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Iran Conflict 2026
18MAR

Migrant workers bear the Gulf's losses

3 min read
06:00UTC

Human Rights Watch documents 11 dead and 268 injured across Gulf states from Iranian strikes — the majority migrant workers with no political voice in the conflict killing them.

ConflictDeveloping
Key takeaway

Pezeshkian's broken apology proves Iran's civilian government does not control IRGC targeting decisions.

Human Rights Watch documented at least 11 civilian deaths and 268 injuries across Gulf States from Iranian strikes since 28 February 1. Migrant workers comprise the majority of victims. The report catalogues strikes on residential buildings, hotels, civilian airports, embassies, and financial centres — infrastructure with no military function, staffed and inhabited overwhelmingly by foreign labour.

The demographics explain the casualty pattern. Expatriates make up roughly 88% of the UAE's population, 85% of Qatar's, and 70% of Kuwait's — overwhelmingly South Asian, Southeast Asian, and East African workers who run the ports, oil terminals, airports, and construction sites Iran is now striking. Many live in densely packed housing without access to reinforced shelters. Many work under the Kafala sponsorship system, which restricts their ability to leave the country without employer permission. When Oman suffered its first wartime deaths — two foreign nationals killed by a drone in the al-Awahi Industrial Area — the dead were workers, not soldiers or citizens. The first fatality inside Abu Dhabi was a person of Palestinian nationality struck by a missile in Al Bahyah .

Pezeshkian's 8 March apology and pledge to stop targeting neighbouring states produced no change in Iranian fire 2. The UAE intercepted 10 ballistic missiles and 45 drones on 17 March alone, closing its airspace for hours. Cumulative Gulf interceptions exceed 2,000 since 28 February. The Security Council's Resolution 2817 — passed 13–0 with a record 135 co-sponsors condemning Iran's attacks on neighbours — has had no observable effect on targeting. The IRGC has declared all US interests in the UAE 'legitimate targets' , a designation encompassing the commercial infrastructure where migrant workers spend their days. These workers cannot vote, cannot petition their governments for protection, and in many cases cannot leave. They face the war's highest civilian exposure and hold no voice in how it ends.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

When a country's president apologises for attacking civilian targets and the attacks continue without pause, it reveals who actually controls the military. In Iran's governance structure, the IRGC reports to the Supreme Leader — not to the civilian president. Pezeshkian's 8 March apology was either disregarded by the IRGC or was never intended to bind its operations. This matters enormously for diplomacy. Any ceasefire negotiated with Pezeshkian's government cannot be reliably assumed to halt IRGC missiles. The gap between civilian government statements and IRGC actions is not a malfunction of Iranian governance — it is a documented structural feature that any negotiation framework must explicitly account for.

Deep Analysis
Synthesis

Pezeshkian's unimplemented apology simultaneously provides diplomatic cover for the civilian government — which can claim moderation to Western interlocutors — and operational freedom for the IRGC. This dual-track structure has been analytically documented since at least 2009 and represents a deliberate governance arrangement rather than a coordination failure. Any ceasefire or de-escalation framework that does not separately and explicitly bind IRGC operational decision-making is structurally inadequate to the institutional reality it must address.

Root Causes

The kafala sponsorship system in Gulf states ties migrant workers' legal residency to individual employers, preventing voluntary evacuation without risking deportation. Workers concentrated in dense labour camps and non-reinforced residential buildings lack access to hardened shelter infrastructure built for citizens. These structural conditions — not incidental targeting — systematically expose the migrant population to disproportionate casualty rates during any strike campaign.

Escalation

HRW's finding that Pezeshkian's apology was followed by uninterrupted attacks is a structural indicator that Iranian civilian diplomatic signals carry no operational weight. This creates a fundamental verification problem for any ceasefire mechanism: civilian government assurances alone cannot bind IRGC behaviour, and no alternative binding authority has been identified.

What could happen next?
  • Meaning

    IRGC disregard for Pezeshkian's apology confirms that Iran's civilian government cannot deliver operational compliance in any ceasefire agreement without explicit IRGC buy-in.

    Immediate · Assessed
  • Consequence

    Migrant worker casualties will generate diplomatic pressure from South Asian governments whose remittance-dependent economies are directly exposed to Gulf labour market disruption.

    Short term · Assessed
  • Risk

    Kafala system prevents voluntary worker evacuation, meaning migrant casualty exposure will grow proportionally with strike tempo without any legal self-protection mechanism available.

    Immediate · Assessed
  • Precedent

    HRW's evidentiary documentation of civilian targeting patterns establishes a foundation for future international humanitarian law accountability proceedings against identifiable IRGC commanders.

    Long term · Suggested
First Reported In

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Human Rights Watch· 18 Mar 2026
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Different Perspectives
India
India
India buys more Saudi crude than any other country and has 2.5 million nationals working in the kingdom, so a $100 Brent and a live strike on Saudi tankers reach New Delhi through both fuel bills and remittance risk. Neither channel has an alternative route the way Saudi Arabia's own pipeline does.
Qatar
Qatar
Qatar co-authored the four-mediator ten-day ceasefire proposal alongside Egypt, Pakistan and Oman, centred on resuming Hormuz navigation, while separately pursuing its dated compensation claim against Iran at the UN Security Council filed on 21 July. Doha is mediating and litigating in the same week.
Israel
Israel
Israeli intelligence, reported by the Wall Street Journal, assesses Iran moved thousands of centrifuges and part of its roughly 440kg enriched-uranium stock into Pickaxe Mountain after the June 2025 strikes on its three main nuclear sites. Some of the US refuelling aircraft now deploying to the region are bound for Israeli bases and Ramon Airport.
Houthis
Houthis
Yahya Saree announced the missile and drone strikes on the Encelia and Layla on 22 July as enforcement of the embargo his forces had declared by radio warning alone two days earlier. Six vessels already turned back on the broadcast; the strike shows Houthi forces will use weapons once warnings stop working.
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia's state news agency confirmed only a fire on the Encelia's bow, with the crew safe; the Layla strike remains unconfirmed by Riyadh. The kingdom built its Petroline pipeline specifically to bypass Hormuz through the Red Sea, so the tanker fire lands on the route Riyadh had already spent billions escaping.
United States
United States
Washington is weighing both ten-day proposals but wants a longer truce than either offers, and moved F-16 and F-35 jets plus refuelling aircraft into the region while it decides. That deployment, not Trump's Pickaxe Mountain remarks, is the measurable US action, buying options for the day talks fail rather than betting on them.