11JUN

US strikes reach Tehran on day two, ordered by phone

4 min read

09:17UTC

CENTCOM struck surveillance, communications and air-defence sites at western Tehran, Sirik and Minab on 10-11 June, widening the war inland from the coast as Trump ordered a second day verbally from the Oval Office.

← Back to IRGC declares Hormuz shut; US strikes again Jump to analysis ↓

ConflictDeveloping

Key takeaway

The campaign reached the capital on its second day, ordered again by phone, with Washington calling the bombing the negotiation.

CENTCOM completed a second consecutive day of strikes on Iran across 10-11 June, hitting military surveillance, communications and air-defence sites at western Tehran, Sirik and Minab. The geography is the news: the 9-10 June strikes had stayed on the Hormuz coast at Qeshm, Bandar Abbas and Jask , and this round reached the capital. US Marine, Air Force and Navy assets ran the operation, which CENTCOM framed as self-defence against continued aggression and reported complete with no American casualties.

Donald Trump ordered it the way he ordered the first round, verbally from the Oval Office, with no AUMF, no Article 51 notice to the United Nations and no signed instrument, repeating the method even as a second day of ordnance landed . Pete Hegseth said the strikes were designed to set the terms for a deal and that Iran would be wise to take it; pressed on method, he said, "If we need to negotiate with bombs, we'll negotiate with bombs." Trump told reporters Iran "had a chance to sign a deal and survive" and should "start signing a paper."

Reading the two days together, the bombing is being run as the diplomacy rather than alongside it. The word from Washington each day has been "sign," delivered with a second strike order and an amended draft returned to Tehran. That collapses the distinction between coercion and negotiation, and it leaves Iran answering ordnance rather than a written offer.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

The United States carried out air strikes on military sites in Iran for the second day running on 10-11 June. On the first day, strikes had stayed near the coast. This second round hit sites close to Tehran, Iran's capital, a significant escalation in how far into the country the bombing was reaching. President Trump ordered the strikes in a verbal conversation at the White House. Unlike most military operations, there was no formal written authorisation from Congress and no legal notification to the United Nations. Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth told journalists the strikes were designed to force Iran to sign a deal, saying 'if we need to negotiate with bombs, we'll negotiate with bombs.'

Deep Analysis

Root Causes

The legal gap driving the no-AUMF pattern predates this conflict. The 2001 and 2002 AUMFs authorised force against al-Qaeda and Iraqi state actors respectively. Congress never passed an Iran-specific authorisation, and the Trump administration has relied on Article II inherent presidential war powers for every kinetic action since 28 February 2026.

The House's 215-208 War Powers Resolution on 3 June passed with the narrowest possible majority and Trump is expected to veto it. Senate cloture on a war-powers resolution fell ten votes short of the 60 required. The structural condition enabling verbal-order strikes is therefore not presidential preference alone but a Congress too closely divided to force an AUMF requirement.

Escalation

Upward and widening. The target set moved from the Hormuz coast to the capital in 24 hours. A second verbal strike order with no AUMF and no Article 51 notice hardens the pattern of force by spoken word. Hegseth's 'negotiate with bombs' framing means Washington has no threshold at which it would pause strikes to allow a negotiating response.

What could happen next?

Precedent
Two consecutive days of presidential verbal strike orders on a foreign capital without AUMF or Article 51 notice establish the pattern as a standing doctrine, not a one-off emergency measure. Any future administration would cite this as precedent for Article II air campaigns.
Long term · Assessed
Risk
Iran's strikes on Azraq, Bahrain, and Kuwait bases (ID:4075) showed the IRGC is willing to hit third-country US facilities. A third day of US strikes on Tehran-area targets raises the probability of IRGC targeting of UAE-based US assets, which would draw UAE into the conflict.
Immediate · Assessed
Consequence
Damage to communications and air-defence infrastructure at Sirik and Minab degrades the physical capacity of Bandar Abbas export operations even after any ceasefire, adding weeks to any post-deal oil supply recovery.
Short term · Assessed

Source Landscape

This story draws on mixed-leaning sources from United States and Qatar (includes United States state media)

United States

Qatar

Primary parallel: The 1999 Operation Allied Force against Yugoslavia proceeded for 78 days without a UN Security Council resolution and without a formal US AUMF, with the Clinton administration relying on NATO collective defence authority and Article II inherent powers.

The geographic escalation from Day 1 coastal targets to Day 2 capital-area targets mirrors the gradual widening of the Allied Force target set from air-defence to civilian infrastructure, a pattern that drew sustained European legal challenge at the International Court of Justice.

Counter-parallel: Operation Desert Fox in December 1998, in which the Clinton administration struck Iraqi targets for four days on presidential authority, is the domestic parallel most often cited. Desert Fox was terminated after 70 hours, partly because the House impeachment vote was imminent but partly because the narrow target set was exhausted. The current campaign has no self-limiting target set and no impeachment parallel, making the analogy weaker on duration.

