16APR

F/A-18 disables tankers via smokestack on 8 May

4 min read

14:27UTC

A US Navy F/A-18 from USS George H.W. Bush put 500-pound laser-guided warheads down the chimneys of M/T Sea Star III and M/T Sevda on 8 May. CENTCOM's blockade redirection count climbed to 57.

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ConflictDeveloping

Key takeaway

An aerial doctrine that disables tankers without sinking them, the same weekend Trump called it 'a love tap'.

An F/A-18 Super Hornet launched from the USS George H.W. Bush (CVN 77) disabled two Iranian-flagged tankers, M/T Sea Star III and M/T Sevda, on 8 May by firing precision munitions through their smokestacks ¹. US Central Command (CENTCOM), the Pentagon command responsible for the Strait of Hormuz blockade, confirmed both vessels were attempting to reach Iranian ports in violation of standing redirection orders. The ordnance, likely 500-pound laser-guided warheads, was dropped down the chimney rather than into hull or magazine, disabling the propulsion and electrics without rupturing the cargo or killing the crew.

This was the third blockade enforcement action in a fortnight and the first to use aerial precision-disabling rather than naval gun fire. CENTCOM's commercial-vessel redirection count has now climbed from 48 on 3 May to 52 on 7 May to 57 on 8 May, five fresh redirections in two days. Four Iranian-flagged vessels have been physically disabled across the campaign so far ². The technique maps onto a long-standing US Navy preference for proportional kinetic response: the 1988 Praying Mantis engagements aimed to neutralise Iranian platforms without sinking civilian shipping in the same waters. The 2026 variant uses laser-guided ordnance for what 1988 did with five-inch gun fire.

The Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters, the IRGC overarching joint operational command, claimed "significant damage" to US destroyers from the 7-8 May missile, drone and small-boat salvos near Bandar Abbas . CENTCOM confirmed zero hull damage and zero US casualties ³. Tasnim, the IRGC-linked agency, cited an unnamed senior source claiming three US destroyers fled to the Gulf of Oman. Both accounts cannot be true; both are real official statements in an information war running behind the kinetic one.

Donald Trump described the same exchange to ABC News as "just a love tap" on the same weekend his pilots were dropping laser-guided ordnance down two tanker chimneys. The verbal de-escalation track and the kinetic enforcement track are no longer running on the same calendar. The new precision-disabling doctrine creates an evidentiary record (vessel still afloat, intact cargo, surviving crew) that enables prosecution under the Hormuz blockade legal architecture, where sinking would have foreclosed it. CENTCOM has not yet published the rules of engagement under which an aircraft may put precision munitions into a non-combatant tanker.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

A US Navy jet from the aircraft carrier USS George H.W. Bush flew over two Iranian oil tankers on 8 May and dropped precision bombs through their smokestacks, the metal exhaust chimneys on top of the ships. This disabled both ships' engines and electricity without blowing holes in the hull or igniting the cargo. This was not a random attack. The US has been enforcing a naval blockade, turning back ships trying to deliver oil to Iran. These two tankers were attempting to bypass the blockade to reach Iranian ports. The method of disabling through the smokestack, rather than firing at the hull, was chosen specifically to incapacitate the vessel without sinking it or killing the crew, so the ships can be towed away and the action defended as proportionate under international law. Despite this, President Trump described the same strikes to ABC News as 'just a love tap', while the actual bombs used weighed 500 pounds. The gap between his public description and what his military actually did illustrates how differently the verbal and military tracks of this war are being run.

Deep Analysis

Root Causes

The US Navy's preference for disabling rather than sinking reflects a structural constraint specific to the Strait of Hormuz geography.

The strait is 33 km wide at its narrowest navigable point; a sunk VLCC (Very Large Crude Carrier) at the choke would produce a navigational obstruction with a draught exceeding 20 metres, potentially closing the channel entirely for weeks. **CENTCOM** planners are operating with an implicit constraint that the blockade must remain selectively permeable: enough enforcement to coerce, not enough structural damage to make the strait itself unnavigable. Disabling-not-sinking preserves the option space.

The F/A-18 strike on M/T Sea Star III and M/T Sevda on 8 May is the third enforcement action and the first aerial one, driven by the absence of a surface-boarding alternative that could safely approach vessels in an active IRGC-fire environment. The switch to aerial precision was not a doctrinal preference but a tactical necessity produced by the IRGC's small-boat swarm tactics near Bandar Abbas .

What could happen next?

Precedent
The smokestack precision-disabling technique, applied without published RoE, sets a doctrinal precedent other naval powers may cite to justify similar disabling strikes on third-party shipping in contested chokepoints.
Medium term · 0.8
Risk
Without published RoE, an aircraft crew error or escalation in a future engagement has no established legal boundary; the first fatality on a disabled tanker would collapse the proportionality defence CENTCOM is currently relying on.
Short term · 0.82
Consequence
The 57-vessel CENTCOM redirection count creates an evidentiary record that will be presented to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea once Iran or a flag state files; each disabled vessel is a discrete legal case.
Long term · 0.7

Source Landscape

This story draws on centre-left-leaning sources from United States and Israel

United States

Israel

Primary parallel: Operation Praying Mantis on 18 April 1988 saw the US Navy surface-fire and air-strike Iranian naval platforms and oil platforms in the Persian Gulf after an Iranian mine disabled USS Samuel B. Roberts. The targeting logic was identical to 2026: disable or destroy Iran-linked maritime assets without sinking civilian shipping in the same waters.

