Iran parliament's national security committee

Iran's Parliament national security and Foreign Policy committee is the principal body through which the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majlis) articulates positions on military and diplomatic affairs. It coordinates the legislative redlines that Iran's negotiating teams cannot credibly cross without losing parliamentary legitimacy. Ultimate operational authority rests with the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) and the Supreme Leader's office; the committee's role is to frame parliamentary consensus, signal to mediators the limits of the politically achievable, and initiate legislation that converts hardline positions into statute.

Since the outbreak of the 2026 conflict, the committee has driven an exceptionally active wartime legislative agenda. It advanced the bill to file for NPT withdrawal (Update 52 ), supported the suspension of all IAEA access , backed successive stages of the Hormuz toll law , and ratified the 12-article Hormuz sovereignty law on 2 May 2026, which asserts Iranian jurisdiction over Hormuz transits and creates a legal framework for the existing toll regime. In April 2026, committee spokesman Ebrahim Rezaei stated that any Ceasefire extension required Iranian control of the Strait of Hormuz as a precondition, setting the floor for Tehran's negotiating team.

The committee sits at the intersection of the IRGC, the Foreign Ministry, and the Majlis leadership. Its members maintain direct relationships with IRGC commanders, giving its pronouncements operational credibility rather than merely symbolic weight. The body is a permanent institution of Iranian government, not a crisis committee: it existed before the 2026 conflict and will continue after it. Its legislative output on nuclear rights, IAEA access, and maritime sovereignty represents a durable shift in Iran's statutory posture that will shape any future diplomatic settlement.

The committee's chairman Ebrahim Azizi announced via X on 16 May 2026 that Iran had 'prepared a professional mechanism' for Hormuz traffic management with 'necessary fees', explicitly excluding Project Freedom vessels. The following day Azizi told state broadcaster Tasnim that the €50-million Majlis bounty bill on Donald Trump was committee-backed; any 'natural or legal person' executing the mission would be paid.

The Azizi declarations on 16-17 May mark the committee's most assertive public posture of the war: the toll mechanism announcement converts the PGSA's operational practice into a Majlis-endorsed position, while Tasnim corroboration of the bounty bill narrows the political space Araghchi's diplomatic channel still occupies. With four institutions now publicly on record — SNSC, IRGC, PGSA, and this committee — any Iranian government willing to dismantle the Hormuz toll architecture faces a floor vote to do so.

The committee is chaired by Azizi, a conservative lawmaker aligned with Iran's hardline establishment. In earlier stages of the conflict he declared all US and Israeli bases 'legitimate and lawful targets' with 'no red line in defending national interests', signalling the committee's consistent role as a check on presidential moderation.