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European Oil Markets
23JUL

Iran's deal waits on a leader unseen since March

3 min read
19:27UTC

The MoU awaits a decision from Mojtaba Khamenei, unseen in public since early March; analysts at the Stimson and Soufan centres assess IRGC commanders now hold day-to-day authority over the war.

EconomicAssessed
Key takeaway

With the supreme leader unseen since March, the corps that shut Hormuz now decides whether any deal survives.

Mojtaba Khamenei has not appeared in public since early March, more than three months after being named Iran's supreme leader and wounded in the 28 February strike that killed his father. He has governed since through written statements relayed by state media. Pakistan's interior minister Mohsin Naqvi carried dual civilian and military letters to him in Tehran on 6-7 June ; more than three months on, no public response has come, and the MOU reportedly still waits on his word.

Thomas Juneau of the Stimson Center and analysts at The Soufan Center assess that IRGC commanders now hold day-to-day authority over the war, exceeding the supreme leader's. The Naqvi channel, on that reading, routes letters to a figure who may no longer be the decision node, while the corps acts on its own initiative. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, the civilian negotiator, has been overruled by the corps before.

The Hormuz closure supplies the proof. A military command that can shut the strait the same week its government's mediators are pressing for a deal is the command that decides whether any deal holds, whatever the absent leader eventually signs. The question is no longer whether Tehran wants an agreement; it is whether the part of Tehran that wants one can deliver the part that is fighting.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

Iran's supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, is the country's most powerful official on paper, with constitutional authority above the president and parliament. He was appointed in March 2026 after his father was killed in a February air strike. He was wounded in the same attack and has not appeared in public since early March. Pakistan is trying to help broker a peace deal and has sent a senior official to deliver letters from both Pakistani civilian and military leaders to Khamenei. But there has been no public response. Analysts watching Iran closely believe the military commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) are actually making the day-to-day war decisions, not Khamenei. That creates a big problem for any peace negotiation: the person the deal needs to sign off may not be the one with authority to make it stick.

Deep Analysis
Root Causes

Mojtaba Khamenei was appointed supreme leader on 7 March in an emergency online session of the Assembly of Experts after the Qom headquarters was destroyed. At least eight members boycotted, citing IRGC pressure and Mojtaba's lack of the marja theological credentials required by Article 109 of Iran's constitution.

The constitutional legitimacy deficit combined with physical injury means his authority over the corps rests on IRGC political endorsement rather than constitutional mandate, inverting the normal relationship between the supreme leader and the military.

The parallel command problem is amplified by the Naqvi channel's structure. Pakistan's mediation routes through civilian interlocutors (Foreign Minister Araghchi) as well as military ones (Field Marshal Asim Munir's equivalent letters).

But the 11 June Hormuz closure shows the IRGC acting independently of both channels on the same week the civilian mediators were pressing for a deal. The two-track structure, civilian plus military mediation, does not resolve to a single authoritative answer if the corps command overrides whatever the civilians agree to.

Escalation

Stable but structurally dangerous. The IRGC holding day-to-day authority without a functioning supreme-leader endorsement mechanism means there is no single escalation decision node that a mediator can reach. Any deal needs corps buy-in that no external mediator currently has direct access to.

What could happen next?
  • Risk

    If Khamenei's incapacity is permanent or worsens, a formal succession process under Article 111 of Iran's constitution must convene the Assembly of Experts. With the Qom headquarters destroyed and the assembly's authority contested, a second wartime succession would create a deeper legitimacy crisis inside Iran.

    Medium term · Assessed
  • Consequence

    The Pakistan mediation channel, structured around delivering letters to Khamenei, addresses a figurehead while the IRGC military council makes operational decisions. Unless Pakistan or another mediator gains direct access to IRGC commanders, the channel cannot produce a binding ceasefire commitment.

    Immediate · Assessed
  • Meaning

    The IRGC closing Hormuz on 11 June, the same week Pakistan pressed for a deal through Khamenei, demonstrates that the corps treats the civilian diplomatic track as parallel to, rather than binding on, its military decisions.

    Immediate · Reported
First Reported In

Update #124 · IRGC declares Hormuz shut; US strikes again

Geo.tv / Stimson Center / Soufan Center· 11 Jun 2026
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Causes and effects
This Event
Iran's deal waits on a leader unseen since March
If the decision node has moved from the supreme leader to the corps, then the channel Pakistan is using runs to a figurehead. The IRGC shutting Hormuz the same week its government pressed for a deal is the working evidence that no civilian instrument can bind the military wing.
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