Skip to content
Briefings are running a touch slower this week while we rebuild the foundations.See roadmap
Iran Conflict 2026
4MAR

Treasury Drops Cuba From Russian-Crude Waiver

4 min read
04:21UTC

OFAC issued General License 134C on Monday 18 May after a 48-hour enforcement gap, extending the Russian-crude waiver another 30 days while explicitly excluding Cuba from coverage from 17 June.

ConflictDeveloping
Key takeaway

The third 30-day bridge confirms the waiver is permanent in fact; Cuba's exclusion makes it a foreign-policy lever.

The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), the US Treasury sanctions arm that controls Russia-related authorisations, issued General License 134C on Monday 18 May 2026, two days after General License 134B expired at the close of Saturday 16 May . The new licence authorises delivery, offloading and ancillary services for Russian crude loaded on or before 17 April, through 17 June 2026 1. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent framed the extension as helping 'the most vulnerable nations' access stranded cargoes.

The 48-hour gap between GL 134B's expiry and GL 134C's issuance is the second consecutive enforcement cliff Treasury has run and then patched . GL 134A through GL 134C now form a pattern of monthly bridges rather than termination: Treasury manages the waiver in 30-day windows it can withhold, while the wider sanctions architecture, including the Rosneft and Lukoil Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) redesignations Bessent confirmed on 16 April , remains in place.

The Cienfuegos refinery in Cuba, which had been receiving Russian crude under GL 134B sanctions cover, loses its US licence on 17 June. The new text cuts Cuba from coverage alongside Iran, North Korea and occupied Ukrainian territories. Cuba's grid recovery had been built on that Russian supply line; the island's roughly 337 MW relief contribution from Cienfuegos throughput is now on a clock with no obvious replacement.

The Cuba carve-out matters because it reveals what the GL 134 series actually is. A pure market-stability instrument would treat all third-country buyers identically; a foreign-policy lever picks winners and losers. Bessent has just used the same authorisation to keep Indian and Chinese refiners covered for another month while pulling cover from a single politically isolated buyer. The enforcement mechanism for in-transit Sovcomflot cargoes already loaded under GL 134B is not detailed in the published licence, which leaves the Cienfuegos restart pathway dependent on Treasury clarification that has not yet arrived.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

The US government controls which countries can legally handle Russian oil through a series of special licences. On 18 May it issued General License 134C, the third monthly bridge, and Cuba lost its coverage. Cuba had been getting Russian oil through a previous version of the licence. Its main refinery at Cienfuegos loses US permission to receive Russian oil from 17 June onwards. Cuba's electricity system has been in crisis for years and depends on that oil. The US is using the monthly licence like a dial it can turn. Countries it wants to keep on-side (India, China) stay covered. Countries it wants to pressure (Cuba, Iran) get cut out. Russia still gets to sell its oil to the covered buyers, but the US controls who those buyers are.

Deep Analysis
Root Causes

The GL 134 rolling series reflects a structural contradiction in US Russia policy: the SDN redesignations of Rosneft and Lukoil on 16 April were politically necessary to maintain sanctions credibility with European allies, but the market impact of hard enforcement on both companies simultaneously would have sent Brent above $120 and created humanitarian fuel shortages in six or seven smaller economies dependent on Russian crude.

The Cuba carve-out has a separate root cause. Cuba's Cienfuegos refinery had been receiving Russian crude under GL 134B with Washington's tacit acceptance. Cutting Cuba specifically while keeping India and China covered signals that Treasury is using the waiver to enforce foreign-policy priorities unrelated to Russia sanctions: Havana's alignment with Moscow and Venezuela on hemispheric issues made it the expendable buyer in the 17 June reset.

What could happen next?
  • Precedent

    The Cuba exclusion establishes that OFAC can use the GL 134 series to impose country-specific costs independent of the wider Russia sanctions regime, turning a market-stability tool into a precision foreign-policy instrument.

    Medium term · Assessed
  • Risk

    If GL 134D does not appear before 17 June, Asian refiners holding in-transit Russian cargoes face a brief period of legal uncertainty that could spike charter rates and insurance premiums for the shadow fleet.

    Immediate · Reported
  • Consequence

    Cuba's grid recovery, which had been partially stabilised by Cienfuegos throughput, faces renewed electricity crisis from 17 June without an identified replacement crude supply.

    Short term · Reported
First Reported In

Update #17 · Istanbul talks, refineries dark, deficit overruns

IAEA· 22 May 2026
Read original
Causes and effects
This Event
Treasury Drops Cuba From Russian-Crude Waiver
A third consecutive 30-day rolling licence confirms Treasury is running the Russian-crude waiver as a managed permanent instrument, and the Cuba exclusion turns that instrument into a country-specific foreign-policy lever.
Different Perspectives
Oil markets / Lloyd's underwriters
Oil markets / Lloyd's underwriters
Futures markets priced CENTCOM's strikes-complete statement as a de-escalation signal and pushed Brent down 1.7 per cent to $94.71, even as the IRGC declared Hormuz closed. Lloyd's war-risk premiums held elevated because institutional de-listing requires a UN Security Council resolution that Russia and China have just shown they will block.
Pakistan (mediator)
Pakistan (mediator)
Interior minister Mohsin Naqvi carried dual civilian and military letters to Mojtaba Khamenei in Tehran on 6-7 June with no public response. The IRGC's Hormuz closure on 11 June shows the corps is acting independently of the channel Pakistan is using, making the mediation structurally unable to produce a binding commitment without direct IRGC access.
Russia and China
Russia and China
Russia and China voted against GOV/2026/40 at the IAEA Board, following through on the blocking position coordinated with Grossi in Geneva on 5 June; both states continue to oppose Western institutional pressure on Iran at every multilateral venue.
E3 and IAEA (UK, France, Germany)
E3 and IAEA (UK, France, Germany)
The E3 co-sponsored IAEA resolution GOV/2026/40, adopted 21-3-10 on 10 June, demanding Iran disclose 440.9 kg of unaccounted HEU and admit inspectors to four denied facilities. The 10 abstentions and Russia-China noes leave any Security Council referral without a viable enforcement path.
IRGC / Iran military command
IRGC / Iran military command
The corps declared Hormuz closed to all traffic on 11 June and claimed two vessels struck, overriding the MoU its own civilian negotiators were pursuing through Pakistan. The closure order used the Persian Gulf Strait Authority apparatus to convert a toll mechanism into a military prohibition.
Trump administration / CENTCOM
Trump administration / CENTCOM
CENTCOM completed a second day of strikes on Tehran, Sirik and Minab, rejected the IRGC Hormuz closure as inconsistent with observed transit, and said strikes were complete. Hegseth framed the bombing explicitly as the negotiation: the method is coercive deal-making with no stated pause threshold.