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Russia-Ukraine War 2026
19JUL

India faces three Iran tracks, speaks on one

3 min read
13:35UTC

India's Ministry of External Affairs engaged Tehran at high level on 23 April after the Epaminondas was seized carrying cargo bound for Mundra port in Gujarat. The MEA has held public silence for eight days on the 15 April OFAC designations naming Indian nationals and India-registered firms in the Shamkhani network.

ConflictDeveloping
Key takeaway

Delhi is handling three Iran tracks but has chosen to speak on only the one with Indian crews at sea.

India's Ministry of External Affairs engaged Tehran at high level on 23 April after the Epaminondas was seized carrying cargo bound for Mundra port in Gujarat 1. The engagement routed through the same ministry that has now held public silence for eight days on the 15 April OFAC designations of the Shamkhani network , which named Chetan Prakash Balhotra, Navi Mumbai-registered Fleet Tanqo Private Limited and other Indian firms .

Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri demarched Iran's ambassador Fathali on 18 April after the IRGC fired on the Indian tankers Sanmar Herald and Jag Arnav . Three Iran tracks now converge on Misri's office inside a week: tanker firings producing a demarche, OFAC sanctions producing silence and the Epaminondas producing quiet diplomacy.

Delhi cannot publicly demand the corps stop firing on Indian-bound vessels while staying silent on Treasury sanctions targeting Indian firms that help Iran evade the same sanctions those vessels operate inside. India is the largest non-Chinese user of Iranian-routed crude, so every week the MEA holds the line leaves Mumbai and Chennai operators unable to price their next cargo. Misri's office has chosen the shipping file over the sanctions file because Indian crews are at sea and Indian firms are on paper.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

India faces three separate problems from the Iran conflict, all landing at once on 23 April. First, an Indian-bound cargo ship was seized by Iran's military in the Strait of Hormuz. Second, the US Treasury named Indian companies and individuals as part of an Iranian oil-smuggling network called the Shamkhani network. Third, the US government's waiver that allowed Indian refineries to legally buy Iranian oil expired with no renewal. India is one of the world's largest oil importers and has historically bought cheap Iranian crude despite US sanctions. It has also been developing a major port at Chabahar in Iran, which India views as its gateway to Central Asia and Afghanistan. New Delhi has been trying to stay on good terms with both the US and Iran, but these three simultaneous developments make that balancing act harder. It is now publicly engaged on the first problem (the ship seizure) while publicly silent on the other two, which carry greater long-term legal and economic risk.

What could happen next?
  • Risk

    Indian banks processing transactions for OFAC-designated Indian firms in the Shamkhani network face US correspondent banking sanctions after a 60-day wind-down period, creating systemic risk for India's banking sector connectivity to the dollar system.

First Reported In

Update #77 · Pentagon: six months to clear Hormuz mines

UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office· 23 Apr 2026
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