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Russia-Ukraine War 2026
3MAR

OFAC quietly extends Russia crude waiver

4 min read
09:47UTC

OFAC issued General License 134B on 17 April, one day after Bessent killed GL 134A, keeping pre-loaded Russia-origin crude legal through 16 May at roughly $150 million a day.

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Key takeaway

Treasury's 16 April announcement looked like a kill; the 17 April licence kept Russian cargoes flowing for another month.

The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued General License 134B on 17 April 2026, one day after Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent announced the non-renewal of GL 134A and the redesignation of Rosneft and Lukoil as Specially Designated Nationals . GL 134B authorises continued transactions in Russia-origin crude oil and petroleum products loaded onto vessels by 12:01 a.m. EDT on 17 April, with the authorisation valid through 12:01 a.m. EDT on 16 May 2026. Ancillary services covered include docking, bunkering, emergency repairs and maritime insurance. The licence carves out any cargo touching Iran, North Korea, Cuba, Crimea, Donetsk or Luhansk-linked entities, which remain under their separate sanctions architecture.

GL 134A had run since November 2025 and was scheduled to expire on 11 April . Bessent's 16 April statement was read by wires including Reuters and Semafor as a hard kill of the at-sea cargo channel. The licence Treasury's own sanctions desk signed the next day kept that channel running for any cargo already on the water. The real cliff is 16 May, not 11 April.

At Urals $106.81/bbl in early May, every day of legal at-sea liquidation translates to roughly $150 million in cargoes Moscow's shadow fleet can sell with insurance and port access. The four-week extension therefore covers cargoes worth roughly $4.5bn that the 16 April press release had implied were stranded.

The instrument resembles the 2022 price-cap architecture more than the 2014 Crimea designations: a cliff-extension licence designed to prevent disorderly liquidation rather than to reduce Russian revenue immediately. At $121/bbl, an at-sea waiver would subsidise Moscow at 2.6 times the price-cap design rate ; at $106 the multiple is lower but the legal-cargo flow is unbroken. The press-release moment moved one direction. The licence moved the other.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

OFAC, the US Treasury's sanctions office, quietly issued a new licence on 17 April 2026, one day after Treasury Secretary Bessent announced that an earlier licence allowing Russia to sell oil had not been renewed. The new licence, called General License 134B, allows Russian oil that was already loaded onto ships before 17 April to continue being sold until 16 May. In plain terms: Bessent's announcement sounded like a hard stop. The licence issued the next day kept Russian oil revenues flowing for another month. The difference between the two is worth roughly $4.5 billion to Moscow over the four-week window.

Deep Analysis
Root Causes

The structural cause of the GL 134A-to-134B gap is the shadow fleet architecture that Russia built between 2022 and 2025. Approximately 300 to 400 tankers operating outside Western insurance frameworks loaded Russian crude in the weeks before GL 134A's 11 April expiry, knowing a non-renewal announcement was possible.

Those tankers were at sea when the Bessent statement dropped. OFAC's operational constraint was straightforward: it could not simultaneously enforce a hard cut-off and avoid stranding hundreds of laden tankers in international waters without clear port destinations, which would have created a humanitarian and environmental liability larger than the revenue denial.

The second structural cause is the $106/bbl Urals price environment. GL 134A was defensible at $73/bbl as a market-stabilisation measure issued during the Iran war's early supply shock. At $106/bbl the waiver is worth approximately $150 million per day to Moscow, and the political cost of each extension day has risen proportionally.

OFAC's 16 May hard cliff reflects an internal Treasury assessment that the at-sea cargo can realistically clear port by that date at current shipping speeds, making a GL 134C issuance operationally unnecessary.

What could happen next?
  • Consequence

    GL 134B establishes a precedent that OFAC will issue a same-day extension whenever a publicly announced sanctions cliff would strand at-sea cargo at scale, creating a structural market expectation of rolling extensions.

    Immediate · 0.82
  • Risk

    If OFAC issues GL 134C before 16 May at above-$100/bbl Urals, the credibility of all future Treasury sanctions announcements on Russian crude is materially reduced, affecting allied governments' willingness to coordinate.

    Short term · 0.75
  • Consequence

    Russia's RNRC capitalisation gap means Moscow has a structural interest in another OFAC extension after 16 May; without it, the shadow fleet faces underinsured voyages or Chinese P&I cover at higher cost.

    Medium term · 0.72
Sources:Baker McKenzie Sanctions News·Baker McKenzie Sanctions News·Reuters
Mentions:Kremlin →Moscow →Cuba →Reuters →Iran →North Korea →Urals →Donetsk →Crimea →Semafor →Libya →OFAC →General License 134B →Scott Bessent →Rosneft →Lukoil →US Treasury →Russia →Luhansk →
First Reported In

Update #15 · Hardware-free parade; crude waiver lives on

Baker McKenzie Sanctions News· 3 May 2026
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Causes and effects
Caused by
Treasury kills $150M-a-day Russian oil waiver
GL 134B was issued one day after Bessent announced GL 134A non-renewal and Rosneft/Lukoil SDN redesignation on 16 April
Occurred 16 Apr 2026
Read story →
GL 134A lapses toward quiet extension
GL 134A's 11 April expiry created the legal gap that GL 134B bridged, extending the at-sea crude waiver by one month
Occurred 11 Apr 2026
Read story →
This Event
OFAC quietly extends Russia crude waiver
First post-Iran-war narrative extension beyond a published cliff date; reframes the 16 April press release as optics rather than enforcement.
Led to
OFAC GL 134B expires 16 May, no successor
OFAC issued GL 134B on 17 April as a one-day reflexive extension after 134A lapsed; its 16 May expiry is the direct target of the current cliff.
Occurred 16 May 2026
Read story →
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