confirmation of Iran-Oman bilateral Hormuz consultations on 18 May deepened the bilateral guided-passage architecture documented in event 3.

Occurred 18 May 2026

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IRGC toll booth live at Hormuz

PGSA as a formal Majlis-backed state authority advances on and institutionalises the IRGC's ad-hoc Hormuz toll regime operational since March (ID:1447).

Occurred 23 Mar 2026

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This Event

PGSA opens vessel portal, withholds tariff schedule

The tariff vacuum preserves IRGC bargaining power per cargo and keeps Hormuz war-risk cover closed; Windward logged a 600% dark-AIS surge as informal yuan and Bitcoin channels ran parallel.

Led to

Rial bill, yuan portal, two ships

PGSA yuan/Bitcoin portal launched 18 May operates on currency rules incompatible with the Majlis rial-only bill

Occurred 20 May 2026

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Iran charts Hormuz with formal PGSA coordinates

PGSA withholding its fee schedule four days after promising one (ID:3477) is the context for the 20 May coordinate publication, which adds cartographic substance while the fee remains absent.

Occurred 20 May 2026

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Different Perspectives

Oil markets and Lloyd's of London

Brent fell to $89.25 on ceasefire probability, not new barrels, with traders voting for Trump's deed over Tehran's denial. Lloyd's has not repriced Hormuz war-risk cover because its trigger requires a UN Security Council resolution or government certification, so tanker insurance costs remain elevated regardless of the spot move.

Pakistan and Qatar mediators

Pakistan's Mohsin Naqvi was in Tehran for his second visit in under a week, using the Pakistan-Qatar channel that delivered April's ceasefire after an identical public-denial cycle. The channel carries both civilian and military buy-in from Islamabad, the only configuration Iran's split command cannot dismiss as a partial signal.

India

India summoned the US Deputy Chief of Mission after three Indian sailors were killed aboard MT Settebello, the first formal grievance from a major non-belligerent directed at US enforcement. Indian seafarers supply roughly 12 per cent of the global maritime workforce; their presence on third-flag Gulf tankers is structurally inevitable regardless of bilateral diplomacy.

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)

The IRGC declared Hormuz closed on 11 June while civilian negotiators were on the same mediation channel, then issued no public comment on the MoU framework. Its silence on the framework, rather than any foreign ministry statement, is the operative approval signal; the corps' unilateral Hormuz closure shows it did not treat the diplomatic track as binding on its operations.

Iran foreign ministry (Baghaei)

Esmail Baghaei told IRNA that reports of a finalised deal were 'merely speculation' and that Iran had 'not yet made a final decision'. The denial is structurally identical to Iranian foreign ministry statements during the April ceasefire talks, which produced a binding text within 48 hours of the same language.

Trump administration / CENTCOM

Trump cancelled the third strike day and called the MoU 'very strong' and almost ready to sign, while CENTCOM kept tanker enforcement running in the same 24-hour window. The administration is simultaneously withdrawing the military pressure it claims drove the deal and sustaining the enforcement campaign it is trying to trade away.