Brent Crude reached $96.34 when the first strikes on the capital area were confirmed, then eased to $94.71 the following day after CENTCOM said strikes were complete . The CENTCOM 'strikes complete' line, not the IRGC Hormuz closure, drove the pullback.

This shows markets are primarily tracking US operational tempo rather than Iranian responses: a US statement that strikes have stopped reduced the immediate escalation premium more than the IRGC's closure of the world's most important oil chokepoint raised it.

The strike package at Sirik and Minab hit air-defence and communications infrastructure near the Bandar Abbas export terminal, Iran's primary tanker-loading facility. Damage to that infrastructure, if sustained, reduces the physical capacity to resume tanker operations even after a deal is signed, adding a structural lag to any post-deal export recovery.

Consensus view: Mark Cancian and Chris Park at the Center for Strategic and International Studies assessed in late May that the US had already spent roughly $25 billion on the Iran campaign, with no signed AUMF constraining the scope. On the verbal-order pattern, Cancian notes that Article II self-defence claims used for consecutive days of strikes on a foreign capital are qualitatively different from the single-strike precedent set by the Obama administration's Libya model.

Counter-view: Elbridge Colby, now at the Pentagon's Office of Net Assessment, holds that the Article II self-defence framing is legally sufficient because Iran's attack on a US helicopter constitutes ongoing armed attack, making a new AUMF an obstacle rather than a requirement. IRGC-aligned Iranian media argues the strikes confirm there is no legal ceiling on US escalation, and that Iran's only leverage is physical deterrence rather than legal argument.

Key tension: Whether a second day of strikes expands the Article II justification into a standing authorisation for indefinite air campaign, or whether each day of strikes requires an independent constitutional trigger, is the unresolved constitutional question.

First Reported In

Update #124 · IRGC declares Hormuz shut; US strikes again

CENTCOM / Jerusalem Post· 11 Jun 2026

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Causes and effects

Caused by

US strikes four Iranian sites near Hormuz

Day-two CENTCOM strikes at western Tehran, Sirik and Minab escalated the first-day strikes on coastal air-defence sites at Qeshm, Bandar Abbas and Jask.

Occurred 9 Jun 2026

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Trump strikes Iran with no war authority

Trump's second verbal strike order without AUMF or Article 51 notice repeated and advanced the legal precedent set by his first order on 9 June.

Occurred 9 Jun 2026

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This Event

US strikes reach Tehran on day two, ordered by phone

The target set moved from the Hormuz coast to the capital, a deliberate widening of the air campaign. A second strike order issued with no AUMF, no Article 51 notice and no signed instrument hardened the pattern of force by spoken word, with Hegseth casting the bombing as the negotiation itself.

Led to

IRGC declares Hormuz shut, vetoing Iran's own deal

The IRGC closure declaration came on the same day as the second US strike day, suggesting the closure was a direct escalatory response.

Occurred 11 Jun 2026

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Different Perspectives

Oil markets / Lloyd's underwriters

Futures markets priced CENTCOM's strikes-complete statement as a de-escalation signal and pushed Brent down 1.7 per cent to $94.71, even as the IRGC declared Hormuz closed. Lloyd's war-risk premiums held elevated because institutional de-listing requires a UN Security Council resolution that Russia and China have just shown they will block.

Pakistan (mediator)

Interior minister Mohsin Naqvi carried dual civilian and military letters to Mojtaba Khamenei in Tehran on 6-7 June with no public response. The IRGC's Hormuz closure on 11 June shows the corps is acting independently of the channel Pakistan is using, making the mediation structurally unable to produce a binding commitment without direct IRGC access.

Russia and China

Russia and China voted against GOV/2026/40 at the IAEA Board, following through on the blocking position coordinated with Grossi in Geneva on 5 June; both states continue to oppose Western institutional pressure on Iran at every multilateral venue.

E3 and IAEA (UK, France, Germany)

The E3 co-sponsored IAEA resolution GOV/2026/40, adopted 21-3-10 on 10 June, demanding Iran disclose 440.9 kg of unaccounted HEU and admit inspectors to four denied facilities. The 10 abstentions and Russia-China noes leave any Security Council referral without a viable enforcement path.

IRGC / Iran military command

The corps declared Hormuz closed to all traffic on 11 June and claimed two vessels struck, overriding the MoU its own civilian negotiators were pursuing through Pakistan. The closure order used the Persian Gulf Strait Authority apparatus to convert a toll mechanism into a military prohibition.

Trump administration / CENTCOM

CENTCOM completed a second day of strikes on Tehran, Sirik and Minab, rejected the IRGC Hormuz closure as inconsistent with observed transit, and said strikes were complete. Hegseth framed the bombing explicitly as the negotiation: the method is coercive deal-making with no stated pause threshold.