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Iran Conflict 2026
5MAR

Brent settles $105.30 with no fresh seizure

3 min read
09:10UTC

Brent crude settled at $105.30 on 25 April with intraday prints above $106 and a weekly gain of roughly 18%. The talks collapse alone is now the bullish driver, not fresh kinetics.

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Key takeaway

Brent at $105 has been repriced as the baseline; future incidents push from there, not from $67.

Brent crude settled at $105.30 on 25 April with intraday prints above $106 and a weekly gain of roughly 18% per The National 1. This is the second consecutive session above $105, 57% above the $67.41 pre-war baseline and a continuation from the $105.73 close on 24 April . No new IRGC seizure occurred on 25 April, and the dark-shipping picture from the Larak-Qeshm carve-out was unchanged.

The price moved on the absence of a diplomatic resolution rather than on a fresh provocation. That is a structural shift: the market has stopped treating each diplomatic failure as a temporary setback and is pricing the absence of a resolution track as the default scenario. The repricing matters because future seizures will now push the price from $105 rather than from $67, amplifying the economic shock of any tactical escalation. UK and European pump prices follow Brent with a one-to-two-week lag.

The options curve confirms the shift. With the baseline reset, any de-escalation announcement becomes disproportionately bearish rather than merely corrective, which makes the political incentive structure for Tehran and Washington asymmetric: Iran loses revenue floor on a deal, and US consumer pump prices ease only after a deal is concrete enough to clear forwards. Brent at $105 is the new floor, not a ceiling.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

The price of oil affects almost everything: petrol at the pump, heating bills, the cost of goods moved by truck or ship. The benchmark price for much of the world's oil is called 'Brent crude', named after a North Sea oil field. Before the Iran war began, Brent was around $67 a barrel. On 25 April it closed at $105.30. That is a rise of nearly 57%, and it happened in under two months. Oil markets usually react strongly to specific events (a ship seized, a factory bombed). What is significant about Saturday's price is that nothing new happened: no IRGC boarding, no strike, no military escalation. The price stayed above $105 purely because traders stopped believing the war would end soon. When the diplomacy collapses and traders update their expectations, prices move even without a physical event.

Deep Analysis
Root Causes

Each Islamabad channel failure narrows the oil market's probability distribution around a near-term diplomatic resolution. When Islamabad 3 collapsed via Trump's Truth Social post, traders priced the event harder than a formal diplomatic postponement would have warranted, because a social-media cancellation carries no institutional machinery for reversal.

The ceasefire is nominally in force, but CENTCOM's interdiction count reached 33 on 25 April while the naval blockade continues. Traders have concluded that a nominal ceasefire does not translate to resumed Hormuz commercial transit. Until a deal explicitly addresses the blockade, the $38/bbl structural premium over the pre-war baseline persists regardless of individual daily incident counts.

What could happen next?
  • Consequence

    European and Asian central banks running quarterly inflation assessments in May will incorporate $105+ Brent into their forecasts, likely deferring planned interest rate cuts by one to two quarters.

  • Risk

    Goldman Sachs's $120 Q3 severe scenario becomes the base case rather than the tail risk if both the Islamabad diplomatic track and the AUMF congressional track fail before 1 May.

First Reported In

Update #79 · Islamabad 3 collapses; Witkoff grounded, talks stall

Al Jazeera· 25 Apr 2026
Read original
Different Perspectives
IAEA
IAEA
Director General Rafael Grossi appeared in person at the UNSC on 19 May and warned that a direct hit on an operating reactor 'could result in very high release of radioactivity'. The session produced a condemnation record but no resolution, and the Barakah perimeter was already struck on 17 May.
Hengaw (Kurdish rights monitor)
Hengaw (Kurdish rights monitor)
Hengaw documented three judicial executions and the detention of Kurdish writer Majid Karimi in Tehran on 19 May, establishing Khorasan Razavi province as the newest geography in Iran's wartime judicial record. The organisation's Norway-based operation continues to surface a domestic repression track running in parallel with every diplomatic and military development.
India
India
Six India-flagged vessels conducted a coordinated cluster transit under PGSA bilateral assurances during the 17 May window, paying no yuan tolls. New Delhi's inclusion in Iran's state-to-state passage track insulates Indian energy supply without requiring endorsement of the PGSA's yuan-toll architecture or alignment with the US coalition.
Pakistan
Pakistan
Pakistan is the only functioning diplomatic bridge between Tehran and Washington. Its role is relay, not mediation in the settlement sense: it conveyed Iran's 10-point counter-MOU in early May, relayed the US rejection, and is now passing 'corrective points' in the third documented exchange of this sub-cycle without either side working from a shared text.
UK and France (Northwood coalition)
UK and France (Northwood coalition)
Twenty-six coalition members have published no rules of engagement eight days after the Bahrain joint statement; Lloyd's underwriters have conditioned war-risk reopening on written ROE from either Iran or the coalition. Italian and French mine-countermeasures deployments are operating on the in-water clearance task CENTCOM Admiral Brad Cooper's 90% mine-stockpile claim does not address.
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia
Riyadh has not publicly commented on the Barakah strike or the 50-47 discharge vote. Saudi output feeds the IEA's $106 base case; the $5 Brent premium above that model reflects institutional uncertainty no Gulf producer can compress through supply adjustment alone.