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Iran Conflict 2026
6MAR

Houthis sidelined by 2025 strikes

4 min read
04:48UTC

Al Jazeera concludes Israeli strikes last summer destroyed Ansar Allah's command structure months before the war — leaving weapons without officers to coordinate their use.

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ConflictAssessed
Key takeaway

The Houthis' silence reveals that Israel pre-emptively neutralised Iran's most geographically positioned proxy before the war began, exposing a critical miscalculation in Iran's deterrence architecture.

Al Jazeera published analysis on Friday attributing Ansar Allah's absence from the Iran conflict to Israeli strikes in August–September 2025 that destroyed the group's military command structure. The Houthi leader's televised warning on Day 5 — "our fingers are on the trigger, ready to respond at any moment" — was, by Al Jazeera's assessment, rhetoric from a force whose trigger fingers belonged to officers already dead.

The distinction the analysis draws is between weapons platforms and operational capability. Yemen's Houthis retain the drones, ballistic missiles, and anti-ship missiles they used to disrupt Red Sea commercial shipping throughout 2023–2024, when their campaign forced Maersk, MSC, and other major container lines to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope, effectively doubling Asia-to-Europe transit times. What they lack is the command-and-control layer — the mid-ranking officers who plan targeting sequences, coordinate timing with Iranian logistics, and translate strategic intent into the kind of complex, multi-domain operations the group executed during the Red Sea crisis. Possessing an arsenal is not the same as possessing the organisational capacity to employ it.

For Tehran, the absence is doctrinal. Iran's "axis of resistance" was built around simultaneous pressure on multiple fronts: Hezbollah from Lebanon, Ansar Allah from Yemen, allied militias from Iraq and Syria. In this war, Hezbollah has engaged — launching coordinated strikes with Iranian forces against Tel Aviv and Haifa — but from a force severely degraded by Israel's 2024 campaign that killed much of its senior leadership. Iraqi militias have remained largely quiet. And the Houthis, who were arguably the most operationally active of Iran's partners eighteen months ago, are absent entirely.

The strategic consequence is plain. Iran is fighting without the distributed multi-front pressure its defence doctrine assumed it would have. The Bab el-Mandeb strait, which Ansar Allah controlled as a chokepoint lever throughout 2024, remains open. One of Iran's three designed pressure points — the southern front that was supposed to stretch US naval forces between the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea — was neutralised months before the first American strike fell on 28 February. The war Iran prepared to fight with allies is not the war Iran is fighting alone.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

Having weapons is not the same as being able to use them effectively. The Houthis have missiles and drones, but the experienced officers who knew how to plan and coordinate major operations — the people who would decide what to target, how to time attacks, and how to synchronise with Iran — were killed in Israeli strikes months before this war started. Without that command layer, the weapons sit idle. It is roughly analogous to an army that still has tanks but has lost all its officers who know how to drive and manoeuvre them in coordination. The Houthi leader's tough talk about being 'ready to strike' was real in the sense that the hardware exists; it was hollow in the sense that the organisation to use it effectively no longer does.

Deep Analysis
Synthesis

The operational silence of the Houthis retroactively reveals that Iran entered this conflict with a materially weaker proxy network than its pre-war deterrence posture implied. If Iranian decision-makers believed Houthi participation was available as a credible second-front threat — and the Day 5 rhetoric suggests they did, or were content to let adversaries believe so — then Iran's escalation calculus was based on a false order-of-battle. This is a strategic intelligence failure with implications beyond this conflict: it suggests adversaries can degrade Iran's extended deterrence through pre-conflict proxy decapitation without triggering the war those proxies were meant to deter.

Root Causes

The Houthis' geographic isolation in Yemen makes organic command reconstitution uniquely difficult — unlike Hezbollah, which can draw on Lebanese and Syrian cadres and Iranian advisers with short logistics lines, the Houthis cannot rapidly import replacement command talent. Iran's Axis of Resistance model delegates both weapons and operational autonomy to proxies, but that decentralisation creates a structural vulnerability: each node's effectiveness is bounded by its own command depth, not Iran's overall personnel pool.

Escalation

Houthi absence removes a distributed pressure-release valve from Iran's strategic toolkit: rather than dispersing Western defensive resources across multiple theatres, Iran must absorb the entire counter-force effort in the Gulf. This concentrates, not reduces, pressure on Iran's remaining direct-fire assets and may push Iranian commanders toward higher-intensity use of the assets they do control.

