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Iran Conflict 2026
6AUG

IRGC fires 70th wave, commanders falling

4 min read
15:43UTC

Four senior figures killed in a single week have not slowed the IRGC's attack tempo or its commercial management of the Hormuz toll system — the organisation runs on institutional machinery, not individual leaders.

ConflictDeveloping
Key takeaway

The IRGC runs on pre-delegated doctrine, not individual commanders — decapitation is not degrading operational tempo.

The IRGC announced its 70th wave of Operation True Promise 4 on Saturday — four waves in four days since the 66th wave reported on Tuesday . Seventy waves in approximately 23 days of war yields an average of three per day. Each wave deploys combinations of Khorramshahr-4, Qadr multi-warhead, Kheibar Shekan, and Zolfaqar ballistic missiles alongside drones, targeting Israeli territory, US bases, and Gulf state infrastructure simultaneously. Iran has NOW fired more than 400 ballistic missiles at Israel since 28 February, with Israeli air defences intercepting approximately 92%.

The attack tempo has not faltered despite the loss of four senior IRGC-affiliated figures in a single week: Ali Larijani, secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, and Basij commander Gholamreza Soleimani were killed together in Tehran on 16 March . Intelligence Minister Esmail Khatib was killed the following day . IRGC spokesman Brig. Gen. Ali Mohammad Naeini was killed on 19 March — minutes after publicly insisting Iran was still manufacturing missiles, contradicting US claims of 90% capacity destruction . The IRGC simultaneously manages the strait of Hormuz toll system, processing roughly 89 to 90 vessels over the first two weeks of March under a regime that requires cargo manifests, crew nationalities, and payments of up to $2 million per transit 1.

The IRGC's resilience reflects a command architecture built for exactly this scenario. The organisation was restructured after the January 2020 killing of Qasem Soleimani, distributing operational authority across regional commands and functional directorates precisely to avoid single-point-of-failure vulnerabilities. The corps controls its own intelligence, its own missile forces, its own naval arm, and — through the Khatam al-Anbiya construction headquarters — a parallel economic infrastructure worth tens of billions of dollars. It does not require a functioning Supreme Leader to operate daily; Jerusalem Post sources described the current power arrangement as one in which "the Revolutionary Guards are controlling him, not the other way around" 2, referring to Mojtaba Khamenei.

The US-Israeli campaign has now struck more than 8,000 targets and killed three members of The Supreme Leader's inner circle. The operational logic assumes that leadership elimination degrades an adversary's capacity to sustain operations and eventually forces a negotiated settlement. The IRGC's 70th wave is the counter-evidence: the organisation operates on institutional momentum, pre-delegated authority, and dispersed command nodes. The question this poses for Washington and Tel Aviv is whether the decapitation strategy has a threshold at which cumulative losses produce organisational paralysis — or whether the IRGC, like the Viet Cong's provincial structure or the Taliban's shura councils, is an institution whose distributed design means it absorbs leadership losses without proportional operational degradation.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

Despite losing four top generals in a single week, Iran's Revolutionary Guards are still launching daily missile attacks and running a complex toll system on the world's most important oil shipping lane. This is not luck — it is how the IRGC was engineered. After the Iran-Iraq war, it distributed authority so that no single commander's death could halt operations. The organisation effectively functions on standing orders, operating continuously without requiring direction from the top.

Deep Analysis
Synthesis

The combination of sustained missile waves and Hormuz toll administration under leadership attrition indicates the IRGC has effectively separated tactical execution from strategic command. Mid-level commanders are executing standing orders without apex authorisation. This means decapitation targeting is producing symbolic rather than operational effects — and may be consuming limited precision-strike capacity while simultaneously strengthening the domestic narrative that the IRGC is indispensable to Iranian national survival.

Root Causes

The IRGC's resilience reflects its 45-year development as a parallel state — controlling construction firms, import monopolies, financial networks and media alongside military functions. This economic and institutional breadth means military decapitation does not touch the organisation's substrate. The IRGC is not a conventional military hierarchy vulnerable to leadership attrition; it is a state-within-a-state with distributed authority and pre-delegated operational chains that run independently of any supreme commander.

Escalation

The four-wave-per-day cadence — 66 to 70 waves in four days — is consistent with prior tempo, indicating no measurable operational degradation from leadership losses. The IRGC's simultaneous management of Hormuz toll collection and daily missile operations demonstrates sufficient middle-management depth to run complex parallel activities, a level of institutional capacity that decapitation strikes have not visibly degraded.

What could happen next?
  • Meaning

    Decapitation strategy is not degrading IRGC operational tempo; symbolic leadership kills are not producing measurable strategic effects on the organisation's output.

    Immediate · Assessed
  • Risk

    US and Israeli planners may continue consuming precision-strike capacity on senior IRGC figures while operational output — missile waves, toll collection — remains unchanged.

    Short term · Suggested
  • Consequence

    If the IRGC institutionalises Hormuz toll collection as a revenue mechanism, it acquires a long-term economic incentive to maintain selective closure regardless of any political settlement.

    Medium term · Suggested
  • Precedent

    The IRGC model — state-within-state with pre-delegated authority and commercial substrate — demonstrates a decapitation-resistant architecture that adversarial non-state and hybrid actors will study and replicate.

    Long term · Suggested
First Reported In

Update #45 · Ultimatum expires; Iran tolls Hormuz at $2m

Al Jazeera· 23 Mar 2026
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Causes and effects
This Event
IRGC fires 70th wave, commanders falling
The IRGC's ability to sustain daily multi-front operations while simultaneously running a complex maritime toll system — despite the rapid-fire elimination of four senior figures — demonstrates an institutional command structure that does not depend on centralised leadership. This has direct implications for the US-Israeli decapitation strategy and for how long Iran can maintain offensive operations.
Different Perspectives
Hengaw
Hengaw
The Norway-based monitoring group reported the Urmia executions of Omid Behzad and Pouria Safvat, the only source to do so, consistent with its documented pattern of recording far more executions than the Iranian state acknowledges. Iran's government has not confirmed either execution.
Shipping and insurance underwriters
Shipping and insurance underwriters
War-risk premiums price the Houthi campaign because the group announces its targets in advance, but a reopening Trump has promised without a published text gives underwriters no benchmark to reprice Hormuz cover against. Insurers want a text before they move rates, not a promise.
Houthi movement
Houthi movement
Spokesman Yahya Saree claimed strikes on two tankers in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden on 5 August, only one of which UKMTO could confirm. The group's campaign against shipping continues on its own schedule, independent of any Hormuz arrangement further north.
Oman
Oman
Muscat has brokered the coordinates both Tehran and Washington's wire sources now describe differently, but has published no account of its own. Oman's position depends on treating Hormuz as a shared route, which is not what Iran is currently describing.
United States Central Command
United States Central Command
CENTCOM raised its interdiction tally from 35 to 44 redirected vessels and disclosed its first boardings on 3 August, the day before Trump promised a reopening. The command's own enforcement record does not yet reflect the release the President has described.
Iran's Foreign Ministry
Iran's Foreign Ministry
Spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei described the agreed Hormuz coordinates as a wholly new corridor under Iranian management, not a split of the existing route, days after his own deputy rejected Oman's lane proposal. Tehran wants the arrangement read as a change of ownership, not a compromise on access.