6AUG

Iran hardliners rage but cannot block it

3 min read

15:43UTC

Lawmaker Nabavian called the memorandum a path to making Iran a US colony; around 60 MPs demanded Ghalibaf justify his signature, but analysts say the revolt has no blocking power.

← Back to Two Hormuz deals, neither one published Jump to analysis ↓

ConflictDeveloping

Key takeaway

Around 60 MPs condemned the deal, but Khamenei's silence leaves them no leader.

Iranian lawmaker Mahmoud Nabavian said on 16 June that the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding would make Iran "a colony of the United States". Paydari Front MP Hossein Samsami called nuclear and regional negotiations impermissible; hardline lawmaker Amirhossein Sabeti said it violates the Supreme Leader's red lines ¹. Around 60 MPs have demanded Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf justify his signature .

The noise carries no blocking power. Alex Vatanka of the Middle East Institute, a Washington think tank, judges the hardliners "loud, but they have a weak case to make"; Jason Brodsky of United Against Nuclear Iran assesses that "the Supreme Leader made a decision, and that's going to carry the day" ². Mojtaba Khamenei has said nothing publicly about the deal, and no named IRGC officer has spoken for or against it.

That silence is what lets the agreement proceed: it commits the corps to nothing while denying the hardliners a leader to rally behind. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has held day-to-day war authority since Khamenei vanished from view in March , and the corps has chosen to stay silent rather than endorse or veto. A revolt of around sixty backbenchers without a single senior cleric, general or the Supreme Leader behind it cannot override a decision the office that outranks them all has already taken in private.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

About 60 Iranian members of parliament publicly attacked the deal, saying it would turn Iran into a US colony and violated lines the Supreme Leader had drawn. But they cannot actually block it. In Iran's political system, when the Supreme Leader indicates something should happen, even indirectly through silence and allowing it to proceed, parliament's objection is a protest rather than a veto. Moreover, the head of Iran's military force, the Revolutionary Guards, stayed completely quiet. They didn't endorse or oppose the deal. Since the Guards control the strait and the weapons, their silence effectively left the hardline MPs without any military institution backing their complaint. Loud voices, no lever.

Deep Analysis

Root Causes

The revolt has no blocking power for a specific constitutional reason: the Majlis did not sign the MOU and cannot revoke it. Ghalibaf signed in his capacity as speaker, acting as a state representative under the Supreme Leader's implicit authorisation. Under Iran's constitution, Article 110 grants the Supreme Leader authority over major state policies; a parliamentary revolt against a decision the Supreme Leader has tacitly endorsed carries no veto.

The IRGC commanders' restraint removed the hardliners' last institutional backer. The corps controls Hormuz and, as of 17 June, had not resumed toll-collection at an escalatory pace following the MOU signature. General Ahmad Vahidi's silence tells the Paydari Front MPs what Article 110 already tells constitutionalists: no military institution stands behind the parliamentary protest.

What could happen next?

Risk
The hardliner revolt's blocking power increases if the 60-day talks produce a written nuclear concession text, giving the Paydari Front a specific document to organise opposition around rather than an unread page-and-a-half MOU.
Meaning
Khamenei's public silence functions as a constitutional authorisation in Iran's political system; the corps' parallel silence removes the hardliners' last institutional ally.

Source Landscape

This story draws on centre-right-leaning sources from United Kingdom

United Kingdom

Primary parallel: In 1990, Majlis Speaker Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani accepted UN Security Council Resolution 598, ending the Iran-Iraq war, over hardline objections. Khomeini described the ceasefire as drinking a cup of poison.

Rafsanjani succeeded because IRGC commanders were privately exhausted from eight years of war and refused to mobilise against the deal. In 2026, Ghalibaf repeated the pattern: a corps-origin speaker signed over hardline MP protests that found no corps commander willing to publicly back them.

Counter-parallel: In 2005, Iranian hardliners drove President Khatami to abandon the Tehran Declaration nuclear suspension. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's election as president provided the institutional vehicle for that reversal; the office of the presidency gave the Paydari bloc the executive authority the Majlis alone lacked. President Pezeshkian has publicly defended the Islamabad MOU, blocking the same pathway in 2026.

Consensus view: Alex Vatanka of the Middle East Institute and Jason Brodsky of United Against Nuclear Iran both assessed the hardliners had no blocking power and that Khamenei's decision would carry.

The structural reason: in the Islamic Republic's constitutional design, the Supreme Leader's will expressed through silence, acquiescence, and the IRGC's non-intervention is conclusive. The Majlis has no veto over executive agreements signed by a parliamentary speaker acting under Supreme Leader authorisation.

Counter-view: The 60 MPs demanding Ghalibaf's justification represent the Paydari Front's full mobilisation. The real test comes when the 60-day talks produce a concrete nuclear concession text: at that point, the hardliners will have a written document to organise around rather than a page-and-a-half MoU whose contents are still disputed.

Key tension: Whether Khamenei's silence holds as a form of authorisation through the 60-day window, or whether a written nuclear concession triggers a public break with the corps that his silence currently masks.

First Reported In

Update #130 · Trump signed the war over; it kept going

Iran International· 17 Jun 2026

Read original →

Causes and effects

Caused by

Iran's parliament turns on its signatory

The 60 MPs demanding Ghalibaf justify his signature on 15 June escalated into the named hardliner condemnations with Vatanka/Brodsky counter-assessments on 16-17 June.

Occurred 15 Jun 2026

Read story →

Iran's deal waits on a leader unseen since March

The IRGC's day-to-day war authority and Khamenei's absence from public life are the structural conditions under which the hardliner revolt lacks any senior figure to rally behind.

Occurred 11 Jun 2026

Read story →

This Event

Iran hardliners rage but cannot block it

Khamenei's public silence both enables the deal and denies the hardliners a senior figure to rally behind.

Different Perspectives

Hengaw

The Norway-based monitoring group reported the Urmia executions of Omid Behzad and Pouria Safvat, the only source to do so, consistent with its documented pattern of recording far more executions than the Iranian state acknowledges. Iran's government has not confirmed either execution.

Shipping and insurance underwriters

War-risk premiums price the Houthi campaign because the group announces its targets in advance, but a reopening Trump has promised without a published text gives underwriters no benchmark to reprice Hormuz cover against. Insurers want a text before they move rates, not a promise.

Houthi movement

Spokesman Yahya Saree claimed strikes on two tankers in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden on 5 August, only one of which UKMTO could confirm. The group's campaign against shipping continues on its own schedule, independent of any Hormuz arrangement further north.

Oman

Muscat has brokered the coordinates both Tehran and Washington's wire sources now describe differently, but has published no account of its own. Oman's position depends on treating Hormuz as a shared route, which is not what Iran is currently describing.

United States Central Command

CENTCOM raised its interdiction tally from 35 to 44 redirected vessels and disclosed its first boardings on 3 August, the day before Trump promised a reopening. The command's own enforcement record does not yet reflect the release the President has described.

Iran's Foreign Ministry

Spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei described the agreed Hormuz coordinates as a wholly new corridor under Iranian management, not a split of the existing route, days after his own deputy rejected Oman's lane proposal. Tehran wants the arrangement read as a change of ownership, not a compromise on access.