17AUG

Houthis threaten to close Bab al-Mandeb

2 min read

15:37UTC

A senior Houthi official described closing the Red Sea strait as one stage in a deliberate escalation ladder.

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ConflictDeveloping

Key takeaway

Dual-chokepoint pressure is now an active threat, not a theoretical scenario.

Mohammed Mansour, Houthi deputy information minister, told reporters: "We are conducting this battle in stages, and closing the Bab al-Mandeb strait is among our options." ¹ Roughly 30% of Israeli imports and 6-7 million barrels per day of oil, approximately 7% of global supply, pass through the strait.

Mansour's language mirrors Iranian diplomatic formulations around Hormuz in the war's first week. The framing is a staged escalation ladder, not a single decision. Yahya Saree announced three formal red lines before the missile attack: US and Israeli use of the Red Sea for strikes, growing third-country participation, and escalating attacks on the "Axis of Resistance."

The IEA stated explicitly that its 400 million barrel emergency release "cannot substitute for the transit route itself" . Iran's Hormuz traffic control already routes vessels through a narrow corridor past Larak Island under IRGC escort; the Majlis toll bill would codify that system into domestic law. If both chokepoints tighten further, no reserve release addresses the shortfall.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

Bab al-Mandeb is a narrow sea passage between Yemen and East Africa. Almost all the oil and cargo that moves between Asia and Europe passes through it. Around 6-7 million barrels of oil cross every day. A senior Houthi official said on 28 March that closing this strait is one of their options as the war continues. They already have missiles and drones on Yemen's coastline. Iran already controls the other major oil route, the Strait of Hormuz. If the Houthis block Bab al-Mandeb as well, there would be no alternative route for most of the world's oil. Emergency reserves would run out in weeks; there is no spare capacity to replace both routes at once.

Deep Analysis

Root Causes

The structural driver is the Houthis' geographic positioning. Yemen's Tihama coast overlooks Bab al-Mandeb's 29-kilometre narrows. Anti-ship missiles already deployed there can reach any vessel in the strait. Unlike Hormuz, there is no second passage: cargo cannot route around Bab al-Mandeb without circumnavigating Africa, adding 6,000 nautical miles and roughly 20 days per voyage.

The Houthis' leverage exists regardless of Iranian direction because the geography is permanent. Tehran did not create this chokepoint; it merely held the group back from using it.

What could happen next?

Risk
Dual chokepoint closure would exceed IEA emergency reserve capacity; no government has a contingency plan for simultaneous Hormuz restriction and Bab al-Mandeb closure.
Consequence
Any ceasefire negotiation must now include Houthi participation or Bab al-Mandeb remains at risk regardless of what Iran agrees.

Source Landscape

This story draws on centre-left-leaning sources from United States

United States

Primary parallel: Egypt's closure of the strait of Tiran in May 1967, which Israel treated as a casus belli. A chokepoint threat without an accompanying deal triggered a pre-emptive war. The current context differs in that the US Navy has far greater strike range than Israel did in 1967, but the coercive logic is the same.

Counter-parallel: The 2023-24 Houthi Red Sea campaign, when the group closed Bab al-Mandeb to Israeli-linked shipping but exempted most commercial traffic. That precedent suggests they can calibrate closure selectively, which makes a full closure a ladder rung rather than an all-or-nothing decision.

An immediate closure would add an estimated $15-20 per barrel to Brent Crude within 48 hours, based on freight-rate responses during the 2023-24 Houthi disruption. At $112 plus $20, Brent would exceed the $130 threshold Oxford Economics links to sustained demand destruction in import-dependent economies.

Structurally, the Asia-Europe container trade bears the greater long-term cost. Circumnavigation adds 20 days and roughly $2 million in fuel per large vessel. That produces a persistent 8-12% container cost increase, feeding into EU and UK retail prices within two to three months.

Consensus view: Windward and Lloyd's List analysts assess the threat as calibrated coercive signalling. A closure declaration forfeits the leverage the threat provides; the Houthis will not close unless they judge the war is already lost.

Counter-view: Chatham House Gulf analysts argue the Houthis' domestic political audience rewards maximalist action. If Iranian-sponsored talks collapse permanently, Ansarallah faces internal pressure to escalate regardless of strategic calculation.

Key tension: Whether the Houthis will accept a ceasefire that does not explicitly include them, or whether their entry creates a veto over any deal.

Sources:Axios

Mentions:Israel →Pakistan →Majlis →Iran →Windward →Yahya Saree →Strait of Hormuz →Bab al-Mandeb →Mohammed Mansour →Larak-Qeshm →

First Reported In

Update #50 · Houthis join; Iran holds two chokepoints

Axios· 28 Mar 2026

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Causes and effects

Caused by

Iran rejects US plan, sets five terms

Iran's rejection of US ceasefire terms and demand for Hormuz sovereignty set the strategic context for activating the Houthi dual-chokepoint threat.

Occurred 25 Mar 2026

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This Event

Houthis threaten to close Bab al-Mandeb

If the Houthis close Bab al-Mandeb while Iran controls Hormuz, the IEA's emergency reserves cannot compensate for the combined disruption.

Led to

GPS blacked out across Gulf chokepoints

The GNSS denial zone extending to Bab al-Mandeb is the electronic precursor to the physical closure threatened by Houthi minister Mansour.

Occurred 29 Mar 2026

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Different Perspectives

Shipping and insurance underwriters

Kpler counted five Hormuz transits on 16 August against 31 the previous weekend, while Windward logged four vessels going AIS-dark for up to a month; underwriters price both the attacks and a sanctions register that names their counterparties in unreadable scanned images. Two trackers now measure only the ships that consent to be seen.

China

China sits at the end of the payment chain the 14 August designation targets: Iran's shadow banking network exists to convert sanctioned oil sales, much of it to Chinese refiners, into usable funds. Beijing has previously refused to recognise OFAC's jurisdiction over its own entities buying Iranian crude, leaving this designation to test compliance rather than change trade.

Qatar

Qatar's foreign ministry denied on 16 August holding any Iranian pilots alive, contradicting Iranian General Mohammad Bagherzadeh's claim that Doha holds three Su-24 aircrew, and said it had recovered only one set of remains. Qatar carries Iran's messages to Washington, and this is a public break with Tehran over a fact only one aircrew inquiry can settle.

Oman

Oman's shipping-map talks, covering monitoring, environment and maritime services, were publicly decoupled from any Hormuz reopening by Iran's own foreign minister on 17 August. Muscat's mediation channel keeps functioning on the narrow file it was given, while the political decision it hoped to unlock stays with Iran's security council.

Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia separately called the recurrence of tanker attacks on Emirati shipping a dangerous escalation, breaking from the UAE's repeated formula. Riyadh speaking in its own name over an attack on another state's vessels signals it reads the pattern differently from Abu Dhabi's flat statements.

United Arab Emirates

The UAE foreign ministry condemned a third ADNOC-linked tanker attack on 15 August in language identical, word for word, to its statement the day before. Three consecutive strikes on Emirati shipping have not moved Abu Dhabi's public wording by a single adjective.