Skip to content
Briefings are running a touch slower this week while we rebuild the foundations.See roadmap
Iran Conflict 2026
28APR

Iran internet blackout enters 60th day

3 min read
09:13UTC

Netblocks logged Iranian connectivity at 1 to 4 per cent of normal across the 60-day national blackout, the longest sustained restriction in its tracker. The 2019 Iran shutdown lasted five days.

ConflictDeveloping
Key takeaway

Sixty days of blackout has converted from an emergency tool into governance and into a future bargaining chip.

Iran's nationwide internet shutdown entered its 60th consecutive day on Tuesday 28 April, an estimated 1,440 cumulative hours of restricted national connectivity. NetBlocks, the London-based internet observatory that operates the most-cited cross-country tracker of state-imposed shutdowns, has logged Iranian connectivity at 1 to 4 per cent of normal across the period 1. The 2019 Iranian shutdown, the previous benchmark, lasted five days; the current run is twelvefold longer and has overtaken every state-imposed restriction the tracker has documented since launch in 2016.

The operational distinction matters. A five-day blackout is an emergency control tool, deployed during acute protest unrest and lifted before economic dependencies fail. A sixty-day blackout is something else: the Iranian government has discovered that domestic banking, logistics, healthcare scheduling and food distribution can function on the internal national-information-network the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting authority and the Ministry of Communications built in stages from 2016 onwards, without restoring access to the global internet. Restoration has stopped being a domestic-political imperative and has become a discretionary tool the state can offer or withhold in negotiation.

The civilian population has been informationally isolated through every Pakistani mediation round, every diplomatic capital Abbas Araghchi has visited and every wartime address the executive has delivered. Iranians cannot read in real time the three-phase ceasefire text their own foreign minister handed Pakistan , watch the Boris Yeltsin Library photographs of their president's envoy meeting Putin, or verify the casualty figures Hengaw publishes from Yazd and Ghezel Hesar . The diaspora and human rights monitors maintain the documentary record on the population's behalf; the population has no independent reading of the terms being negotiated in its name.

The blackout's persistence at sixty days is also a confidence-building measure available for the next round. Restoration is the cheapest concession Tehran can offer, costs nothing to deliver and has measurable verification: NetBlocks reads will rise, civilian commerce will resume, the diaspora will see the change. If a Hormuz-first text reaches signed form, restoration becomes a separately negotiable line item that does not require either side to move on the nuclear file.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

Iranians have been cut off from the internet for two months. They cannot see what their own government is offering Washington, watch their foreign minister meet Russia's president, or read human rights reports about executions happening at home. The government can say anything it likes about the negotiations domestically because the population has no way to check. This is twelve times longer than any previous national internet shutdown on record.

Deep Analysis
Root Causes

Iran's connectivity infrastructure runs through three state-controlled backbone providers , Telecommunication Infrastructure Company (TIC), Irancell and MCI , all of which are legally required to comply with orders from the Supreme Council of Cyberspace.

The council is chaired by the President but its decisions require Supreme Leader approval. The shutdown's continuation through Pezeshkian's presidency therefore reflects a command-level decision above the reformist civilian government, consistent with the IRGC political structure that has sidelined Araghchi on operational matters.

At 1,440 hours, the shutdown has also covered every Hengaw documentation cycle for wartime executions. Domestic media cannot publish Fakhrabadi's execution; the only record reaching international audiences is via Hengaw's diaspora network. The blackout is serving a dual function: suppressing political opposition and controlling the execution documentation flow.

What could happen next?
  • Consequence

    Internet restoration now constitutes a measurable confidence-building concession Iran could offer in any Hormuz-first deal at near-zero operational cost, providing a low-friction diplomatic chip with domestic-legitimacy value.

  • Risk

    Sixty days of information isolation means the Iranian population has no context for any deal terms presented domestically; the government could announce favourable deal terms that contradict the written text held by Pakistan without domestic challenge.

First Reported In

Update #82 · Iran writes Phase 1; Washington still has no pen

PBS NewsHour· 28 Apr 2026
Read original
Causes and effects
This Event
Iran internet blackout enters 60th day
A government negotiating on its citizens' behalf with no domestic feedback loop can claim any deal terms it wants without contradiction. Sustained blackout has converted from an emergency tool into governance.
Different Perspectives
Israel
Israel
Israeli strikes on Hezbollah positions in Lebanon continued through the weekend, maintaining the secondary front. The IDF has publicly named Mojtaba Khamenei as an assassination target; his courier-governance mode complicates targeting but does not remove him from the order.
Russia
Russia
Putin told a Moscow press conference that Washington, not Tehran or Moscow, killed the Russia-custody uranium arrangement by demanding US-territory-only storage. Neither Tehran nor Washington has corroborated the account, which appeared in second-tier outlets only, consistent with a trial balloon rather than a formal position.
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
HMS Dragon was redeployed from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Middle East on 9 May, the first physical European platform commitment to the Gulf. The Ministry of Defence called it "prudent planning" while publishing no rules of engagement, no tasking order, and no vessel name, committing a named asset to a conflict zone before the political instrument authorising it exists.
United Arab Emirates
United Arab Emirates
UAE air defences intercepted two Iranian drones over its territory on 10 May, a kinetic escalation six days after the Fujairah oil terminal strike that drew no formal protest. The three-state simultaneous operation, not the severity of individual strikes, appears to have crossed the threshold at which the GCC states collectively began responding.
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia
Riyadh issued the first formal Gulf-state protest of the conflict on 10 May, demanding an "immediate halt to blatant attacks on territories and territorial waters of Gulf states", ending 10 weeks of channelling displeasure through OPEC+ quota discussions. The protest forecloses Saudi Arabia's preferred quiet-channel role and reduces the functioning back-channel architecture to Pakistan alone.
Qatar
Qatar
Doha is simultaneously a strike target, the site of the Safesea Neha attack 23 nautical miles offshore, and an active MOU mediator: Qatar's prime minister met Rubio and Vance in Washington the same weekend. Whether Qatar issues its own formal protest or maintains its dual role is the critical escalation indicator for the week of 11 May.