CREA

CREA's monthly numbers are the main Independent read on what Russia earns from fossil fuels. Its May figures showed Urals crude averaging $82.02 a barrel, 12% down on April, as China cut Russian crude purchases by 23%; total fossil-fuel earnings still rose 2% because Baltic shipments recovered.

In June Urals fell a further 26% to $63.18, and seaborne product loadings hit a record low, yet product revenue rose 14% on dearer global fuel. By September CREA put the extra revenue from the Hormuz price spike at around €31bn over six months. Russia's Finance Ministry booked a 16.7% fall in oil and gas receipts for January to August, with non-oil taxes carrying the budget.

CREA's port data has become a check on Ukrainian strike claims as well as on Russian revenue. On 12 September Robert Brovdi, commander of Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces, claimed 285 tankers struck; the months he itemised added up to 79.

CREA measured a real fall in loadings at the berths over the same period, so the direction of Brovdi's claim matched Independent evidence. It did not corroborate the 285 total. That split, between a measurable effect on exports and a headline number nobody outside the military can verify, is the role CREA plays in the strike campaign: it confirms what tracked ships show and nothing more.

CREA's vessel tracking set the baseline for the shadow-fleet debate in 2026. Its February data showed 56% of Russian crude moving on sanctioned shadow tankers, with 23 false-flag vessels delivering €800m of cargo, while every Yamal LNG cargo reached EU ports for the first time since 2018.

The share held through the summer. In August CREA counted 150 shadow tankers among the 311 vessels that exported Russian crude and products, carrying 52% of Russia's seaborne oil. European states acted against the same fleet that spring: Sweden boarded the Sea Owl I on 12 March, bound for Primorsk under a false declaration.