28APR

SNSC restores 'Internet Pro' on Day 60

3 min read

09:13UTC

Iran's Supreme National Security Council approved limited online access for select businesses and academics on 28 April, the first concession on a 1,416-hour blackout.

← Back to Iran writes Phase 1; Washington still has no pen Jump to analysis ↓

ConflictDeveloping

Key takeaway

Iran's SNSC approved limited access on Day 60, the first concession on a 1,416-hour blackout.

Iran's Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) approved an 'Internet Pro' scheme on 28 April 2026 to restore limited online access for select businesses and academics, the first concession on a 60-day blackout that Netblocks now logs at 1,416 hours . Government spokesperson Fatemeh Mohajerani confirmed the scheme; broader access will only resume when 'current geopolitical problems' are resolved. The National confirmed via the Iranian government readout.

The Supreme National Security Council is Iran's principal national security decision-making body, chaired by the President and ratified by the Supreme Leader. Its sign-off on Internet Pro routes around the Ministry of Communications, which has carried the operational shutdown since 28 February. Daily economic losses run at $30-40 million direct and up to $80 million indirect across the full 60 days, a cumulative cost the SNSC has held against the security calculus until this Tuesday. The 1,416-hour figure corrects the 1,440-hour rounded projection in the prior NetBlocks entry; the body has now logged the longest sustained national internet shutdown in its records.

The scheme's eligibility criteria, restricted to businesses and academics that the SNSC vets case by case, encodes the same selective-access logic Iran used during the 2009 Green Movement and the November 2019 fuel-protest shutdown. Mohajerani's 'current geopolitical problems' phrase is doing real work: it ties the timing of full restoration to the ceasefire architecture Abbas Araghchi is moving through Islamabad and St Petersburg, where he met Vladimir Putin on 26-27 April . The decision arrives the same Tuesday the Islamabad ceasefire text lands in Washington and Mahan Air resumes the Tehran-Moscow rotation, on a domestic clock that is moving while the WPR clock expires on the other side of the negotiation. The economic ministries pushing for restoration will read the SNSC concession as a partial win after eight weeks of internal pressure; the security file holding the broader blackout has produced a smaller crack rather than a structural reversal.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

Iran's government shut down most internet access on 28 February when the war began. For 60 days, most Iranians could not use social media, news sites, or international communication apps. Businesses and universities have been unable to process payments, submit research, or communicate with partners abroad. On 28 April the government approved a partial fix called 'Internet Pro', which gives certain approved businesses and academics access to the internet. Ordinary residential users still cannot use it freely. The government said it will only restore full access when the war situation improves. Critics say the real reason for the blackout is to stop people organising protests, not to protect national security.

Deep Analysis

Root Causes

Iran's internet infrastructure is structurally centralised through the National Information Network (SHOMA), a state-built intranet that SNSC can partition from the global internet without cutting domestic services.

This architecture, built specifically to enable selective shutdowns after the 2009 and 2019 protests, is what makes Internet Pro technically feasible: business-grade access runs on SHOMA's domestic backbone while residential connectivity to external platforms is separately controlled.

The economic ministries' documented daily loss figure of $30-40 million direct and $80 million indirect reflects cumulative pressure from export-facing businesses, insurance and financial services, and academic institutions, none of which can operate competitive functions on SHOMA's domestic backbone alone. Internet Pro is therefore a targeted relief measure for the sectors with the highest per-capita economic loss, not a rights concession.

What could happen next?

Consequence
At $30-80 million per day in economic losses, the 60-day blackout has cost Iran's economy an estimated $1.8-4.8 billion in cumulative direct and indirect losses, a figure that compounds the sanctions pressure already constraining SNSC economic decision-making.
Risk
Internet Pro's two-tier structure, preserving business access while maintaining residential suppression, creates a documented Iranian playbook for wartime internet governance that other authoritarian states may adopt in future conflict scenarios.

Source Landscape

This story draws on centre-right-leaning sources from United Arab Emirates

United Arab Emirates

Primary parallel: Myanmar's internet shutdown following the February 2021 military coup is the closest modern structural precedent for duration. The Myanmar junta maintained near-total internet restrictions for 17 months before moving to selective restoration.