What could happen next?
  • Consequence

    The Red Sea and Bab-el-Mandeb remain open to commercial shipping, preserving the Europe-Asia container lane and preventing a second simultaneous chokepoint closure that would compound the Hormuz crisis.

    Immediate · Assessed
  • Precedent

    Israel has demonstrated that pre-conflict command decapitation of a proxy force is operationally achievable and strategically decisive — establishing a template other states will study for neutralising Iran's proxy network before future contingencies.

    Long term · Assessed
  • Risk

    Iraqi Shia militias and remaining Hezbollah elements — the other major Axis of Resistance nodes — now face the same pre-emptive targeting logic and may be subjected to analogous Israeli or US degradation operations before any further regional escalation.

    Short term · Suggested
  • Meaning

    Iran's deterrence architecture assumed proxy network breadth as a force multiplier; the Houthi situation reveals that breadth was already structurally compromised, narrowing Iran's actual strategic options relative to its declared posture.

    Immediate · Assessed
Sources:Al Jazeera
Mentions:attrition →Persian Gulf →Haifa →CMA CGM →Maersk →Red Sea →Tel Aviv →National Security Council (Iran) →Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) →Strait of Hormuz →Al Jazeera →Houthis →Lebanon →Syria →Iran →Tehran →Israel →Hezbollah →Yemen →
First Reported In

Update #25 · Russia shares targeting data on US forces

Al Jazeera· 7 Mar 2026
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Causes and effects
Caused by
Houthis signal readiness to join the war
Houthi leader's 'fingers on the trigger' rhetoric explained as posturing from a force whose command structure was destroyed by Israeli strikes months prior; rhetoric was performative, not operational
Occurred 6 Mar 2026
Read story →
This Event
Houthis sidelined by 2025 strikes
The Houthis' absence means Iran's 'axis of resistance' multi-front strategy — designed to stretch US and Israeli defences across the Red Sea, Lebanon, and the Gulf simultaneously — has failed to activate at the moment Tehran needed it most, leaving the Bab el-Mandeb chokepoint unexercised and Iran fighting what is effectively a single-front war.
Different Perspectives
South Korean financial markets
South Korean financial markets
South Korea, which imports virtually all its crude oil, is absorbing the war's economic transmission most acutely among non-belligerents. The second KOSPI circuit breaker in four sessions — with Samsung down over 10% and SK Hynix down 12.3% — reflects an industrial economy unable to reprice energy costs that have risen 72% in ten days. The market response indicates Korean industry cannot sustain oil above $100 per barrel without margin compression across manufacturing, semiconductors, and shipping.
Migrant worker communities in the Gulf
Migrant worker communities in the Gulf
The first confirmed civilian deaths in Saudi Arabia — one Indian and one Bangladeshi killed, twelve Bangladeshis wounded — fell on communities with no voice in the military decisions that placed them in harm's way. Migrant workers live near military installations because that housing is affordable, not by choice. Bangladesh and India face the dilemma of needing to protect nationals who cannot easily leave a war zone while depending on Gulf remittances that fund a substantial share of their domestic economies.
Azerbaijan — President Ilham Aliyev
Azerbaijan — President Ilham Aliyev
Aliyev treats the Nakhchivan strikes as a direct act of war against Azerbaijani sovereignty, placing armed forces on full combat readiness and demanding an Iranian explanation. The response is calibrated to maximise international sympathy while stopping short of military retaliation — Baku cannot fight Iran alone and needs either Turkish or NATO backing to credibly deter further strikes.
Oil-importing nations (Japan, South Korea, India)
Oil-importing nations (Japan, South Korea, India)
The Hormuz closure is an existential threat. Japan, South Korea, and India receive the majority of their crude through the strait — they will bear the heaviest economic cost of a war they had no part in.
Global South governments (Indonesia, Brazil, South Africa)
Global South governments (Indonesia, Brazil, South Africa)
Neutrality was possible when the targets were military. 148 dead schoolgirls made it impossible — no government can explain that away to its own citizens.
Turkey
Turkey
Has absorbed three Iranian ballistic missile interceptions since 4 March without invoking NATO Article 5 consultation. Each incident narrows Ankara's political room to continue absorbing without Alliance-level response.