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European Oil Markets
4JUN

OFAC signs GL 134C, third Russia bridge

3 min read
10:20UTC

Bradley T. Smith signed General License 134C at 14:05 EDT on Monday 18 May, reinstating Western vessel services on Russian crude loaded by 17 April and reversing the cliff the market had priced two days earlier.

EconomicDeveloping
Key takeaway

GL 134C reopened insurance and classification cover, not a price number, so Urals stabilises rather than rallies.

OFAC Director Bradley T. Smith signed General License 134C at 14:05 EDT on Monday 18 May, authorising in-transit completions on Russian-origin crude loaded on or before 17 April and running through 12:01 a.m. EDT on 17 June 1. This is the third consecutive 30-day bridge, and it reverses the read that Treasury had ruled out a successor after GL 134B lapsed on 16 May . The licence reinstates the full vessel-services umbrella, insurance, crewing, bunkering, piloting, classification and salvage, while paragraph (b)(1) holds the Cuba, Iran and DPRK carve-out in place 2.

The P&L moves straight off that paragraph. The cliff that priced as an exit-or-face-OFAC binary on 16 May is now an insurance-rate normalisation problem for KEBCO and Urals term holders. Cover runs through commercial vessel services, not a price-cap number, so it is the insurance and classification chain that reopens, not the discount math. Urals-Brent is stabilising on the news rather than rallying, because the variable that moved is P&I availability for pre-17-April cargoes.

Set that against the Druzhba southern leg , where MOL and Slovak refiners keep roughly 175-200kbd of exempt pipeline barrels at a feedstock advantage that has touched $40/bbl. Seaborne cargoes carry a freight-and-insurance compliance cost the pipeline crowd never pays, so 134C narrows the gap without closing it. The 17 June expiry now becomes the next binary: a fourth bridge, or the first hard cliff the freight desk has had to price.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

The US government allows companies to temporarily move Russian oil even while Russia is under sanctions ; using a legal permit called a General Licence. When the previous permit (GL 134B) expired in May, there was confusion about whether a new one would be issued. On 18 May, a new one called GL 134C was signed, giving companies until 17 June to complete oil shipments that were already in progress. Think of it like an extension on a moving deadline: the rules are getting stricter over time, but companies get a window to finish what they started. Cuba was specifically excluded ; any shipment that passed through Cuba loses the protection entirely.

Deep Analysis
Root Causes

GL 134C's existence reflects a structural trilemma: the US wants Russian oil revenue curtailed, but abrupt vessel-services withdrawal would simultaneously spike European energy costs (at current Brent above $96), expose allied refineries to supply disruption, and push marginal Russian barrels fully into shadow-fleet channels that Western sanctions cannot reach.

The 30-day rolling structure is a product of this trilemma. Each extension reduces the waiver window (loading cutoffs predate the waiver by 31 days) while maintaining the fiction of a wind-down ; the pre-17 April loading cutoff in GL 134C means the eligible cargo universe is already shrinking without Treasury having to announce a formal termination.

What could happen next?
  • Consequence

    Without a GL 134D by 17 June, term holders of pre-17 April Urals and KEBCO cargoes face the same forced-exit or compliance-risk binary that GL 134B's expiry created on 16 May.

    Short term · Reported
  • Precedent

    The Adani $275m settlement on the same day as GL 134C establishes simultaneous carrot-and-stick enforcement as an explicit OFAC template for commodity sanctions.

    Medium term · Assessed
  • Risk

    Each successive loading cutoff (17 April for GL 134C) shrinks the eligible cargo universe; at some iteration the waiver covers so few barrels that terminal expiry becomes economically painless for Washington but logistically disruptive for NWE refiners.

    Medium term · Assessed
First Reported In

Update #2 · GL 134C reverses the cliff, Brent -$14

OFAC· 26 May 2026
Read original
Causes and effects
This Event
OFAC signs GL 134C, third Russia bridge
The 16 May exit-or-face-OFAC binary becomes an insurance and classification re-rating, not a forced unwind of Russian term positions.
Different Perspectives
Kazakhstan (Tengiz / CPC pipeline operators)
Kazakhstan (Tengiz / CPC pipeline operators)
Kazakhstan's 322kbd Tengiz overage runs on the CPC pipeline, which bypasses the Gulf, making it structurally durable and effectively quota-exempt within the cartel. The Tengiz expansion reached plateau production in early 2026 and cannot be throttled without reservoir damage, setting a precedent for infrastructure-forced overproduction as an OPEC+ carve-out.
NWE sell-side macro desk
NWE sell-side macro desk
The divergence between sub-$97 Brent and a crack near $54 is the structural trade: long the crack against crude, with the June OFAC calendar as convexity on top. With the WTI unwind complete and Brent-WTI at $2 with no mechanical compressor, the Brent-WTI spread carries cheap optionality on the three June dates rather than a directional flat-price call.
Italian government / ISAB / Priolo Gargallo operators
Italian government / ISAB / Priolo Gargallo operators
Six GL rollovers without a completed ISAB sale leave the 320kbd Sicilian refinery under a sanctions-perimeter procurement overhang; the Italian Golden Power review has no confirmed timeline and can block the Ludoil deal independently of OFAC. Rome secured a 30-day EU derogation for ISAB in 2012 and is expected to seek one again if 27 June approaches.
Chinese state refiners (CNPC / Sinopec)
Chinese state refiners (CNPC / Sinopec)
Chinese seaborne crude imports ran at a decade-low 6.78mbd in May as refining margins stayed negative near -$2/bbl, with state refiners drawing on onshore strategic stocks rather than buying at $90-plus Brent. The demand hole, not a reopened Hormuz, compressed the Brent-Dubai EFS off its $6-plus peak; restart signal is margin recovery above $3-5/bbl.
EU Council sanctions directorate
EU Council sanctions directorate
Brussels adopted its 21st sanctions package on 26 May targeting shadow-fleet tanker listings and bank financing rather than revising the G7 price cap, a doctrine that routes pressure through freight and financing costs rather than cap arithmetic. The EU's approach compounds OFAC's tonnage drain without requiring G7 consensus on a new cap number.
US Treasury / OFAC
US Treasury / OFAC
OFAC has issued no GL 134D rollover as of 04 June, leaving a 13-day cliff on the Russian vessel-services umbrella while simultaneously running a negotiation-only clock on the ISAB divestiture to 27 June. The dual-deadline architecture, authorise-without-compelling on the Russian refinery track while closing Iranian buyer legs, is OFAC's deliberate June compliance design.