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Iran Conflict 2026
21MAY

Pakistan relays Trump's terms to Tehran

3 min read
09:55UTC

US envoys Witkoff and Kushner reportedly reached Iran's parliamentary speaker through Pakistani intermediaries — but Ghalibaf's authority to bind the forces prosecuting the war is an open question.

ConflictDeveloping
Key takeaway

Ghalibaf's IRGC background means any agreement he reaches cannot bind Iran's military without separate authorisation.

Axios identified Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Iran's parliamentary speaker, as the Iranian figure in contact with the Trump administration 1. US special envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner reportedly spoke with Ghalibaf on Sunday evening 2. CNN reported the US shared a 15-point list of expectations via Pakistan 3. Whether Iran agreed to any terms remains unclear. Mediators are NOW working to arrange a face-to-face meeting between Ghalibaf and the US delegation in Islamabad.

Pakistan has form as an intermediary. Islamabad maintained working relationships with both Washington and Tehran through the 2015 nuclear negotiations and keeps intelligence-level contacts with the IRGC. The proposed Islamabad venue gives Pakistan a visible mediating role it has sought since hostilities began — and a stake in any outcome.

The choice of interlocutor raises a harder question. In Iran's constitutional architecture, The Supreme Leader commands the armed forces; the IRGC reports to his office, not to Parliament. Four days ago, Ghalibaf himself publicly threatened that regional energy and oil infrastructure "will be irreversibly destroyed" if Iranian power plants are struck . Whether he can negotiate a peace framework depends on who is directing him. The Jerusalem Post reported, citing unnamed sources, that the IRGC controls the new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei rather than the reverse , and Mojtaba has not appeared in public since assuming office on 9 March . If the Guards are the effective authority, Ghalibaf's remit extends only as far as they permit.

The gap between Washington's claims and Tehran's denials is narrow but measurable. A senior Iranian Foreign Ministry official told CBS News: "we received points from the U.S. through mediators and they are being reviewed" 4 — a shift from Araghchi's categorical denial of any US contact four days earlier . Whether this opening widens into an Islamabad meeting depends on a calculation no Pakistani mediator controls: whether Iran's military leadership sees greater value in a diplomatic exit than in the toll revenues and strategic leverage the Hormuz Chokepoint currently provides.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

The US sent Kushner and Witkoff — Trump's personal envoys — to speak with Iran's parliamentary speaker through Pakistani intermediaries. The choice of Ghalibaf matters because he is not Iran's foreign minister or supreme leader: he is the speaker of parliament and a former IRGC commander. That is roughly like negotiating a company's debt restructuring with its head of parliamentary relations rather than its chief financial officer. He can convey messages and signal intent, but he cannot commit Iran's military to compliance with any terms he agrees. Any deal he reaches still requires separate sign-off from Iran's Supreme Leader and the IRGC command.

Deep Analysis
Synthesis

The Abraham Accords model succeeded with Gulf states that had economic modernisation incentives and no existential ideological objection to US engagement. Iran's case differs structurally: regime legitimacy is partly constituted by anti-American posture, and Ghalibaf's IRGC background makes him accountable to the same military command currently under bombardment. Transplanting an Accords-style personal-diplomacy methodology to a party under active attack — whose negotiating representative cannot bind its own military — is applying a tool designed for a structurally different problem.

Root Causes

Kushner's involvement — rather than career State Department diplomats — mirrors the Abraham Accords model: Trump's structural preference for personal-relationship diplomacy that bypasses institutional frameworks and moves with direct presidential authority. This model succeeds when counterparts have economic incentives to engage; it lacks the institutional backstop to manage failure when they do not.

What could happen next?
  • Opportunity

    Pakistan's intermediary role provides multilateral cover and face-saving architecture that publicly acknowledged bilateral US-Iran talks could not offer either government domestically.

    Immediate · Suggested
  • Risk

    The Kushner-led personal-diplomacy model has no institutional backstop if negotiations collapse — no State Department infrastructure exists to maintain continuity or manage failure gracefully.

    Short term · Assessed
  • Meaning

    Ghalibaf's selection as Iran's interlocutor confirms the IRGC-political complex, not the foreign ministry, is managing Iran's crisis response and will determine any settlement's durability.

    Immediate · Assessed
  • Consequence

    If the Islamabad meeting occurs, it normalises direct US-Iran crisis contact at senior level, potentially reactivating diplomatic channels frozen since the 2018 JCPOA withdrawal.

    Medium term · Suggested
First Reported In

Update #46 · Trump delays strikes; oil crashes to $99

Axios· 24 Mar 2026
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Causes and effects
This Event
Pakistan relays Trump's terms to Tehran
The channel's structure — Pakistan as go-between, a parliamentary speaker as counterpart — reveals both the possibility of negotiations and their limits. Ghalibaf holds no command authority over the IRGC or Iran's military operations, meaning any framework he discusses cannot bind the forces fighting the war unless the supreme leader's office and the Guards endorse it.
Different Perspectives
Turkey (Shakarab consideration)
Turkey (Shakarab consideration)
Ankara serves as one of two Western-adjacent Iran back-channels while Turkish national Gholamreza Khani Shakarab faces imminent execution on espionage charges in Iran. President Erdogan cannot deflect the domestic political crisis that a Turkish execution would trigger, which would force suspension of the mediating role.
Germany (Bundestag gap)
Germany (Bundestag gap)
Belgium, Germany, Australia, and France committed Hormuz coalition hardware on 18 May. Germany's Bundestag authorisation for the coalition deployment remains pending, creating a constitutional gap between the commitment announced and the parliamentary mandate required to operationalise it.
IEA and oil market analysts
IEA and oil market analysts
The IEA's $106 May Brent projection met the market in one session on 20 May as Brent fell 5.16% on diplomatic optimism. Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley's two-layer premium framework holds: the kinetic component compressed; the structural insurance component tied to Lloyd's ROE remains unresolved.
Hengaw
Hengaw
Documented the dual Kurdish execution at Naqadeh on 21 May, the two Iraqi-national espionage executions on 20 May, and Gholamreza Khani Shakarab's imminent execution risk. The 24-hour cluster covers two executions at one facility, the first foreign-national espionage executions, and a Turkish national whose death would suspend Ankara's mediation.
Lloyd's of London
Lloyd's of London
Hull rates stand at 110-125% of vessel value on the secondary market; the Joint War Committee has conditioned cover reopening on written ROE from the coalition or PGSA. The Majlis rial bill makes any compliant ROE structurally impossible to draft while the PGSA's yuan portal remains its operational mechanism.
United Kingdom and France (Northwood coalition)
United Kingdom and France (Northwood coalition)
The 26-nation coalition paper requires Lloyd's to see written rules of engagement before Hormuz war-risk cover reopens. The Majlis rial bill adds a second governance incompatibility on top of the unpublished PGSA fee schedule; coalition ROE cannot mention rial without conceding Iranian sovereignty over the strait.