22JUN

China and Russia Veto Hormuz Resolution

2 min read

13:56UTC

UN Security Council

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EconomicDeveloping

Key takeaway

The multilateral route to Hormuz reopening is closed; only bilateral talks or force remain.

The UN Security Council voted 11 to 2 for a resolution calling for Hormuz reopening. Russia and China vetoed it. Russia's alignment with Iran was expected and follows its consistent pattern of shielding Tehran from multilateral pressure. China's veto is more consequential: its active protection of a toll regime that advantages its own shipping at the expense of Japanese, South Korean, and European competitors reveals a strategic calculation. The Hormuz disruption functions as an economic weapon against China's rivals, and Beijing has now voted to preserve it .

The veto forecloses the UNSC route for any future enforcement action. Hormuz reopening now depends entirely on bilateral US-Iran negotiation or unilateral US military action, both of which carry costs the administration has so far declined to pay . The IRGC mine chart corridor system operates without any multilateral challenge mechanism.

China's toll-paying tankers already transit while Japanese and South Korean ships wait. The competitive tilt is not incidental; it restructures East Asian energy access under a framework China has formally voted to protect. For the 325 tankers stranded inside the Persian Gulf, the multilateral route to freedom of navigation is now closed.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

The United Nations tried to pass a vote demanding the Strait of Hormuz be reopened to all ships. Eleven countries voted yes. Russia and China — who each have veto power on the Security Council — blocked it. China's ships are already paying Iran's fees and getting through while Japanese and South Korean ships wait. China benefits from the blockade hurting its economic rivals, so it voted to keep it.

Deep Analysis

Root Causes

China imports approximately 15% of its crude oil through Hormuz from Gulf states, plus additional Iranian crude. The toll regime, which its tankers pay and which Japan and South Korea's tankers cannot use freely, tilts a competitive advantage China's way during an energy-intensive period of industrial policy.

The veto is not ideological alignment with Iran — it is commercial self-interest in a system that disadvantages rivals.

What could happen next?

Consequence
The UNSC veto closes the multilateral enforcement route permanently for this crisis; Hormuz reopening now requires either US bilateral negotiation with Iran or unilateral military action.
Precedent
China's willingness to veto a free-navigation resolution signals to Gulf states, Japan, South Korea, and the EU that their energy security cannot be guaranteed through multilateral mechanisms when Chinese commercial interests conflict.

Source Landscape

This story draws on centre-left-leaning sources from United States

United States

Primary parallel: China's 2022 and 2023 UNSC vetoes on Syria blocked accountability for chemical weapons use. In each case, the veto protected a state actor whose continued operation served Chinese strategic interests. The pattern is consistent: veto when the resolution addresses a situation where China's ally or partner benefits from the status quo.

Counter-parallel: During the 1980s tanker war, the Soviet Union also refused UNSC action that would have forced Hormuz reopening through US naval presence. The analogy is imperfect: the USSR was not an Iranian oil customer with tankers actively transiting; China has a direct commercial stake the USSR did not.

China is Iran's largest oil buyer, purchasing an estimated 1.5-1.8 million barrels per day of Iranian crude at steep discounts throughout the sanctions period.

Japanese and South Korean refiners, unable to transit at toll-paying rates, face spot LNG costs up 40% since Hormuz closure. The veto preserves a competitive energy pricing advantage for Chinese industry at the direct expense of East Asian rivals.

Consensus view: Carnegie Endowment's James Acton and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) both note that China's Hormuz veto is the most consequential geopolitical signal of the ceasefire period: it reveals that Beijing has chosen economic advantage over its stated support for free navigation and multilateral order.

Counter-view: Chinese state media (Xinhua, Global Times) frames the veto as opposition to 'unilateral coercive measures' by the West rather than protection of toll-paying tankers. From Beijing's perspective, the UNSC resolution was US-drafted and served US interests in controlling the energy leverage Iran now holds.

Key tension: China is Iran's largest oil customer and the primary beneficiary of the toll regime; its veto is commercially rational but strategically signals to Japan, South Korea, and the EU that their energy security is subordinate to Chinese interests when the two conflict.

First Reported In

Update #64 · Islamabad talks open already cracked

Bloomberg· 10 Apr 2026

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Causes and effects

This Event

China and Russia Veto Hormuz Resolution

The veto removes the multilateral route and confirms China's economic interest in the toll regime outweighs its stated support for free navigation.

Led to

Russia and China kill Iran's UN monitor

Russia and China closed the Council to Iran once before, vetoing the Hormuz resolution in April.

Occurred 17 Sept 2026

Read story →

Different Perspectives

Cross-border power traders

The France-Germany day-ahead spread flipped from a EUR 17.20 German premium on 1 August to a EUR 4.15 French premium on 3 August, the same day French curtailment peaked. They cannot yet attribute the flip to curtailment alone, since a like-for-like overnight comparison shows French nuclear output rising while wind fell and demand returned on the weekday step.

EDF

River-cooling limits took 7.6 GW, 12 per cent of its fleet, offline on 3 August, the highest curtailment since the heatwave began, with an easing forecast to 4.3 GW on 4 August and 3 GW after. It manages the cut as a recurring seasonal constraint, expecting it to lift with river temperature, not repair.

Gasunie

TTF, the Dutch hub it operates, drifted to roughly EUR 55 to 58 per MWh across the window, staying inside its recent range through both the German spark reversal and the French curtailment. It reads a flat hub price as evidence that neither event this window carried enough weight to move the fuel leg on its own.

German gas-fired generators

Record German solar of 18,761 MW on 2 August pushed the clean spark spread to minus 18.48 EUR/MWh, a loss-making day, before it returned to plus 16.20 on 3 August. They now price dispatch against post-solar residual load rather than wind alone, since the sign flipped inside 48 hours on unchanged fuel and carbon costs.

European Commission (DG Energy)

Its implementing-measures register logged transposition notices from only Portugal and Slovakia against Wednesday's Article 94 deadline for Directive (EU) 2024/1788, with 25 states silent. It expects the register to fill only gradually, since filing routinely lags legislating and any infringement track against non-notifying states runs on a slower clock than the deadline itself.

Spain's LNG terminal operators

Spain's 9,145 GWh terminal inventory is the largest single stock in the EU LNG network, an option value that can reroute cargoes wherever the winter strip pays best rather than a cavern gas obligation tied to a fixed date. That flexibility matters more as Germany's cavern shortfall pushes more of the winter security question onto import infrastructure.