Kazem Gharibabadi
Iran's deputy foreign minister for legal affairs and lead nuclear negotiator from 2024.
Gharibabadi countered Oman's voluntary-fee Hormuz proposal on 30 July by demanding Iran control its own territorial lane plus part of the opposite lane, the latest hardening in his handling of the strait's routing dispute.
Last refreshed: 31 July 2026 · Appears in 2 active topics
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Kazem Gharibabadi has served as Iran's Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs for Legal and International Affairs since September 2024 and is Tehran's designated nuclear negotiator for the Islamabad MOU process. A jurist by training, he previously served as Deputy Head of the Judiciary and headed Iran's Human Rights Headquarters, the body responsible for Iran's official UN reporting, before moving into diplomacy, and he was formerly Iran's ambassador in Vienna, the seat of the IAEA.
He is the son-in-law of Brigadier General Mohammad Baqer Zolqadr, a senior IRGC commander and Secretary of the Expediency Discernment Council, a family tie that gives him standing within the Supreme Leader's security circle alongside his legal specialism. In February 2026, lawyers filed a Universal-jurisdiction complaint against him in Switzerland alleging crimes against humanity over the crackdown following Mahsa Amini's death in custody in 2022.
Gharibabadi's combination of IRGC-adjacent family ties and legal training positions him to police the precise wording of any emerging nuclear agreement while retaining credibility with hardliners, making him a pivotal figure in Iran's divided foreign-policy apparatus rather than a purely technical negotiator.
Gharibabadi counters Oman's Hormuz fee plan
Gharibabadi rejected Oman's voluntary-fee proposal for policing the Strait of Hormuz on 30 July, countering with a demand that Iran control not only its own territorial shipping lane but part of the lane on the opposite, Omani side. The move follows weeks of splits among the fee's own authors over how any Hormuz policing arrangement should work.
As Iran's deputy foreign minister for legal affairs, Gharibabadi is the official through whom Tehran's negotiating position on the strait passes, and his lane demand raises Iran's price for any routing deal well beyond a fee dispute into a question of territorial control.
Gharibabadi sets conditions before inspectors return
At the Islamabad MOU signing on 14 June, Gharibabadi declared the text was drafted "in continued distrust" and named three preconditions for substantive talks: lifting the naval blockade, formally ending military operations, and releasing frozen Iranian funds. On 26 June he hardened that position further, setting two explicit conditions for any IAEA inspector return: a completed final agreement and termination of all sanctions, both unmet with no agreed timetable.
That sequencing leaves verification trailing any eventual deal rather than underpinning it, a structural choice that narrows what the 60-day MOU window can realistically deliver.
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