The EU Council's short-term contract ban on Russian LNG enters force on 25 April 2026, ten days from the 15 April print, removing approximately 17 bcm per year, around 13% of EU LNG imports across the first eleven months of 2025 1. Long-term contracts follow on 1 January 2027. Importers must operate under a prior-authorisation system requiring proof of non-Russian origin for every cargo, and member states must notify The Commission of remaining Russian gas contracts within one month of entry-into-force.
The distinction against the 27 March transshipment measure matters. That instrument covered re-export to non-EU destinations, not inbound volumes; Bruegel's dataset confirms it did not materially reduce Russian LNG arrivals at EU terminals . The new instrument is the first that actually blocks Russian LNG at the European border, and the supply arithmetic changes on day one rather than across a transition.
What is missing from every source reviewed is a named replacement. Ras Laffan force majeure remains in force , Atlantic cargo diversions to Asia are now close to a dozen , and record March 2026 volumes read as front-loading rather than a durable bridge 2. At March import patterns the cut displaces roughly 1.3 to 1.6 bcm each month; replacing that from US flexible supply requires winning cargoes on a JKM-TTF spread that has not widened.
For procurement desks the compliance load lands on the 25th and the origin-proof paperwork applies to every non-Russian cargo from the first day. Bruegel's refill estimate did not assume another 17 bcm/yr would be removed on top of an already difficult supply picture. Implementation is certain; the open question is which importer breaks cover first on where the volume will come from.
