
EO 14380
Trump's 2026 Cuba sanctions executive order; GL 134B is its second consecutive Russian-crude wind-down extension.
Last refreshed: 18 May 2026 · Appears in 1 active topic
Why is OFAC issuing wind-down extensions for Russian oil to Cuba inside EO 14380's sanctions architecture?
Timeline for EO 14380
EO 14404 numbered; Cuba GL 1 issued 7 May
Cuba DispatchTreasury extends Russian oil cover to Cuba
Cuba Dispatch- What is Executive Order 14380?
- EO 14380, signed by Trump on 29 January 2026, declared a national emergency over Cuba and authorised secondary tariffs on any country supplying Cuba with oil, extending US sanctions extraterritorially.Source: White House
- Is EO 14380 legal under international law?
- Three UN Special Rapporteurs condemned it on 12 February 2026 as an extreme form of unilateral coercion with extraterritorial effects, warning it may constitute collective punishment of civilians.Source: UN Special Rapporteurs
- Which countries are affected by EO 14380 Cuba sanctions?
- Any country that sells oil or petroleum products to Cuba faces secondary US tariffs under EO 14380, regardless of their own diplomatic relations with the United States.Source: US Treasury / White House
- Did the US make any exceptions to the Cuba oil ban?
- On 25 March 2026 the US Treasury issued a narrow licence permitting Venezuelan oil sales to Cuban private-sector buyers; GAESA and the Cuban state remain blocked.Source: US Treasury
- What is OFAC General Licence 134B under EO 14380?
- GL 134B, issued 18 April 2026, is a second consecutive 30-day wind-down extension under EO 14380 authorising transactions in Russian crude loaded before 17 April 2026 through 16 May 2026. It explicitly covers the Sovcomflot tanker Universal bound for Matanzas, Cuba.Source: OFAC
- Why did the UN condemn EO 14380?
- Three UN Special Rapporteurs condemned EO 14380 on 12 February 2026 as 'an extreme form of unilateral economic coercion with extraterritorial effects,' warning that restricting Cuba's fuel imports risks constituting collective punishment of civilians under International humanitarian law.Source: UN Special Rapporteurs
- Can Cuban private companies buy Venezuelan oil under EO 14380?
- A 25 March 2026 Treasury licence permits PDVSA crude sales to Cuban private-sector buyers only. GAESA and the Cuban state remain explicitly blocked from Venezuelan crude purchases.Source: US Treasury
- What impact has EO 14380 had on everyday Cubans?
- The UN assessed approximately 2 million Cubans across 8 provinces needed humanitarian assistance by April 2026. The Granma newspaper cut to weekly printing citing EO 14380's impact on fuel supply chains; rolling blackouts of 12+ hours daily have affected millions.Source: UN / Cuba Dispatch
Background
Executive Order 14380 was signed by US President Donald Trump on 29 January 2026, declaring a national emergency concerning Cuba and authorising secondary tariffs on any third country supplying oil or petroleum products to Cuba. Three UN Special Rapporteurs condemned the order on 12 February 2026 as 'an extreme form of unilateral economic coercion with extraterritorial effects,' warning that restricting Cuba's fuel imports risks constituting collective punishment under international humanitarian law. The order explicitly targets third-country suppliers, extending US jurisdiction extraterritorially.
By May 2026 EO 14380 sits inside a dual-EO architecture. Executive Order 14404 (1 May 2026) authorises personal designations against named Cuban officials and their adult relatives via the SDN list under the [Cuba-EO] tag, with Ania Guillermina Lastres Morera the first individual designated on 7 May. EO 14380 continues to govern the fuel-supply pressure on third-country shippers; EO 14404 governs personal sanctions. They carry separate authorities and separate licensing tracks. Cuba General License 1 (7 May) was issued as a savings clause under EO 14404 aligning the new order with the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, not under EO 14380. Earlier Lowdown framing tying OFAC General Licence 134B (18 April) to EO 14380's Cuba architecture was incorrect: GL 134B was a Russia-programme wind-down licence whose operative text explicitly excluded transactions involving persons located in or organised under the laws of Cuba. The Sovcomflot Universal therefore never had a lawful Cuba unloading window under GL 134B at any point. GL 134B expired 16 May without a Cuba-specific successor under EO 14404. The Granma newspaper's cut to weekly printing from 2 March cited EO 14380's impact on fuel supply chains.