In 1988, the doctrine used five-inch gun fire and anti-ship missiles; in 2026 the F/A-18 substitutes laser-guided precision ordnance dropped through a smokestack. In both cases, the proportionality calculation set a ceiling of disabling over sinking civilian cargo carriers in the same contested waters.

Counter-parallel: On 17 May 1987 an Iraqi Mirage F-1 fired two Exocet missiles into USS Stark (FFG-31), killing 37 US sailors. The incident demonstrated how rapidly a pilot's technical error or deliberate action can breach a proportionality framework that lacks published rules of engagement to bound it.

The Stark incident produced the Reagan administration's clarification of self-defence doctrine for Gulf shipping; no comparable published clarification has yet been issued in 2026 for the offensive use of precision ordnance against tankers.

Consensus view: Commander James Kraska of the US Naval War College's Stockton Center for International Law and Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg of the European University Viadrina both document that smokestack-entry precision strikes on non-combatant vessels occupy a legally distinct category from hull perforation.

Under UNCLOS Article 58 and San Remo Manual Rule 67, a belligerent may board and disable a neutral vessel carrying contraband bound for an enemy port without sinking it, provided force is proportionate. The F/A-18 strike exploits this by disabling propulsion and electrics without rupturing cargo or killing crew, creating an evidentiary record of proportionality that would be impossible to construct if the vessel were sunk.

Counter-view: Yoram Dinstein's standard work on naval warfare (Naval Warfare at Sea, 7th ed.) and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Armament and Disarmament programme both flag that the critical legal question is not proportionality of force but authority: no published rules of engagement authorise a naval aviator to place precision munitions inside a non-combatant tanker underway.

The absence of published RoE means the doctrine is operational reality without legal scaffolding, which is precisely the condition under which subsequent incidents escalate unpredictably.

Key tension: Whether CENTCOM will publish the rules of engagement under which a pilot may strike a non-combatant tanker's smokestack before a third-party maritime court (such as the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea) asserts jurisdiction over the first disabled vessel's flag state claim.

First Reported In

Update #92 · An MOU asking Iran to surrender what nobody can count

Arms Control Association· 9 May 2026

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Causes and effects

Caused by

CENTCOM blockade tally hits 48 vessels

CENTCOM's blockade enforcement that reached 48 redirections on 3 May established the escalation baseline the 8 May smokestack bombing advanced.

Occurred 3 May 2026

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CENTCOM redirections rise to 52, pace slows

The 52-redirection count on 7 May is the direct predecessor to the 57-redirection count and smokestack disabling on 8 May.

Occurred 6 May 2026

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IRGC fires on US destroyers in Hormuz

The IRGC missile and drone attacks on US destroyers on 7-8 May directly preceded and contextualise the US smokestack strike response on 8 May.

Occurred 7 May 2026

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This Event

F/A-18 disables tankers via smokestack on 8 May

The first aerial precision-disabling under the Hormuz blockade establishes a doctrinal middle ground between redirect and sink, and contradicts the President's verbal characterisation of the same engagement.

Led to

CENTCOM redirections hit 58; four ships disabled

The four disabled ships as of 10 May include the two named in the 8 May smokestack-bombing action (Sea Star III and Sevda), plus two additional unnamed disabling actions

Occurred 10 May 2026

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Different Perspectives

China

Beijing has not publicly commented on the dual Oreshnik launch. China's declared position of urging restraint and dialogue sits awkwardly alongside its continued economic ties with Russia; the weapons escalation tests whether Beijing's neutrality framing can survive a European IRBM normalisation event.

IAEA

Director General Grossi condemned the ZNPP reactor-6 turbine building strike and stated "there should be no attack of any kind from or against the plant." The agency confirmed normal radiation levels but has not resolved attribution; Rosatom CEO Likachev warned the region is "one step closer to an incident."

Turkey

Ankara hosted Istanbul Round 2 at Ciragan Palace on 2 June and secured a 1,200-for-1,200 prisoner exchange, consolidating Turkey as the war's sole diplomatic venue after Rubio confirmed US mediation has ended. Erdogan's leverage over both parties grows with each round.

European Union

EU Ambassador Mathernova answered Lavrov's evacuation demand with "We stay in Kyiv. We stay with Ukraine." The Verkhovna Rada approved the EUR 90bn EU loan on 28 May; the EUR 9.1bn first tranche, the EU's first explicit defence-procurement financing, arrives mid-June.

United States

Rubio declared US mediation stagnated on 22 May and confirmed no talks were occurring, then received Lavrov's evacuation demand three days later without ordering embassy drawdown. Washington's leverage now runs through the GL 134C sanctions cliff on 17 June rather than any active diplomatic channel.

Ukraine

Zelenskyy called Russia's 2-3 day ceasefire counter-offer at Istanbul Round 2 "shortsighted" and submitted a full peace memorandum covering EU membership, international guarantees, phased sanctions relief and frozen-asset reparations. Kyiv's position is that a partial ceasefire freeze aids Russian reconstitution; only an all-domain 30-day pause is acceptable.