The UAE intercepted 10 Iranian ballistic missiles and 45 drones on 17 March1, closing its airspace for several hours. Despite the high interception rate, a third fire struck Fujairah's oil zone — following strikes on 13 March and an earlier hit that ignited the bunkering facility. Oil loading at Fujairah, one of the world's largest bunkering hubs, has been suspended since the second strike.
The 17 March barrage added to what is already an unprecedented sustained air defence campaign. As of 15 March, the UAE military had intercepted 298 ballistic missiles, 15 cruise missiles, and 1,606 drones, with 7 killed and 142 injured. The 55 additional intercepts push the UAE's cumulative total past 1,970. The recurring Fujairah fires demonstrate a problem that interception statistics cannot resolve: oil infrastructure can be disrupted by debris from successful intercepts as easily as by direct hits, and each fire compounds the insurance, shipping, and reputational costs that keep tankers away.
Human Rights Watch documented at least 11 civilian deaths and 268 injuries across Gulf states, with migrant workers comprising the majority of victims2. President Pezeshkian's 8 March apology and pledge to stop targeting Gulf neighbours has been followed by uninterrupted strikes — a gap between civilian government statements and IRGC operations that Gulf capitals have noted publicly. An IRGC spokesman stated that weapons manufactured after the war began have not yet been used. Gulf air defence systems — THAAD, Patriot, and indigenous platforms — are performing at high rates, but every system has a finite interceptor supply. The question is sustainability: how long can interception rates hold against an adversary that claims to be firing from old stock while its newer arsenal remains in reserve?