Iranian authorities have explicitly referenced 'national security emergency' framing that mirrors Myanmar's stated rationale. Both cases use selective business-grade restoration as a pressure-release valve to limit economic damage while maintaining residential and social media suppression.

Counter-parallel: Myanmar's shutdown occurred after a domestic coup, without the external military pressure of an active war. The SNSC's stated reason for deferring full restoration is 'geopolitical problems' rather than domestic unrest management, giving it a different legal framing under Iranian emergency law.

In practice, domestic dissent risk remains the operative concern given Khamenei's wartime governance posture, but the public rationale allows the SNSC to tie restoration to diplomatic progress rather than domestic security improvements.

Consensus view: The Centre for Human Rights in Iran (CHRI) documents that Iran's Internet Pro structure mirrors the two-tier access model deployed during the 2019 fuel-price protests: commercial VPN and business-grade access was preserved for state-linked enterprises while residential connectivity remained severed.

The 2019 model held for 10 days before full restoration; the 2026 version has run 60 days without restoration, suggesting the SNSC treats selective restoration as a permanent wartime governance tool rather than a transitional measure.

Counter-view: Iran International's domestic-politics desk argues that the Internet Pro approval reflects a split within the SNSC between economic ministries, which have documented the $30-80 million daily loss across 60 days, and security ministries, which view blanket restoration as a domestic security risk during wartime. The approval of Internet Pro is the economic ministries' partial win, not a signal of imminent full restoration.

Key tension: Whether the economic cost of continued blanket blackout is large enough to force full restoration before a ceasefire, or whether the SNSC's security calculus treats social media suppression as a non-negotiable wartime instrument regardless of daily economic cost.

Sources:The National

Mentions:Internet Pro →Fatemeh Mohajerani →National Security Council (Iran) →NetBlocks →St Petersburg →Ministry of Communications →Mahan Air →Islamabad →Moscow →Vladimir Putin →Tehran →Iran →Washington →Iran International →Abbas Araghchi →

First Reported In

Update #83 · UAE quits OPEC, war signs nothing

The National· 29 Apr 2026

Read original →

Causes and effects

Caused by

Iran internet blackout enters 60th day

Internet Pro scheme approved on 28 April is the first concession on the 60-day blackout logged at 1,416 hours in ID:2857.

Occurred 28 Apr 2026

Read story →

This Event

SNSC restores 'Internet Pro' on Day 60

The Internet Pro scheme is the first crack in a 60-day shutdown that has cost the Iranian economy $30-40 million daily in direct losses and up to $80 million in indirect losses. Tehran is conditioning broader access on geopolitical resolution, tying domestic connectivity to the same ceasefire architecture Abbas Araghchi is moving through Islamabad and St Petersburg.

Different Perspectives

Oil market and P&I insurers

Brent cleared $87 intraday only once CENTCOM's blockade became physical rather than declared, even though P&I Clubs had already excluded Hormuz war risk a week earlier on 7 July: capital hedged ahead of enforcement, but prices moved only after it.

UAE reporting

UAE reporting placed the Omani tanker deaths at one seafarer against the International Maritime Agency's count of two, the first time in this war that a Gulf state's casualty figures have diverged from an international monitor's.

Jordan

Iranian strikes reached Jordan again on 14 July as part of the Gulf-wide retaliation for the Hormuz blockade, extending the conflict's geographic footprint to a state with no direct stake in the strait itself.

Bahrain

Bahrain sounded air-raid sirens on 14 July during Iran's Gulf-wide retaliation, the same day CENTCOM's blockade order and fourth night of strikes pushed the conflict's physical reach into the wider Gulf littoral.

Kuwait

Kuwait intercepted Iranian missiles and drones on 14 July as Tehran's blockade retaliation reached Gulf states beyond Iran's immediate shoreline, confirming Kuwaiti airspace now sits inside Iran's retaliatory envelope.

Oman

Oman absorbed the war's first tanker casualties in its own waters on 14 July, with two supertankers disabled and seafarers killed, putting the sultanate's shipping lanes directly in the path of the blockade fight for the first time.