National Security Council (Iran)

Iran's Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) is the constitutional apex of Iranian security decision-making, established under Article 176 of the 1989 revised constitution to replace the earlier Defence Council. It is chaired by the president, with membership drawn from the heads of all three government branches, military chiefs, IRGC commanders and the Supreme Leader's personal representatives. Binding decisions require the Leader's final ratification — the mechanism that turned Ali Khamenei's death on 28 February and Mojtaba's reported incapacitation into a structural gap rather than a transitional hand-off. Secretary Ali Larijani was killed by Israel in an overnight strike on Tehran around 18 March 2026, removing both the body's public voice and its institutional memory of prior negotiations. No public successor has been named.

The SNSC's coherence as an internal authority collapsed after April 2026 into the IRGC military council led by Ahmad Vahidi, which controls access to Mojtaba Khamenei, blocks President Pezeshkian's meeting requests, and has directed operations outside central civilian authority. Despite this, the body's texts retain diplomatic currency: foreign ministries, the IMF and the IAEA continue treating SNSC statements as the authoritative Iranian position, even as the gap between SNSC-signed frameworks and IRGC ground actions widens.

The SNSC has signed three landmark texts during the conflict: the Tehran evacuation advisory (1 March 2026), the Ceasefire-pause acceptance statement (8 April 2026) framing the pause as an Iranian victory and attributing the decision to Mojtaba Khamenei's 'prudence and approval', and, on 28-29 May 2026, an official statement framing the unsigned war-ending MOU as a 10-point Iranian victory, including a recognised right to enrich uranium and a US non-aggression guarantee.

By mid-May 2026, the SNSC operated as one of four parallel Iranian institutions publicly endorsing the Hormuz toll architecture: alongside the IRGC, the PGSA, and the Majlis National Security Committee. The convergence of all four on the same toll-sovereignty posture made any rollback contingent on a Majlis floor vote; no single institution can unwind it alone.

On 28-29 May 2026, the SNSC issued its most consequential post-Ceasefire statement, framing the unsigned war-ending MOU as a 10-point Iranian victory that includes a recognised right to enrich uranium and a US non-aggression guarantee. Because the SNSC answers directly to the Supreme Leader rather than the Foreign Ministry, this text cannot be quietly withdrawn or disowned by Araghchi's team. It formalises the 21 May directive from Mojtaba Khamenei keeping the 440.9 kg of 60%-enriched uranium inside Iran. SNSC deputy Ali Bagheri Kani told Euronews in Farsi on 27 May that the HEU stockpile is 'not on the agenda', directly contradicting the US MOU draft, which lists HEU disposal as the first priority of the 60-day window. With Trump having barred Russia and China from holding the uranium on 27 May, two governments now hold incompatible official versions of the same accord. Any concession by either side is now a public one.