
PDVSA
Venezuela's state oil company, drafted in to offset a global supply shock.
On 13 May, Cuba said PDVSA shipments had stopped in November 2025, before Washington's March carve-out. The loss of Cuba's state market left PDVSA's constrained output exposed to US licensing decisions.
Last refreshed: 22 September 2026 · Appears in 2 active topics
Why is Venezuela's oil company unable to supply Cuba even under a US sanctions waiver?
Timeline for PDVSA
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European Oil MarketsBackground
PDVSA is Venezuela's state oil company and the main vehicle through which the government develops and sells the country's petroleum. Its relevance rests on control of Venezuelan crude, including the Orinoco Belt, rather than on a single export relationship.
The company operates under long-running production and infrastructure constraints. On 18 March 2026, the US Treasury authorised global PDVSA crude sales through a US-controlled account during the Hormuz supply shock. The measure showed that PDVSA's market access can be widened or narrowed through US licensing.
That dependence matters because an authorisation changes legal access, not physical capacity. The March 2026 licence excluded Cuba's state sector, leaving PDVSA's commercial options shaped by both Venezuelan production limits and Washington's terms.
PDVSA lost Cuba's state market
On 13 May, Cuba's energy minister said Venezuelan crude shipments had been cut since November 2025. That put PDVSA's break with a longstanding state customer four months before the US licence of 18 March formally excluded Cuba and GAESA from Venezuelan oil.
The follow-up licence of 25 March permitted sales to Cuban private businesses, but not to GAESA, which handles most fuel imports. For PDVSA, the legal opening did not restore access to the buyer with tanker-scale import capacity. The evidence does not establish why shipments stopped, so it cannot show whether the cause was payment, output or anticipated sanctions.