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Iran Conflict 2026
7AUG

Iran's Majlis ratifies 12-article Hormuz sovereignty law

3 min read
12:08UTC

The National Security Committee of Iran's parliament cleared a 12-article statute on 2 May that permanently bars Israeli vessels and demands war reparations from 'hostile' states before transit; a full chamber vote is pending.

ConflictDeveloping
Key takeaway

Tehran has converted a wartime posture into peacetime statute; any ceasefire now has more architecture to unwind.

The National Security Committee of Iran's Majlis ratified a 12-article 'Law on Establishing Iran's Sovereignty over the strait of Hormuz' on Saturday 2 May; the full 290-seat chamber vote is pending and expected within days 1. Article 1 permanently bars Israeli vessels. Ships from countries Tehran designates as 'hostile' must pay 'war reparations' before receiving a transit permit. Non-hostile vessels would pay tolls labelled as 'environmental and security services'. The Majlis is Iran's elected legislature; the National Security Committee is the body that moves defence and foreign-policy bills before the floor takes them.

Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei issued a written statement on 30 April announcing 'new management' of the strait ; the bill is the legislative half of that framing, closing the gap between operational practice and legal claim. Where the IRGC has been collecting transit demands informally for weeks, the new law arms the Guard with domestic legal cover for whatever escalation comes next. Iranian state-wire reporting does not pin a date for the chamber vote, but committee passage in this configuration typically clears the floor without amendment.

Washington's parallel posture sits in sharp contrast. The State Department launched the Maritime Freedom Construct with CENTCOM on 30 April; on Day 65, it still has no named member countries . The UK-France Northwood coalition, run from the Permanent Joint Headquarters in northwest London, has 50-plus nations in operational planning. Tehran has just legislated against an American posture that has yet to find members and a European posture that has yet to draft engagement rules. UNCLOS, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, prohibits transit-passage tolls in principle, and the European Union cited that doctrine in rejecting Trump's earlier toll joint venture. In practice, enforcement happens at the gun, not at The Hague. The Majlis vote gives the IRGC a domestic statute to point to when the next vessel is stopped.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

Iran's parliament passed a law on 2 May declaring that Iran controls the Strait of Hormuz and can charge ships for passing through it. The law permanently bans Israeli ships from the strait and says that ships from countries Iran considers hostile must pay war compensation before they can pass. International maritime law says Iran cannot do this, but Iran never signed that international law. The full 290-member parliament still has to vote to make the law final. In practice, whether the law works depends on whether Iranian naval forces choose to enforce it, not on what lawyers say about it.

Deep Analysis
Root Causes

Iran never ratified UNCLOS, the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, precisely because Article 38 codifies transit-passage rights through international straits that would prevent exactly the toll mechanism the 2 May law attempts. Tehran's 2024 updates to domestic maritime law created the 'hostile-linked vessel' category the Hormuz law builds on.

The Israeli-vessel permanent bar in Article 1 reflects a different structural driver: Mojtaba Khamenei's political legitimacy rests partly on opposing normalisation with Israel. Codifying the Israeli ban in statute anchors it against any future Iranian government that might negotiate a different posture, making it constitutionally durable rather than policy-reversible.

What could happen next?
  • Precedent

    A 290-seat Majlis vote passing the Hormuz sovereignty law would give it constitutional standing in Iran's domestic legal order, making it harder for any post-war Iranian government to abandon the toll framework without appearing to repudiate parliamentary authority.

    Medium term · 0.75
  • Risk

    The Israeli vessel ban in Article 1 creates a permanent legal obstacle to any normalisation between Israel and Iran that includes Hormuz transit, linking the law's lifetime to the broader Israel-Iran conflict resolution rather than to this war alone.

    Long term · 0.8
  • Consequence

    The Maritime Freedom Construct (ID:2948), with still no named member countries on Day 65, gains a specific legal adversary it can point to: a named statute rather than an informal toll mechanism, which may accelerate coalition-building around a named counter-framework.

    Short term · 0.6
First Reported In

Update #87 · China blocks OFAC; Iran writes; Trump tweets

Iran International· 3 May 2026
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Different Perspectives
Turkiye
Turkiye
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Oman
Oman
Muscat is the corridor's broker but has published nothing about the arrangement Fars describes on its behalf. The account leaves Oman administering outbound traffic only, a narrower role than the shared route its mediation has rested on since 1979.
Pakistan
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Islamabad sent Sharif, Munir and Dar to Jeddah to widen a defence commitment it has honoured in cheaper registers since March, when Dar invoked the Saudi mutual defence pact. Jeddah tests whether that hedge becomes a binding trilateral instrument with Turkiye.
United States
United States
Washington rejected the Majlis Hormuz bill outright while CENTCOM's own tally kept climbing to 49 vessels redirected since 14 July. Both instruments tightened in the same week Trump promised the strait would reopen soon.
Iran
Iran
Iran's foreign ministry is selling a phased Hormuz corridor through Oman and denying any percentage cargo tariff, while its own Majlis is legislating fines to 20% and a bar on Israeli-linked cargo. The two accounts, from the same government, do not agree with each other.
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia
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