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Iran Conflict 2026
4MAR

Fujairah hits 1.62 mbpd; ADCOP nears cap

4 min read
04:21UTC

Crude flow through Fujairah reached 1.62 million bpd by late March, a 38% rise within reach of the ADCOP pipeline's 2 million bpd design ceiling, while Khor Fakkan container handling rose 25-fold to 50,000 vessels per week.

ConflictDeveloping
Key takeaway

The Hormuz bypass route is approaching its ceiling as the IRGC claims the water above it.

Crude flow through Fujairah rose from 1.17 mbpd in February to 1.62 mbpd by late March 1, a 38% increase that puts the port within reach of the Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline (ADCOP) design ceiling of 2 mbpd. Khor Fakkan container handling went from 2,000 to 50,000 vessels per week, a 25-fold rise; six container ships were berthed and ten waiting on the day of the report.

Fujairah and Khor Fakkan sit on the United Arab Emirates' eastern coast, on The Gulf of Oman side of the Strait of Hormuz. ADCOP runs 370 km from Habshan, a terminal in Abu Dhabi's interior, to Fujairah, bypassing the strait entirely. When Hormuz is closed or contested, every barrel that previously sailed out of the Persian Gulf has to find another route, and the two UAE eastern ports are the alternative.

That alternative is running out of room. ADCOP's 2 mbpd design ceiling has never been tested at sustained throughput. Pipeline infrastructure operating near design capacity under conflict-zone threat generates compressor and metering stress that maintenance schedules cannot absorb on a normal cycle; real-world ceiling likely sits 200,000 to 300,000 bpd below the published figure. The 1.62 mbpd reading leaves perhaps 80,000 to 180,000 bpd of usable headroom before the pipeline starts forcing maintenance trade-offs. Khor Fakkan's congestion is sharper still: a 25-fold rise in a year cannot be absorbed by adding berths on a weeks-to-months timeline.

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) foreign ministry has not commented directly on the legal pressure. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) published a map on 5 May claiming maritime control zones along the UAE's eastern coastline, the legal escalation that followed the 4 May physical drone strike on the Fujairah Oil Industry Zone . The pattern is kinetic-then-legal: strike a target, then claim sovereignty over the water above it. International maritime law gives the IRGC's coastline claim no recognised standing, yet the 4 May drone strike demonstrated kinetic reach over the same water. If insurance markets price the legal claim, the bypass route's effective capacity falls before its physical capacity does.

A signed MOU would reopen Hormuz and end the toll system, taking the kinetic-then-legal pattern off the board. If Tehran's reply collapses against the 9 May expiry, the 380,000 bpd nominal headroom at Fujairah becomes the constraint that matters: the next significant Hormuz incident exhausts the surface alternative, and crude that cannot move by pipeline or by Khor Fakkan stays unloaded.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

The Strait of Hormuz is blocked, so oil that used to flow through it is going around the long way, through a pipeline in the UAE called ADCOP that runs from inland Abu Dhabi to the port of Fujairah on the UAE's eastern coast. By late March, that bypass route was handling 1.62 million barrels of oil per day. The problem: the pipeline was designed for 2 million barrels per day, and it is within about 380,000 barrels of that limit. Meanwhile, Iran's military struck the Fujairah oil terminal in a drone attack on 4 May and is now claiming legal authority over the sea in front of Fujairah. At current throughput growth rates, the bypass headroom runs out in roughly seven to nine weeks.

What could happen next?
  • Risk

    If the IRGC's 4 May drone strike on Fujairah Oil Industry Zone is followed by further kinetic action at the ADCOP terminal, the physical bypass capacity could drop below 1 million bpd within days, removing the only surface alternative to a blocked Hormuz.

  • Consequence

    Khor Fakkan's 25-fold rise to 50,000 vessels per week cannot be absorbed by berth expansion on any timeline shorter than 18 months; the congestion is a structural constraint, not a transient queue.

First Reported In

Update #91 · MOU in Tehran, missiles in the strait

AGBI· 8 May 2026
Read original
Causes and effects
This Event
Fujairah hits 1.62 mbpd; ADCOP nears cap
The only surface route around a blocked Hormuz is approaching its design ceiling at exactly the moment the IRGC is claiming legal authority over the water above it.
Different Perspectives
Oil markets / Lloyd's underwriters
Oil markets / Lloyd's underwriters
Futures markets priced CENTCOM's strikes-complete statement as a de-escalation signal and pushed Brent down 1.7 per cent to $94.71, even as the IRGC declared Hormuz closed. Lloyd's war-risk premiums held elevated because institutional de-listing requires a UN Security Council resolution that Russia and China have just shown they will block.
Pakistan (mediator)
Pakistan (mediator)
Interior minister Mohsin Naqvi carried dual civilian and military letters to Mojtaba Khamenei in Tehran on 6-7 June with no public response. The IRGC's Hormuz closure on 11 June shows the corps is acting independently of the channel Pakistan is using, making the mediation structurally unable to produce a binding commitment without direct IRGC access.
Russia and China
Russia and China
Russia and China voted against GOV/2026/40 at the IAEA Board, following through on the blocking position coordinated with Grossi in Geneva on 5 June; both states continue to oppose Western institutional pressure on Iran at every multilateral venue.
E3 and IAEA (UK, France, Germany)
E3 and IAEA (UK, France, Germany)
The E3 co-sponsored IAEA resolution GOV/2026/40, adopted 21-3-10 on 10 June, demanding Iran disclose 440.9 kg of unaccounted HEU and admit inspectors to four denied facilities. The 10 abstentions and Russia-China noes leave any Security Council referral without a viable enforcement path.
IRGC / Iran military command
IRGC / Iran military command
The corps declared Hormuz closed to all traffic on 11 June and claimed two vessels struck, overriding the MoU its own civilian negotiators were pursuing through Pakistan. The closure order used the Persian Gulf Strait Authority apparatus to convert a toll mechanism into a military prohibition.
Trump administration / CENTCOM
Trump administration / CENTCOM
CENTCOM completed a second day of strikes on Tehran, Sirik and Minab, rejected the IRGC Hormuz closure as inconsistent with observed transit, and said strikes were complete. Hegseth framed the bombing explicitly as the negotiation: the method is coercive deal-making with no stated pause threshold.