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Iran Conflict 2026
23JUL

GCC backs free passage, splits on Oman

4 min read
19:27UTC

Rubio and the six GCC foreign ministers issued a Manama communique on 25 June welcoming free Hormuz navigation with no tolls, while GCC member Oman had co-signed an Iran fee committee two days earlier.

ConflictDeveloping
Key takeaway

The GCC's no-fees stance collides with Oman, the member already signing Hormuz fees with Iran.

Marco Rubio, the US Secretary of State, and the six foreign ministers of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) issued a communique in Manama on Thursday 25 June welcoming the end of hostilities and the "restoration of free and secure navigation" through the strait of Hormuz, with no tolls and no fees⁠1. The GCC is the Gulf bloc of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman, founded in 1981. Rubio told the ministers there was "zero support among Gulf countries for any toll or fee" and confirmed the Bahrain session did not discuss any Iran reconstruction fund⁠2.

The communique tied lasting Gulf security to three Iranian concessions: an end to missile and drone attacks, a halt to militia support, and no interference in state sovereignty. It is a direct answer to Tehran's posture, and it builds on Rubio's no-tolls declaration in the UAE two days earlier, which set the agenda for the Manama meeting.

The document implicitly rejects both the IRGC toll scheme and the Iran-Oman committee that would set the rates. Yet the contradiction sits inside the bloc itself. Oman, a GCC member, signed the Muscat fee committee with Iran on 23 June, two days before adding its name to a communique opposing exactly those fees. Rubio's "zero support" line papers over a coastal state already co-governing the tariffs the bloc says it will not accept.

That split matters because Oman holds the southern shore of the strait and the Oman-IMO corridor runs through its territorial waters. A no-fees front that includes the one member negotiating a bilateral fee mechanism with Iran is a declaration of intent, not an enforced policy. The bloc agrees on the principle and divides on the signatory who can deliver it.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

On Thursday, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio met the foreign ministers of the six Gulf Arab states in Bahrain and they agreed on a joint statement: there should be no fees or tolls on the strait of Hormuz, the water should be free for ships to use. One of those six states, Oman, had already signed a deal with Iran just two days earlier to set up a joint committee that would manage Hormuz fees. Oman agreed in Bahrain that there should be no fees, while having just agreed in Muscat that it would help set them. This matters because Oman is Iran's preferred negotiating partner and has often acted as a go-between. Iran will almost certainly treat the Oman bilateral deal as the real agreement and the GCC statement as diplomatic theatre.

Deep Analysis
Root Causes

Oman's structural position explains the contradiction. Muscat is the only GCC member that shares a coastline and maritime boundary directly with Iran, maintains a long history of back-channel mediation between Tehran and Washington, and is economically dependent on keeping Hormuz commercially functional rather than politically closed.

Oman cannot afford to subscribe to a zero-fees position that Tehran would punish by directing ships away from Oman's territorial waters and into the IRGC-governed channel.

The GCC's consensus structure created the paradox. Communiques require unanimity, so Oman's signing of the Manama text was necessary for the bloc to have any statement at all. The GCC has no enforcement mechanism for bilateral member-state deals that deviate from collective positions; the bloc can condemn but not compel. Rubio's 'zero support' line therefore describes the GCC's stated position while the operative reality is a member state co-governing the fees the bloc says it opposes.

What could happen next?
  • Consequence

    Oman's dual signing has functionally created two competing Hormuz governance frameworks within the GCC: the bloc's stated zero-fees position and Muscat's operational fee-committee role; whichever Iran chooses to work with will determine the post-60-day transit cost structure.

  • Risk

    If the Iran-Oman committee publishes a tariff before GL X expires on 21 August, it will have established a de facto fee standard that the GCC communique opposed but cannot enforce, splitting the bloc's stated position from the operational reality.

First Reported In

Update #138 · Three flags over Hormuz, none enforced

Al Jazeera· 25 Jun 2026
Read original →
Different Perspectives
Wang Yi
Wang Yi
China's foreign minister and Djibouti's issued a joint communique on 21 October saying the war should not reach the Horn of Africa and stressing free navigation through Bab al-Mandeb. The text names neither Iran nor the Houthis, and Djibouti hosts China's only overseas military base, opposite the Yemeni coast.
Ministry of External Affairs
Ministry of External Affairs
India's foreign ministry called the attacks on Saudi civilian and energy sites "unacceptable" on 22 October and said they must stop at once. An Indian died at Dammam, Indians were injured there and at Shaybah, and about 4,000 Umrah pilgrims remain stranded by one MP's count.
Iraq
Iraq
Iraq closed the al-Sheeb crossing with Iran to travellers and trucks from 21 October and said other crossings would close gradually. Unlike September's closure, which ended on a staged timetable, this one has none, and Iran's interior ministry said it received no notice.
Abdel Fattah el-Sisi
Abdel Fattah el-Sisi
Egypt's president said on 21 October that Cairo's support would "defend Saudi territory, and does not include an attack on Yemen". Araghchi warned that Egyptian involvement would further complicate the situation, and Cairo's limit matches the one Ankara set on 8 October against attacking another state's soil.
UK Ministry of Defence
UK Ministry of Defence
The MoD said on 20 October that RAF Typhoons over Saudi Arabia will not strike the Houthis, but extended tanker support to Saudi operations including against Houthi targets in Yemen. The tanker line sets no limit on strikes, so British aircraft may now refuel Saudi jets on bombing runs.
Turkey
Turkey
Ankara sent the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement to parliament around 20 October, and its published text treats an attack on one party as an attack on all. Article 16 brings it into force only on the last ratification, so the 5 October invocation in Riyadh could not yet bind Turkey.

Written with AI from Lowdown's published reporting. Not individually reviewed by an editor. Editorial standards.